UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4076
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARTHUR PAUL MARRONE, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Chief
District Judge. (5:04-cr-00228)
Submitted: July 31, 2008 Decided: September 10, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, Monica L. Dillon,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Arthur Paul Marrone, III, was convicted by a jury of
assaulting a correctional officer while he was confined at the
Federal Correctional Institution at Beckley, West Virginia, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 111(a)(1),(b) (West Supp. 2008).
Although the advisory guideline range for Marrone’s offense was 18-
24 months, the district court imposed a sentence of sixty months
imprisonment. Marrone appeals his sentence, arguing that the
court’s failure to provide notice before imposing a sentence above
the advisory guideline range was error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h)
and Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991). He also contends
that the sentence was unreasonable. We affirm.
At his sentencing hearing in December 2005, Marrone did
not contest the calculation of the guideline range. However, he
objected to the inclusion in the report, as fact, of the
correctional officer’s testimony that he believed Marrone had tried
to push him over the second tier railing during their struggle. He
also objected to information about his involvement in an inmate
protest that occurred after his conviction while he was confined at
the Carter County Correctional Center, in Kentucky. The latter
purportedly involved a malfunctioning television set. The inmates
put food on the floor at the entrance to their pod and activated an
alarm which brought correctional officers to the area. Acting as
the inmate spokesman, Marrone tried without success to persuade an
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officer to enter the pod. The next day, two confidential sources
told prison officials that Marrone had instigated a scheme to
manufacture weapons, lure a correctional officer into the pod and
take him hostage, and thereby possibly effect an escape from the
prison.
After overruling Marrone’s objections to the presentence
report, the district court indicated that it was inclined to impose
a sentence above the guideline range based on the aggravated nature
of the instant offense and Marrone’s involvement in the incident at
the Carter County Correctional Center. The court heard testimony
about the Carter County incident and Marrone’s attorney cross-
examined the witness thoroughly, having made his own investigation
into the incident. The court concluded that it could disregard
information from the inmates who remained unidentified confidential
sources and still find that Marrone was “deeply involved” in the
incident. The court then imposed a sentence of sixty months
imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2008). As justification, the court cited (1) the seriousness of
the offense, see § 3553(a)(2)(A), especially Marrone’s attempt to
push the correctional officer over a second story railing, which
would have resulted in serious bodily injury to the officer; (2)
its duty to deter others tempted to attack correctional officers as
Marrone did, see § 3553(a)(2)(B); and (3) the need to protect the
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public from further crimes by Marrone, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), given
that his record indicated little chance of rehabilitation.
I. Notice
Because Marrone did not object to the lack of notice in
the district court, review of this issue is for plain error.
United States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Rule
32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
sentencing court to give the parties reasonable notice when it is
considering a departure on a ground not identified as a possible
basis for departure either in the presentence report or in a
party’s prehearing submission. In this case, although the district
court described the above-guidelines sentence as a departure, the
court looked only to the factors set out in § 3553(a). The
sentence was thus a variance, rather than a departure. See
Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2202 (2008)
(“‘Departure’ is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only
to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in
the Guidelines.”). The Supreme Court held in Irizarry that upward
variances do not require notice under either Rule 32(h) or Burns.
Id. at 2203. Therefore, no error occurred.
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II. Reasonableness
Marrone contends that his sentence was unreasonable
because it was greater than necessary to comply with the sentencing
purposes in § 3553(a)(2). In Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586
(2007), the Supreme Court set out the standards for appellate
review of sentences as follows:
Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or
outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must
review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. It must first ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.
Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is
procedurally sound, the appellate court should then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Id. at 597.
First, we discern no procedural defect in the sentence.
Next, as explained in Gall, when reviewing a sentence outside the
guideline range for substantive reasonableness, the appellate court
should “take into account the totality of the circumstances
. . . .” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The court –
may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give
due deference to the district court’s decision that the
§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance. The fact that the appellate court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the
district court.
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Id.
Marrone relies on United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625,
633 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that sentencing court may not vary
from guideline range based on guideline sentencing ratio for
crack/cocaine powder), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 853 (2008). His
reliance is misplaced because, assuming it might previously have
been applicable, Eura has been abrogated by Kimbrough v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). In light of Gall’s conclusion that
the sentencing court “is in a superior position to find facts and
judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case,” id.,
and that its sentencing decision should be accorded great
deference, we conclude that the sentence is not substantively
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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