UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4058
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DIDIER MEJIA-MARTINEZ, a/k/a Carlos Velasques Hernandez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00179-REP-1)
Submitted: August 29, 2008 Decided: September 25, 2008
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles D. Lewis, HICKSTYMAS, LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Richard D.
Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Didier Mejia-Martinez pled guilty to illegal reentry
after being convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),
(b)(1) (2000). The district court imposed a thirty-three month
variance sentence above the advisory guideline range. Mejia-
Martinez appeals his sentence, arguing that the sentence is
unreasonable. We affirm.
According to a statement of facts that both parties
accepted, Mejia-Martinez first entered the United States unlawfully
in 2000 and was convicted in Virginia of possession of cocaine in
April 2004, receiving a three-year suspended sentence. He was
removed from the United States by immigration authorities in
January 2004, in April 2004, and on May 5 and May 12, 2004. In
sentencing Mejia-Martinez, the district court cited the nature and
circumstances of the offense and Mejia-Martinez’s history of
unlawful reentries. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008). The court also noted that a fifth illegal reentry is
a serious offense, and that the sentence should provide just
punishment and adequate deterrence, and protect the public. See 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). The court observed
that Mejia-Martinez’s prior lenient treatment had not deterred him
from returning to the United States.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a
sentence is reviewed for reasonableness, using an abuse of
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discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
586, 597 (2007). The first step in this review requires the
appellate court to ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the
guideline range. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160 (4th
Cir. 2008). Mejia-Martinez has not claimed any procedural error.
The court then considers the substantive reasonableness
of the sentence imposed, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 161. While the court may presume a sentence
within the guidelines range to be reasonable, it may not presume a
sentence outside the range to be unreasonable. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
597. Moreover, it must give due deference to the district court’s
decision that the § 3553(a) factors justify the sentence. Id.
Even if the reviewing court would have reached a different
sentencing result on its own, this fact alone is insufficient to
justify reversal of the district court. Evans, 526 F.3d at 160.
Here, the district court followed the necessary
procedural steps in sentencing Mejia-Martinez, properly calculating
the guidelines range and considering that recommendation in
conjunction with the § 3553(a) factors. In light of the facts of
this case, and the district court’s meaningful articulation of its
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and its bases for varying
from the recommended guideline range, we conclude that the district
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court’s decision to vary and the extent of the variance were
reasonable.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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