UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4315
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL CHARLES CAIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:07-cr-00299-PMD-1)
Submitted: September 16, 2008 Decided: September 18, 2008
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Gordon Baker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John Charles Duane, Eric John
Klumb, Assistant United States Attorneys, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In this appeal pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), Daniel Charles Cain appeals his conviction and the
seventy-month sentence he received following his guilty plea to
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000). We have reviewed the record and
Cain’s contentions and, finding no error, we affirm.
Although Cain’s attorney raises a cursory challenge to
the sufficiency of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, she concludes
the district court complied with the dictates of Rule 11, and that
Cain’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We agree. The
district court fully comported with Rule 11, explaining, among
other things, the nature of the charges, the applicable statutory
maximum, and the rights Cain relinquished by pleading guilty.
Moreover, the district court ensured there was an appropriate
factual basis for the plea. Accordingly, we conclude Cain’s guilty
plea was valid.
Cain next suggests this court should review the
reasonableness of his sentence.
As recently determined by the Supreme Court,
“[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside
the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Appellate courts are charged with
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reviewing sentences for reasonableness. Id. at 594, 597.
Reasonableness review requires appellate consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. at
597.
In determining whether a sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we first assess whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range. Id. at
596-97. We must then consider whether the district court failed to
consider the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) factors
and any arguments presented by the parties, selected a sentence
based on “clearly erroneous facts,” or failed to sufficiently
explain the selected sentence. Id. at 597; United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). Finally, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “taking into account
the ‘totality of the circumstances . . . .’” Pauley, 511 F.3d at
473 (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). We afford sentences that
fall within the properly calculated Guidelines range a presumption
of reasonableness, see id., a presumption permitted by the Supreme
Court. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459, 2462 (2007).
The district court properly calculated Cain’s sentencing
range under the Guidelines and invited counsel to make any relevant
argument pursuant to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. After
hearing counsel’s argument, permitting Cain the opportunity to make
a statement, and considering the § 3553(a) factors, the court
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sentenced Cain to 70 months’ imprisonment, at the low end of his
properly calculated Guidelines range. Thus, we conclude Cain’s
sentence was reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entirety
of the record and found no meritorious issues. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. We require that counsel
inform Cain, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Cain requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would
be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on Cain. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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