UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4114
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONNIE K. VALENTINE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief District
Judge. (1:07-cr-00047-jpj-pms-1)
Submitted: September 30, 2008 Decided: October 17, 2008
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Nancy C. Dickenson,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine Spurell,
Research and Writing Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant.
Julie C. Dudley, Acting United States Attorney, Zachary T. Lee,
Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronnie K. Valentine pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of firearms after having been convicted of a felony, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). He reserved the right to
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
firearms seized from the trunk of his vehicle. We affirm.
On appeal, Valentine argues that the district court erred
in denying his suppression motion because the initial stop of his
vehicle was unconstitutional and the officer lacked probable cause
or any other legitimate basis to search the vehicle. The factual
findings underlying a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear
error, while the legal determinations are reviewed de novo. See
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States
v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression
motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. See United States v.
Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
It is well established that, “‘[i]f a car is readily
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains
contraband,’” an officer may search the car without a warrant.
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (quoting Pennsylvania
v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)). The Supreme Court has
defined the test for probable cause as “whether, given all the
circumstances, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
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evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Court has also held that
“[t]he principal components of a determination of . . . probable
cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or
search, and then the decision whether these historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to . . . probable cause.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at
696.
Our review of the officer’s testimony at the suppression
hearing and the audio and video recording from the dashboard camera
of the patrol car convinces us that the officer’s search of
Valentine’s vehicle was supported by probable cause. The district
court properly denied Valentine’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm Valentine’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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