PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-4291
TABETHA GOFORTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge.
(3:07-cr-00247-MR-1)
Argued: September 26, 2008
Decided: November 21, 2008
Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Shedd
wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Agee
joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: S. Frederick Winiker, III, Charlotte, North Caro-
lina, for Appellant. Adam Christopher Morris, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Car-
olina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gretchen C. F. Shappert,
2 UNITED STATES v. GOFORTH
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appel-
lee.
OPINION
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
Tabetha Goforth was indicted for several violations of the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. Goforth
pled guilty to one count of the indictment, which carries a
maximum penalty of ten years or more, and the magistrate
judge concluded that detention pending sentencing was man-
datory under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). Goforth moved the dis-
trict judge for review of the detention order under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3145, arguing that "exceptional reasons" made detention
inappropriate. The district judge denied the motion, holding
that a district judge is not a "judicial officer" within the mean-
ing of § 3145(c) and therefore has no authority under the sub-
section to determine whether "exceptional reasons" exist. For
the following reasons, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand for further consideration.
I
Prior to 1990, a defendant could be released pending sen-
tencing if a judicial officer found by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendant was "not likely to flee or pose a
danger to the safety of any other person or the community[.]"
See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (1988)(amended 1990).1 If the judi-
cial officer did not make such a finding, the defendant was
detained. Against this backdrop, Congress adopted the Man-
datory Detention Act of 1990. That Act made detention for
specified categories of offenses mandatory with three excep-
tions. Two of the exceptions are based on the presence of
1
A district judge qualified as a "judicial officer" under the pre-1990 ver-
sion of § 3143(a).
UNITED STATES v. GOFORTH 3
specified conditions: (1) if the judicial officer finds a substan-
tial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be
granted, or (2) if an attorney for the government recommends
no sentence of imprisonment be imposed. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3143(a)(2)(A). Critical to this case, the Act amended § 3145
to create a third, more general exception to mandatory deten-
tion:
(c) Appeal from a release or detention order. An
appeal from a release or detention order, or from a
decision denying revocation or amendment of such
an order, is governed by the provisions of section
1291 of title 28 and section 3731 of this title. The
appeal shall be determined promptly. A person sub-
ject to detention pursuant to section 3143(a)(2) or
(b)(2), and who meets the conditions of release set
forth in section 3143(a)(1) or (b)(1), may be ordered
released, under appropriate conditions, by the judi-
cial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are
exceptional reasons why such person’s detention
would not be appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (emphasis added).
Goforth argued to the district judge that she qualified for
"exceptional reasons" release under § 3145(c), but the judge
held that district judges are not "judicial officers" for purposes
of § 3145(c) and thus cannot make an "exceptional reasons"
finding. The judge based this holding largely on the fact that
the "exceptional reasons" language was located in § 3145(c),
which generally governs appeals to a circuit court.2
2
There are 3 subsections of § 3145: § 3145(a) and (b) deal with district
judge review of magistrate judges’ release and detention orders, and
§ 3145(c) generally provides for an appeal to the circuit court.
4 UNITED STATES v. GOFORTH
II
The interpretation of "judicial officer" as it is used in
§ 3145(c) involves a pure question of law which we review de
novo. Ramey v. Director, O.W.C.P., 326 F.3d 474, 476 (4th
Cir. 2003). As with any question of statutory interpretation,
"[o]ur first step in interpreting a statute is to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case."
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). If the
statute is unambiguous, "our inquiry into Congress’ intent is
at an end, for if the language is plain and the statutory scheme
is coherent and consistent, we need not inquire further." Wil-
liam v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007)(internal
citation omitted). In most instances, "[s]tatutory definitions
control the meaning of statutory words." Lawson v. Suwannee
Fruit & S.S.Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949). Moreover, a statu-
tory definition "excludes any meaning that is not stated."
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979).
A.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the text of
§ 3145(c), which authorizes the release of a defendant who
otherwise qualifies for mandatory detention "under appropri-
ate conditions, by the judicial officer, if it is clearly shown
that there are exceptional reasons why such person’s detention
would not be appropriate." While § 3145(c) does not define
"judicial officer," 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1)3 does so in plain and
unambiguous terms:
The term "judicial officer" means, unless otherwise
indicated, any person or court authorized pursuant to
section 3041 of this title, or the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to detain or release a person
before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a
3
Section 3156(a) provides definitions for §§ 3141-3150.
UNITED STATES v. GOFORTH 5
court of the United States, and any judge of the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
This definition unquestionably encompasses district judges.4
A district judge thus qualifies as a "judicial officer" and pos-
sesses "exceptional reasons" authority under § 3145(c) unless
another definition of "judicial officer" is "otherwise indi-
cated."
There is no clear indication in the statute that the definition
is to be applied in a manner that would exclude district
judges. When Congress has altered the § 3156(a)(1) definition
of "judicial officer" in other provisions within the Bail
Reform Act – that is, when it has "otherwise indicated" that
the term should be read differently – it has done so clearly.
For example, § 3141(b) vests authority to order release
pending sentence or appeal in "a judicial officer of a court of
original jurisdiction over an offense, or a judicial officer of a
Federal appellate court." Similarly, § 3148(b) provides that
when a person violates a condition of release, the person shall
be brought before "a judicial officer in the district in which
such person’s arrest was ordered . . .[preferably before] the
judicial officer who ordered the release and whose order is
alleged to have been violated." In these instances, Congress
has clearly altered § 3156(a)(1)’s definition of "judicial offi-
cer." In contrast, we do not find the placement of the "excep-
tional reasons" language within § 3145(c), by itself, sufficient
to constitute the affirmative "indication" required under
§ 3156(a)(1) in order to render its definition of "judicial offi-
4
Section 3041 states in part: "For any offense against the United States,
the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any
United States magistrate judge, or by any chancellor, judge of a supreme
or superior court, chief or first judge of the common pleas, mayor of a
city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where the
offender may be found, and at the expense of the United States, be
arrested and imprisoned or released as provided in chapter 207 of this
title[.]"
6 UNITED STATES v. GOFORTH
cer" inapplicable. Accordingly, because there has been noth-
ing to "otherwise indicate" that the § 3156(a)(1) definition of
"judicial officer" does not apply, we hold that district judges
unambiguously qualify as "judicial officers" under § 3145(c).
We note that our holding is in accord with every other cir-
cuit court to consider the issue. See United States v. Carr, 947
F.2d 1239, 1240 (5th Cir. 1991)(per curiam); United States v.
Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1992)(per curiam);
United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1992)(per
curiam); United States v. Mostrom, 11 F.3d 93 (8th Cir.
1993)(per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013,
1014 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lea, 360 F.3d 401
(2nd Cir. 2004).
B.
We would reach the same result even if we assumed
arguendo that the text of § 3145(c) is ambiguous. While the
general context of that section and its title may suggest that
it addresses appellate judges, legislative history leads us to the
conclusion that the term "judicial officer" here includes dis-
trict judges. During the legislative process, an earlier version
of the "exceptional reasons" amendment to § 3145(c) stated
that it could be applied "by a court of appeals or a judge
thereof." 136 Cong. Rec. S6, 491 (daily ed. May 17,
1990)(Section 1152 – Mandatory Detention); see Jonathan S.
Rosen, An Examination of the "Exceptional Reasons" Juris-
prudence of the Mandatory Detention Act: Title 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3143, 3145(c), 19 Vt. L. Rev. 19, fn.41 (1994). In the final
version of the amendment, however, the language was
changed to say that the determination could be made by "the
judicial officer." If Congress had intended for the "excep-
tional reasons" authority to apply exclusively to circuit
judges, it could have easily left the original language in place.
The substitution of the broader term "judicial officer" indi-
UNITED STATES v. GOFORTH 7
cates that Congress intended to include district judges among
those who could grant "exceptional reasons" relief.5
C.
From a practical standpoint, our conclusion is the most log-
ical. Exceptions to detention are inherently fact-intensive
determinations which district judges are well-positioned to
make at the time detention is considered. It would be surpris-
ing for Congress to create an exception to mandatory deten-
tion predicated on exceptional reasons, only to force a
defendant to seek a ruling from the circuit court that such cir-
cumstances exist. Moreover, attributing this power solely to
circuit judges would mean that as a practical matter, the "ex-
ceptional reasons" issue could often become moot before a
judge ever had the opportunity to rule on it. While Congress
is certainly able to create such an arrangement, we do not
believe it has done so here.
III
In sum, we discern no basis for concluding that Congress
intended to alter the plain and unambiguous statutory defini-
tion of "judicial officer," and we therefore hold that district
judges are "judicial officers" within the language of § 3145(c)
and 3156(a)(1). Having concluded that a district judge is a
"judicial officer" and thereby authorized to release defendants
under § 3145(c) when "exceptional reasons" exist, we vacate
the district court’s order and remand the case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
5
The course of the legislative amendment process could explain why the
term "judicial officer" includes district judges but is placed in § 3145(c),
which generally addresses appeals to the circuit court.