UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5149
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEDI TURONDA HARVELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00169-JAB-7)
Submitted: September 17, 2008 Decided: November 3, 2008
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Clark Fischer, RANDOLPH AND FISCHER, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, David P. Folmar, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kedi Turonda Harvell pled guilty to possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a), (b)(1)(C) (West
1999 & Supp. 2008), after the district court denied her motion to
suppress the cocaine. Harvell appeals the denial of her motion to
suppress. We affirm.
At the suppression hearing, the government produced
evidence that, following a routine traffic stop, Mocksville, North
Carolina Detective Nelson Turrentine asked Harvell if she were
carrying any weapons or drugs and if she would allow a search of
her person. Harvell agreed and was searched by Turrentine’s female
partner, Detective Robin Robbins. Robbins detected an unusual
object in Harvell’s crotch area. Harvell volunteered that it was
a pad, and offered to go with Robbins into a restaurant restroom
for a more extensive search. When they did so, the object was
found to be a plastic bag containing more than four ounces of
cocaine.
Harvell contends on appeal that her consent to the search
was not constitutionally valid because the officers should have
allowed her to go once the traffic stop concluded. At the same
time, she acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the
officers from asking her questions once the traffic stop ended, as
long as the conversation was consensual. See United States
v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2008). Harvell
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principally argues that the evidence does not show that she
consented to an intrusive pat-down of her genital area. This court
reviews the district court’s factual findings underlying a denial
of a motion to suppress for clear error, and its legal
determinations de novo. Id. at 217. Whether an individual’s
consent to a search is voluntary is a factual question determined
under the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); Farrior, 535 F.3d at 219.
Harvell argues that her consent could not have been
voluntary because the pat-down search in the parking lot was
humiliating and degrading, that she suggested going into the
bathroom to protect her privacy, and that her purported consent was
simply the result of coercive circumstances. However, Harvell
produced no evidence at the suppression hearing to counter the
officers’ testimony that she consented to a search of her person in
the parking lot and volunteered to go into the restaurant bathroom
with Detective Robbins for a more extensive search, nor was there
any evidence of coercion or intimidation by Turrentine or Robbins.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
determining that Harvell freely consented to the search, and in
denying the motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the
suppression motion, and affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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