UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1856
MELANIE KELLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF HARTSVILLE; CITY OF DARLINGTON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:07-cv-03682-RBH)
Submitted: October 21, 2008 Decided: October 24, 2008
Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Melanie Kelley, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Melanie Kelley appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying
relief on her civil rights complaint and the district court’s
order denying her Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. *
The district court referred Kelley’s complaint to a
magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000).
The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and
advised Kelley that failure to file timely objections to this
recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court
order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning,
Kelley failed to object to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation.
The timely filing of specific objections to a
magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve
appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when
the parties have been warned of the consequences of
noncompliance. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th
Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Kelley
has waived appellate review by failing to timely file specific
*
Although Kelley did not specify whether her post-judgment
“motion for reconsideration” was filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) or 60(b), because it was filed within the ten-day limit
for Rule 59(e) motions, it is treated as such. See Dove v.
CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978).
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objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice
Kelley’s complaint.
With regard to Kelley’s Rule 59(e) motion, we find
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat’l Fire Ins.
Co., 148 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Kelley’s Rule 59(e) motion.
We also deny Kelly’s motion for a transcript at
government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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