UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4970
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SERGIO MEDINA-PAREDES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (6:07-cr-00273-HMH)
Submitted: July 2, 2008 Decided: July 30, 2008
Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina; Max B. Cauthen, III, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sergio Medina Paredes pled guilty without a plea
agreement to unlawful reentry into the United States by a deported
alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2) (2000), and
was sentenced to forty-six months in prison. Medina Paredes timely
appealed. Medina Paredes’ attorney filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 739 (1967), certifying that
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning
whether the district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
at the guilty plea hearing and whether the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. The
Government did not file a reply brief. Medina Paredes was advised
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, and but has not
done so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Medina Paredes suggests that the district court erred by
not fully complying with Fed. R. Crim P. 11 at the guilty plea
hearing. Contrary to this assertion, the district court
meticulously followed Rule 11 to ensure that Medina Paredes fully
understood the significance of his guilty plea and that the plea
was knowing and voluntary. Medina Paredes stated that he was of
sound mind and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and
the court found him competent to enter a plea. Medina Paredes had
discussed the charges and consulted with his attorney and was
satisfied with the services rendered. The court explained the
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charges against him and that he was subject to a maximum sentence
of up to twenty years in prison, and Medina Paredes stated that he
understood the elements of the charges and the possible penalties.
Medina Paredes also agreed that by pleading guilty, he was
admitting he was indeed guilty of the charges against him, waived
any substantive defenses and objections to any defects in the
proceedings, and relinquished his right to a jury trial. He agreed
that no one forced him to plead guilty or promised him a particular
sentence. Medina Paredes also agreed that his sentence would be
determined after the presentence report was completed, acknowledged
that the guidelines were advisory, and that the judge could
sentence him to a punishment more or less severe than the
guidelines range. Counsel summarized the facts in the case, and
Medina Paredes agreed that they were true and he was indeed guilty.
The court found Medina Paredes’ plea was knowing and voluntary, and
accepted the plea of guilty. In light of this record, we find the
district court fully complied with the mandate of Rule 11.
Medina Paredes next suggests that the forty-six-month
term imposed by the district court was unreasonable. We disagree.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district
court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the sentencing
guidelines. However, in imposing a sentence post-Booker, courts
still must calculate the applicable guidelines range after making
the appropriate findings of fact and consider the range in
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conjunction with other relevant factors under the guidelines and
§ 3553(a). Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). The
court must give both parties “an opportunity to argue for whatever
sentence they deem appropriate,” and the district judge “may not
presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.” Gall, 128 S. Ct.
at 596-97. Instead, the court must make an “individualized
assessment based on the facts presented.” Id. at 597. This court
will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the statutorily
prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] sentence within the
proper advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006); see
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462, 2465 (2007)
(permitting appellate courts to afford a presumption of
reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence).
Here, the district court sentenced Medina Paredes post-
Booker and appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory. The
court sentenced Medina Paredes after considering the sentencing
guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, as instructed by Booker. The
parties were permitted to argue for the sentences they desired;
however, Medina Paredes lodged no objections to the PSR or the
application of the advisory guidelines. Medina Paredes’ forty-six-
month sentence is at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range of
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46 to 57 months and well below the twenty-year statutory maximum
sentence authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2)(2000).
Neither Medina Paredes nor the record suggests any
information to rebut the presumption that his sentence was
reasonable. We therefore conclude that the sentence was eminently
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Medina Paredes’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Medina Paredes, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Medina Paredes requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on Medina Paredes.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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