UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4808
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NATHAN TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (5:07-cr-00008-FPS)
Submitted: August 25, 2008 Decided: September 4, 2008
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen D. Herndon, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon
L. Potter, United States Attorney, Randolph J. Bernard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Nathan Taylor pled guilty to possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000).
Taylor appeals his 180-month sentence, arguing that the district
court erred in sentencing him as an armed career criminal under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000) (“ACCA”).
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
A person who violates § 922(g)(1), possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, and has three prior convictions for
violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed on different
occasions is an armed career criminal subject to enhanced
penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Under § 924(e), a “violent
felony” is defined as a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year that is one of several specified offenses, or a
crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). In considering whether the district
court properly designated Taylor an armed career criminal, this
court reviews the district court’s legal determinations de novo and
its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Wardrick,
350 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 2003).
Taylor first contests the district court’s consideration
of his Ohio state escape conviction as a predicate conviction under
the ACCA. Even assuming, arguendo, that Taylor’s position is well
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taken, we find that Taylor still has the requisite number of
qualifying predicate convictions to qualify him as an armed career
criminal.
Specifically, we reject Taylor’s argument that the
district court improperly considered his two armed robbery
convictions as separate offenses under the ACCA. We have held
that, for purposes of § 924(e), “offenses occur on occasions
different from one another when each offense ‘arose out of a
separate and distinct criminal episode.’” United States v. Leeson,
453 F.3d 631, 640 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1995)). The district court
should consider the following factors in determining whether two
prior offenses arose out of a single criminal episode:
(1) whether the offenses arose in different geographic
locations; (2) whether the nature of each offense was
substantively different; (3) whether each offense
involved different victims; (4) whether each offense
involved different criminal objectives; and (5) after the
defendant committed the first-in-time offense, did the
defendant have the opportunity to make a conscious and
knowing decision to engage in the next-in-time offense.
Id. (citing Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 335-37). Moreover, “if any one
of the factors has a strong presence, it can dispositively
segregate an extended criminal enterprise into a series of separate
and distinct episodes.” Leeson, 453 F.3d at 640-41.
We conclude that Taylor’s armed robbery convictions were
properly considered as two separate qualifying convictions under
the ACCA. For this reason, and because, at the very least, his two
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robbery convictions constitute one predicate conviction, we find
that Taylor had the necessary three qualifying predicate
convictions to support the application of the ACCA. He was
therefore properly sentenced as an armed career criminal.
Accordingly, we affirm Taylor’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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