UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4265
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES EDWARD BLACKMON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (0:03-cr-01004-MJP-1)
Submitted: September 3, 2008 Decided: September 19, 2008
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Allen B. Burnside, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States
Attorney, William K. Witherspoon, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Edward Blackmon pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000), and
was sentenced to life in prison. Counsel for Blackmon has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
alleging that he has found no meritorious issues for appeal and
conceding that the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
when it accepted Blackmon’s guilty plea. Blackmon has filed pro se
supplemental opening and reply briefs claiming that his attorney
was ineffective, that his sentence should not have been enhanced
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000), and that his conviction
violates the Sixth Amendment because the indictment to which he
pled guilty charged him with possession of fifty grams “or more” of
cocaine base. The Government has filed a brief responding to
Blackmon’s pro se supplemental opening brief. Finding no error, we
affirm the district court’s judgment.
In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly reviewed
the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. After a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing at which Blackmon
admitted his guilt and attested that his plea was knowing and
voluntary, the district court sentenced Blackmon to the statutory
minimum of life in prison based on prior convictions admitted to by
him in his plea agreement. Because Blackmon did not dispute that
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he absconded for nearly three and a half years after entering his
guilty plea, thereby triggering the imposition of the enhanced
penalty pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, his mandatory
life sentence was appropriate. See United States v. Farrior, __
F.3d __, 2008 WL 2971779, at *10 (4th Cir. Aug. 5, 2008) (No.
07-4498) (“A statutorily required sentence . . . is per se
reasonable.”); see also Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572,
1577-80 (2008) (holding that a “felony drug offense” is “an offense
punishable by more than one year,” as defined in 21 U.S.C. §
802(44) (2000), regardless of whether the state of conviction
classified the particular offense as a misdemeanor or felony).
Although Blackmon purports to have withdrawn his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his pro se supplemental
reply brief, we find that ineffective assistance is not apparent on
the record. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)
(holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be
established, a defendant must show that but for counsel’s error,
the outcome of his proceedings would have been different).
Accordingly, should he wish to do so, Blackmon may raise his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
We also conclude that Blackmon’s conviction does not
violate the Sixth Amendment because his indictment does not charge
a precise quantity of cocaine. The relevant statute requires only
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50 grams to support a conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
(2000). Blackmon’s indictment charged responsibility for “50 grams
or more” of cocaine base. Greater specificity was not required
since Blackmon needed to admit responsibility for only 50 grams,
and he in fact stipulated to responsibility for 163 grams.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Blackmon in writing of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Blackmon requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may motion this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Blackmon. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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