UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RODNEY LAWRENCE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
District Judge. (1:02-cr-00087-WLO)
Submitted: February 28, 2008 Decided: July 25, 2008
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin D. Porter, MORROW ALEXANDER & PORTER, PLLC, Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Lawrence pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii), (h)
(2000) (“Count Two”), and two counts of structuring transactions to
evade reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5324(a)(3), (c) (2000) (“Counts Eight and Sixteen”). Lawrence
was initially sentenced to ninety-six months’ imprisonment. We
vacated Lawrence’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in
accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
United States v. Lawrence, No. 06-4185 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006)
(unpublished). On remand, the district court resentenced Lawrence
to eighty-seven months in prison and three years of supervised
release. Lawrence’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were
no meritorious issues for appeal, but suggesting that the district
court erred in its imposition of sentence on remand. Lawrence was
advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he
has not done so. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Lawrence first claims that his sentence for Counts Eight
and Sixteen violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
because the sentencing judge determined facts without either a jury
verdict or Lawrence’s admission, which increased Lawrence’s
sentence beyond the statutory maximum provided by 31 U.S.C.
§ 5324(d)(1) (2000). Because Lawrence raises this issue for the
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first time on appeal, this court’s review is for plain error. See
United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 668 (2005). To establish plain error, Lawrence must
show that an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it
affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 732 (1993). Even if these conditions are met, we will only
correct an error that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736.
We find no error because Lawrence pled guilty to
violating § 5324 while violating another law of the United States;
namely, conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) (2000). Accordingly, the district court
properly utilized § 5324(d)(2) to determine the statutory maximum
for Counts Eight and Sixteen.
We further find that Lawrence’s sentence is reasonable.
The district court appropriately treated the Sentencing Guidelines
as advisory, properly calculated and considered the advisory
guideline range, and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000) factors. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47
(4th Cir. 2005). Lawrence’s eighty-seven month sentence, which is
within the applicable guideline range and below the statutory
maximum, is therefore presumptively reasonable. See United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2309 (2006); see also Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
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2462-65 (2007) (approving appellate presumption of reasonableness
accorded sentences within properly calculated guideline range).
Nothing in the record calls into question the reasonableness of
Lawrence’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586,
597-98 (2007).
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Lawrence’s convictions and sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the
client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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