PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 08-4014
DARNELL WILLIAMS, a/k/a Nellie;
LARRY THOMAS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00449-RDB-2)
Argued: October 30, 2008
Decided: December 3, 2008
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and
KING, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge King
wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Williams and Judge
Niemeyer joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Philip S. Jackson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
2 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
Kenneth Wendell Ravenell, Baltimore, Maryland; Joseph
John Gigliotti, Sr., Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellant. William J. Morrow, THE
MURPHY FIRM, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee Darnell
Williams.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
The government challenges, by way of this interlocutory
appeal, the district court’s Order suppressing evidence seized
pursuant to search warrants from the residences of drug con-
spiracy defendants Darnell Williams and Larry Thomas. See
United States v. McCoy, No. 1:06-cr-00449 (D. Md. Oct. 24,
2007). In so ruling, the district court recognized that the gov-
ernment had conceded there was no probable cause to support
the search warrants, and it rejected the government’s position
that the seized evidence was nevertheless admissible under
the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule, as articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984). On appeal, the government — though acknowledging
that it previously conceded lack of probable cause — urges us
to reverse the suppression ruling on the ground that the war-
rants were supported by probable cause. Alternatively, the
government maintains that the district court erred in refusing
to apply the Leon good faith exception. As explained below,
we need only reach the Leon issue, on which we reverse and
remand.
I.
A.
On August 31, 2006, Special Agent Paul Neikirk of the
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 3
Drug Enforcement Administration, Baltimore District Office,
applied to a Maryland state court for a "Search and Seizure
Warrant" relating to the "Premise" 3516 Sandpiper Court,
Edgewood, Maryland (the "Sandpiper Court warrant"). See
J.A. 3.1 The warrant application also refers to the "Person"
Darnell Williams. Id. In support of the application, Neikirk
outlined his expertise, including involvement in at least thirty
drug trafficking investigations, the arrests of more than 500
drug suspects, the making of at least ten affidavits in support
of search warrants, and the execution of more than 100 such
warrants. See id. at 5. He also submitted a twenty-page affida-
vit (the "Sandpiper Court affidavit"), plus a single-page
exhibit listing property to be seized. On the first page of the
Sandpiper Court affidavit, Neikirk again refers to the "Per-
son" Darnell Williams and the "Premise" 3516 Sandpiper
Court, and he avers that "[y]our Affiant believes that probable
cause exists for the issuance of said warrant for these pre-
mise(s) . . . which are being used for the illegal use, storage,
sale, packaging and concealment of controlled dangerous sub-
stance[s]." Id. at 7. Later in the Sandpiper Court affidavit,
Neikirk lists 3516 Sandpiper Court as Williams’s address, see
id. at 9-10, and specifically asserts that "[t]his location is
believed to be the primary residence of Darnell Williams," id.
at 25. The Sandpiper Court affidavit also includes such identi-
fying information as Williams’s date of birth and Social
Security number. See, e.g., id. at 9.
The bulk of the Sandpiper Court affidavit details the inves-
tigation into Williams and his alleged coconspirators (includ-
ing Thomas), which investigation involved, inter alia, a
confidential informant, controlled purchases, intercepted
phone calls, and physical surveillance. The Sandpiper Court
affidavit reflects, for example, the following:
1
Citations herein to "J.A. ___" refer to the contents of the Joint Appen-
dix filed by the parties in this appeal.
4 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
• After identifying Thomas "as a mid-level narcotic
dealer," the confidential informant made con-
trolled purchases of "multiple ounces of cocaine
from Thomas on numerous occasions from Janu-
ary 2006-May 2006," J.A. 7;
• The subsequent court-approved interception of
calls made on a phone utilized by Thomas led
Special Agent Neikirk to secure court authoriza-
tion to intercept calls made on eight other phones,
including two cell phones used by Williams, see
id. at 7-11;
• Between July 9, 2006, and August 25, 2006,
investigators intercepted fifteen calls involving
Williams that Neikirk believed, based on his
training and experience, to be "drug pertinent,"
see id. at 14-25; and
• In August 2006, investigators conducted physical
surveillance of Williams meeting with suspected
drug suppliers in Houston, Texas, after learning
that Williams had made arrangements to fly
there, see id. at 23.
According to the Sandpiper Court affidavit, the investigation
"established that Darnell Williams is managing an ongoing
drug distribution network that operates throughout the United
States of America[,] [i]ncluding[ ] Maryland, Georgia, South
Carolina and Texas, with at least one ultimate street level dis-
tribution point being in the Baltimore, Maryland Metropolitan
area." Id. at 12. The Sandpiper Court affidavit also reflects
that Williams pleaded guilty in February 1994 in a Maryland
state court to possession with intent to distribute controlled
dangerous substances, as well as controlled dangerous sub-
stance distribution with a firearm, and that there had been
numerous other state criminal charges brought against him
between 1993 and 2000. See id. at 13-14.
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 5
The Sandpiper Court affidavit does not specify any particu-
lar evidence — such as evidence gathered from intercepted
phone calls or physical surveillance — linking the Sandpiper
Court dwelling to drug trafficking activity. Special Agent
Neikirk asserts therein, however, that
[y]our Affiant knows based on his training and expe-
rience that drug dealers tend to maintain quantities of
narcotics, firearms and proceeds from drug sales and
records of drug transactions in their houses . . . for
safekeeping. Your Affiant knows based on his train-
ing and experience that drug dealers often utilize
safes and other locked containers in their residence
to secure quantities of drugs, firearms and proceeds
from drug sales. . . . Your Affiant has also learned
that narcotic dealers tend to "stash" quantities of nar-
cotics, monies, and handguns in their houses.
J.A. 12. This training- and experience-based knowledge,
together with the evidence of drug trafficking gathered against
Williams, gave rise to Neikirk’s "belie[f] that probable cause
exists that Darnell Williams is storing controlled dangerous
substances, firearms, proceeds from drug transactions and
business records thereof at 3516 Sandpiper C[ourt]." Id. at 13;
see also id. at 25 ("[A]s a result of your Affiant[’]s involve-
ment in this investigation, and his expertise and experience in
the investigation of dangerous drugs, your Affiant believes
that there is presently concealed within the aforesaid dwelling
. . . items constitut[ing] evidence that relates to the illegal dis-
tribution and possession with the intent to distribute con-
trolled dangerous substances . . . .").
At the close of the Sandpiper Court affidavit, Special Agent
Neikirk seeks authorization for a "no knock entry," explaining
that "[t]his location is believed to be the primary residence of
Darnell Williams," that "it is possible that he could be home
at the time the warrant is executed," and that Williams has a
history of violence (including prior arrests for assault with
6 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
intent to murder and various firearms offenses) indicating a
risk to the executing officers. J.A. 25-26. Finally, Neikirk reit-
erates that, "[a]s a result of the above listed [intercepted
phone] calls and probable cause corroborated from the confi-
dential source, your Affiant believes that sufficient probable
cause exists that the narcotics laws of Maryland are being vio-
lated with the dwelling of 3516 Sandpiper Court." Id. at 26.
At the same time he sought the Sandpiper Court warrant
(on August 31, 2006), Special Agent Neikirk also applied to
the Maryland state court for a "Search and Seizure Warrant"
relating to the "Premise" 135 Baltimore Avenue, Baltimore,
Maryland (the "Baltimore Avenue warrant"). See J.A. 30.
That warrant application refers to the "Person" Larry Thomas.
Id. In support of the application, Neikirk again outlined his
expertise, and he submitted a seventeen-page affidavit (the
"Baltimore Avenue affidavit"), plus a single-page exhibit list-
ing property to be seized. The first page of the Baltimore Ave-
nue affidavit refers to the "Person" Larry Thomas and the
"Premise" 135 Baltimore Avenue, and contains an assertion
of probable cause identical to that found in the Sandpiper
Court affidavit. Id. at 34 ("Your Affiant believes that probable
cause exists for the issuance of said warrant for these pre-
mise(s) . . . which are being used for the illegal use, storage,
sale, packaging and concealment of controlled dangerous sub-
stance[s] . . . .") Also on the first page of the Baltimore Ave-
nue affidavit, Neikirk lists 135 Baltimore Avenue as
Thomas’s address, see id., and later therein Neikirk specifi-
cally asserts that "[t]his location is believed to be the primary
residence of Larry Thomas," id. at 50.2 The Baltimore Avenue
affidavit also includes such identifying information as Thom-
as’s date of birth and Social Security number. See, e.g., id. at
34.
2
The Baltimore Avenue affidavit varyingly refers to the Baltimore Ave-
nue residence as being located in Baltimore, Maryland, and Dundalk,
Maryland (an unincorporated community in Baltimore County). The par-
ties do not contend, however, that these varying references have any sig-
nificance to the propriety of the district court’s suppression ruling.
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 7
The majority of the Baltimore Avenue affidavit details the
investigation into Thomas, Williams, and their alleged cocon-
spirators. Specific to Thomas, the Baltimore Avenue affidavit
(like the Sandpiper Court affidavit) reflects that he was identi-
fied as a mid-level drug dealer by the confidential informant,
that the informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from
Thomas between January and May 2006, and that Neikirk
thereafter secured authorization to intercept calls made on a
phone utilized by Thomas, leading to the court-approved
interception of calls made on eight other phones. See J.A. 34-
38. The Baltimore Avenue affidavit also provides information
about approximately two dozen intercepted calls involving
Thomas that Neikirk believed to relate to drug transactions.
See id. at 41-49. The Baltimore Avenue affidavit reflects that
Thomas last reported earned wages in 2001, and that he had
been convicted in Maryland state courts on three separate
occasions in 2000 of controlled dangerous substance and
assault offenses. See id. at 40.
Like the Sandpiper Court affidavit, the Baltimore Avenue
affidavit does not specify any particular evidence linking the
dwelling to be searched to drug activity. The Baltimore Ave-
nue affidavit includes, however, an identical assertion of
knowledge, based on Special Agent Neikirk’s training and
experience, "that drug dealers tend to maintain quantities of
narcotics, firearms and proceeds from drug sales and records
of drug transactions in their houses . . . for safekeeping." J.A.
39. Based on this knowledge and the evidence of Thomas’s
drug trafficking, Neikirk concludes in the Baltimore Avenue
affidavit "that probable cause exists that Larry Thomas is stor-
ing controlled dangerous substances, firearms, proceeds from
drug transactions and business records thereof at 135 Balti-
more Avenue." Id. at 40; see also id. at 49 ("[A]s a result of
your Affiant’s involvement in this investigation, and his
expertise and experience in the investigation of dangerous
drugs, your Affiant believes that there is presently concealed
within the aforesaid dwelling . . . items constitut[ing] evi-
dence that relates to the illegal distribution and possession
8 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
with the intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances
. . . .").
In closing, Special Agent Neikirk seeks permission in the
Baltimore Avenue affidavit for a "no knock entry," specifying
that "[t]his location is believed to be the primary residence of
Larry Thomas" and detailing the potential danger posed by
him (including the fact that he was heard "firing a handgun
repeated times" during intercepted phone calls and threatening
on one such call to "shoot his way out"). J.A. 49-50. Lastly,
Neikirk asserts that, "[a]s a result of the above listed [inter-
cepted phone] calls and probable cause corroborated from the
confidential source, your Affiant believes that sufficient prob-
able cause exists that the narcotics laws of Maryland are being
violated with the dwelling of 135 Baltimore Avenue." Id. at
50.
On August 31, 2006, after reviewing and initialing each
page of the respective supporting affidavits, the Maryland
state court approved both the Sandpiper Court warrant and the
Baltimore Avenue warrant. The warrants were executed on
September 11, 2006. From the Sandpiper Court dwelling,
officers seized $295,000 in cash. From the Baltimore Avenue
dwelling, officers seized a firearm, cocaine residue, and vari-
ous items commonly used in drug distribution, such as a digi-
tal scale and numerous empty capsules.3
B.
A grand jury in the District of Maryland indicted Williams
and Thomas, along with other alleged coconspirators, on one
count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in contravention of
21 U.S.C. § 846. Thereafter, Williams filed a motion to sup-
3
Although unnecessary to the resolution of the issues in this appeal, we
observe that it is undisputed that, at the time the search warrants were exe-
cuted, Williams was residing in the Sandpiper Court dwelling, and
Thomas was living in the Baltimore Avenue dwelling.
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 9
press evidence seized from the Sandpiper Court dwelling, and
Thomas filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from the
Baltimore Avenue dwelling. The district court conducted a
hearing on the motions on October 12, 2007.
On October 24, 2007, the district court issued its Order
granting the motions to suppress, as well as a Memorandum
Opinion (the "Opinion") explaining its ruling.4 The court
observed in the Opinion that the government conceded both
in its response to the motions and at the October 12, 2007
hearing that there was no probable cause to support the search
warrants, i.e., "that there was insufficient information outlined
in the supporting affidavits connecting 3516 Sandpiper Court
and 135 Baltimore Ave[nue] with the alleged criminal activ-
ity." Opinion 2. The court then recognized that the govern-
ment sought "to avoid suppression because of the good faith
exception outlined in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984)." Id. at 3. The court refused to apply the Leon good
faith exception, however, on the ground that the supporting
affidavits were fatally "bare bones." Id. at 4. This was so, in
the court’s view, because the affidavits were "devoid of any
specific evidence suggesting how the place to be searched is
related to the criminal activity," id. at 5, and because they
contained no evidence that Williams and Thomas were cur-
rently residing in the targeted dwellings, see id. at 5 n.4.
The government timely noted this interlocutory appeal. We
possess jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731.5
4
The Order is found at J.A. 57-58, and the Opinion is found at J.A. 59-
64.
5
In accordance with the jurisdictional predicate of 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the
United States Attorney has certified that this interlocutory appeal "is not
taken for purpose of delay" and that the excluded evidence "is a substan-
tial proof of a fact material in the proceeding."
10 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
II.
On appeal, the government contends that the district court
erred in granting the motions to suppress because, notwith-
standing its concession to the contrary, the Sandpiper Court
and Baltimore Avenue warrants were supported by probable
cause. Alternatively, the government contends that the seized
evidence is admissible under the good faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule articulated in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The parties differ, as a
threshold matter, over whether we can properly consider the
first contention in light of the government’s acknowledgment
that it conceded lack of probable cause in the district court.
We need not resolve such an issue, however, because we
agree with the government’s second contention: that, at the
very least, the Leon good faith exception applies. See United
States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
"that a reviewing court may proceed to the good faith excep-
tion without first deciding whether the warrant was supported
by probable cause" (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 925)). In reach-
ing this conclusion, we utilize a de novo standard of review.
See United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 520 (4th Cir.
2004) (observing that, where "there are no facts in dispute, the
applicability of the Leon exception . . . is purely a legal con-
clusion, and we review the district court’s ruling de novo").
A.
As the Supreme Court instructed in Leon, "a court should
not suppress the fruits of a search conducted under the author-
ity of a warrant, even a ‘subsequently invalidated’ warrant,
unless ‘a reasonably well trained officer would have known
that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authoriza-
tion.’" United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.
2002) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). The Leon Court
explained "that the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary
rule is not achieved through the suppression of evidence
obtained by ‘an officer acting with objective good faith’
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 11
within the scope of a search warrant issued by a magistrate."
United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920). "Hence, under Leon’s good
faith exception, evidence obtained pursuant to a search war-
rant issued by a neutral magistrate does not need to be
excluded if the officer’s reliance on the warrant was ‘objec-
tively reasonable.’" Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922).
The Leon Court admonished that searches conducted "pur-
suant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into
reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally
suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted
in good faith in conducting the search." 468 U.S. at 922
(internal quotation marks omitted). An officer’s reliance on a
warrant would not qualify as "objectively reasonable," how-
ever, in the following four circumstances:
• First, where "the magistrate or judge in issuing a
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit
that the affiant knew was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth," id. at 923;
• Second, where "the magistrate acted as a rubber
stamp for the officers and so ‘wholly abandoned’
his detached and neutral ‘judicial role,’" Bynum,
293 F.3d at 195 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923);
• Third, where a supporting affidavit is "so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,"
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks
omitted); and
• Fourth, where "a warrant [is] so facially deficient
— i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be
searched or the things to be seized — that the
12 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it
to be valid," id.
"In any of these four circumstances, then, the Leon good faith
exception does not apply." Perez, 393 F.3d at 461.
B.
Here, the district court concluded that application of the
Leon good faith exception was barred by the existence of the
third circumstance, i.e., that the Sandpiper Court and Balti-
more Avenue affidavits were "so lacking in indicia of proba-
ble cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation
marks omitted).6 More specifically, the court deemed the affi-
davits to be fatally "bare bones" in two ways: first, in being
"devoid of any specific evidence suggesting how the place to
be searched is related to the criminal activity," Opinion 5 (the
"criminal activity-dwelling nexus"); and second, in lacking
evidence that Williams and Thomas were currently residing in
the targeted dwellings, see id. at 5 n.4 (the "defendant-
6
We note that the district court misidentified the third circumstance bar-
ring application of the Leon good faith exception, using the following lan-
guage: "when the affidavit does not provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause." Opinion
3 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we explained in Bynum,
"‘[s]ubstantial basis’ provides the measure for determination of
whether probable cause exists in the first instance. If a lack of a
substantial basis also prevented application of the Leon objective
good faith exception, the exception would be devoid of sub-
stance. In fact, Leon states that the third circumstance prevents a
finding of objective good faith only when an officer’s affidavit is
"so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable." This is a less demanding
showing than the "substantial basis" threshold required to prove
the existence of probable cause in the first place.
293 F.3d at 195 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks
omitted)) (other citations omitted); see also DeQuasie, 373 F.3d at 521
n.17.
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 13
dwelling nexus"). We assess these two aspects of the court’s
suppression ruling — on the criminal activity-dwelling nexus
and on the defendant-dwelling nexus — in turn.
1.
We begin our assessment with the district court’s ruling on
the criminal activity-dwelling nexus. The pertinent question in
this regard is whether the Sandpiper Court and Baltimore
Avenue affidavits were "so lacking in indicia of probable
cause" tying the targeted dwellings to criminal activity "as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
government defends the affidavits on the ground that they
contained sufficient indicia of probable cause on the criminal
activity-dwelling nexus to justify application of the Leon good
faith exception by (1) extensively detailing the evidence of
Williams’s and Thomas’s involvement in drug trafficking
activities and (2) including Special Agent Neikirk’s assertion
of knowledge, based on his training and experience, "that
drug dealers tend to maintain quantities of narcotics, firearms
and proceeds from drug sales and records of drug transactions
in their houses . . . for safekeeping." J.A. 12, 39. The district
court, however, rejected the government’s reliance on
Neikirk’s assertion of training- and experience-based knowl-
edge, leaving the government with only the evidence of drug
trafficking. See Opinion 4-5. And, as the court observed,
"there were no reports of any drug use at either 3516 Sand-
piper Court or 135 Baltimore Ave[nue]," and "any suspicious
activity engaged in by Defendant Williams and Defendant
Thomas occurred nowhere near" those premises. Id. at 4
(internal quotation marks omitted). Viewing only the evidence
of drug trafficking unconnected to the targeted premises, the
court deemed the affidavits fatally "bare bones." Id. (relying
on United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996)
(determining affidavit based largely on uncorroborated tip
14 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
from anonymous telephone caller to be "bare bones" and
unworthy of Leon good faith exception)).7
In these circumstances, we first address whether the district
court properly discounted Neikirk’s assertion of training- and
experience-based knowledge to tie Williams’s and Thomas’s
drug trafficking activities to their residences. According to the
court, "[a] lack of actual evidence in the affidavits cannot be
remedied by the claim — asserted in both supporting affida-
vits — that ‘drug dealers tend to maintain quantities of narcot-
ics, firearms and proceeds from drug sales and records of drug
transactions in their houses . . . for safekeeping.’" Opinion 5
(quoting Sandpiper Court and Baltimore Avenue affidavits
(J.A. 12, 39)). For this proposition, the court relied on its own
prior suppression ruling in United States v. Cotton, No. 1:05-
cr-00409, 2005 WL 3591960, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2005)
(concluding that "the mere opinion by a police officer that
drug dealers keep drugs in their residences must be supported
by some other objective facts relating to the residence").8
Simply put, the district court’s view is directly at odds with
our precedent. We have consistently determined that there
was probable cause to support search warrants — and not
merely sufficient indicia of probable cause to justify applica-
tion of the Leon good faith exception — in similar circum-
stances. That is, we have upheld warrants to search suspects’
residences and even temporary abodes on the basis of (1) evi-
7
The district court suggested — as did this Court in Wilhelm — that,
because of the "bare bones" nature of the affidavits, the application of the
Leon good faith exception was barred by the existence of the second cir-
cumstance, i.e., that the magistrate judge acted as a rubber stamp for the
officer in approving the warrants. See Opinion 3-4; see also Wilhelm, 80
F.3d at 123.
8
The government did not appeal the district court’s suppression ruling
in Cotton. The defendant, however, appealed from the court’s refusal to
suppress other evidence, and we affirmed in an unpublished per curiam
opinion. See United States v. Cotton, No. 06-4530, 2007 WL 664909 (4th
Cir. Mar. 6, 2007).
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 15
dence of the suspects’ involvement in drug trafficking com-
bined with (2) the reasonable suspicion (whether explicitly
articulated by the applying officer or implicitly arrived at by
the magistrate judge) that drug traffickers store drug-related
evidence in their homes. See United States v. Grossman, 400
F.3d 212, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Servance,
394 F.3d 222, 230 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 544
U.S. 1047 (2005); United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 480,
481-82 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Suarez, 906 F.2d 977,
984-85 (4th Cir. 1990). As we explained in Grossman,
[w]hen issuing a warrant and making a probable
cause determination, judges are to use a "totality of
the circumstances analysis." This standard is not
defined by bright lines and rigid boundaries. Instead,
the standard allows a magistrate judge to review the
facts and circumstances as a whole and make a com-
mon sense determination of whether "there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place." The magistrate
judge’s decision in this regard is one we review with
great deference.
Grossman, 400 F.3d at 217 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983)) (other internal quotation marks omit-
ted). As part of such a common sense determination, we
observed in Grossman, "it is reasonable to suspect that a drug
dealer stores drugs in a home to which he owns a key." Id. at
218; see also Servance, 394 F.3d at 230 (recognizing "that the
nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be
seized may be established by the nature of the item and the
normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evi-
dence" (internal quotation marks omitted)).9
9
Notably, the district court acknowledged our Williams decision in its
Opinion. The court rejected Williams, however, on the ground, inter alia,
that it "dealt with whether a sufficient nexus existed in order to establish
probable cause, a point that had been conceded in this case." Opinion 5
16 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
In light of our precedent, the district court erroneously dis-
counted Special Agent Neikirk’s assertion of training- and
experience-based knowledge to tie Williams’s and Thomas’s
drug trafficking activities to their residences. Had the court
given due consideration to Neikirk’s assertion, together with
the extensive evidence of Williams’s and Thomas’s drug traf-
ficking activities detailed in the Sandpiper Court and Balti-
more Avenue affidavits, it could not have concluded that the
affidavits were "bare bones" with respect to the criminal
activity-dwelling nexus. See Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 121 (recog-
nizing that a "bare bones" affidavit is "one that contains
wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and cir-
cumstances from which a magistrate can independently deter-
mine probable cause" (internal quotation marks omitted)).10
Indeed, the court would have necessarily determined that the
affidavits were not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause"
tying the targeted dwellings to criminal activity "as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon,
468 U.S. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord-
ingly, the district court erred in refusing to apply the Leon
good faith exception in this aspect of its suppression ruling.11
n.4. Of course, even accepting that the government irrevocably conceded
the issue of whether the Sandpiper Court and Baltimore Avenue warrants
were supported by probable cause, Williams is yet entirely relevant to the
issue of whether the Leon good faith exception applies, i.e., whether the
supporting affidavits were "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" tying
the targeted dwellings to criminal activity "as to render official belief in
its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
10
To the extent that Williams and Thomas argue on appeal that the
Sandpiper Court and Baltimore Avenue affidavits failed to establish prob-
able cause that they were engaged in drug trafficking, we disagree.
11
For the criminal activity-dwelling nexus aspect of its suppression rul-
ing, the district court did rely on one of our decisions, United States v.
Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir. 1993). See Opinion 2 ("The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that ‘residential
searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 17
2.
Finally, we assess the district court’s ruling with respect to
the defendant-dwelling nexus. On this question, the district
court observed that in contrast to the scenario in this Court’s
Williams decision — wherein we recognized that the support-
ing affidavit "‘contain[ed] evidence that [the defendant] was
currently residing in the’" targeted motel room — such sce-
nario was "not the case here." Opinion 5 n.4 (quoting Wil-
liams, 974 F.2d at 481 (alterations in original)); see also
Grossman, 400 F.3d at 215-16 (describing evidence compiled
by officer linking Grossman to each of three searched dwell-
ings); Servance, 394 F.3d at 230 (observing that physical sur-
veillance placed Servance in targeted dwelling earlier in day
of search); Suarez, 906 F.2d at 979 (noting that search warrant
application was based, inter alia, on officers’ surveillance of
Suarez during day before search, when he was seen walking
to targeted residence of his girlfriend).
We recognize that the Sandpiper Court and Baltimore Ave-
nue affidavits contain bare assertions that the targeted dwell-
activity to the defendant’s residence.’" (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)).
In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant’s residence
was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing,
however, we distinguished Lalor’s case from prior ones, including Suarez
and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the tar-
geted premises was based on evidence of the suspect’s drug trafficking
activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evi-
dence would be found in the suspect’s home. See id. at 1582-83 (recogniz-
ing that, in Suarez, "residential search upheld based on officer’s reasoned
belief that evidence of drug activity would be found at residence"); id. at
1583 (observing that, in Williams, "totality of facts establishe[d] fair prob-
ability that drug paraphernalia w[ould] be found in drug dealer’s motel
room"). Moreover, although we invalidated the search warrant in Lalor,
we concluded — unlike the district court here — that the evidence seized
thereunder was nevertheless admissible pursuant to the Leon good faith
exception. See id. at 1583. Lalor, therefore, actually undercuts the criminal
activity-dwelling nexus aspect of the court’s suppression ruling.
18 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
ings were Williams’s and Thomas’s current residences,
without explicitly describing how Special Agent Neikirk
came to believe that was so. Nonetheless, we cannot say that
the affidavits were "so lacking in indicia of probable cause"
that the targeted dwellings were the current residences of Wil-
liams and Thomas "as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The affidavits detail Neikirk’s investiga-
tion of Williams, Thomas, and their alleged coconspirators —
an investigation spanning at least seven months and involving
a confidential informant, controlled purchases, intercepted
phone calls, and physical surveillance. The affidavits also pro-
vide identifying information about Williams and Thomas,
including dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and crimi-
nal histories. These details of the affidavits give rise to the
common sense inference that Neikirk learned through his
investigation — by way of, for example, information from the
confidential informant, observations during physical surveil-
lance, record checks, or some combination of all of the above
— that Williams and Thomas lived in the targeted dwellings.
In these circumstances, we are constrained to conclude that
the district court erred in refusing to apply the Leon good faith
exception in the defendant-dwelling nexus aspect of its sup-
pression ruling. Cf. United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d
331, 337 (6th Cir. 1998) (deeming Leon good faith exception
applicable where affidavit "described the location of the [tar-
geted dwelling] with such particularity that a common sense
inference is that the affiant visited the premises himself and
presumably either observed [the suspect] in the residence, or
determined through investigation that [the suspect] frequented
the premises"); United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st
Cir. 1996) (characterizing officer’s failure to explain how he
knew targeted dwelling was suspect’s residence as "hardly
blatant" nor suggestive of actual bad faith, and, thus, applying
Leon exception). As the First Circuit recognized in Procopio,
[t]he focus in a warrant application is usually on
whether the suspect committed a crime and whether
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS 19
evidence of the crime is to be found at his home or
business. That hardly makes the address unimpor-
tant: to invade the wrong location is a serious matter.
But so long as the affidavit itself asserts a link
between the suspect and the address, it is easy to
understand how both the officer applying for the
warrant and the magistrate might overlook a lack of
detail on a point often established by the telephone
book or the name on a mailbox.
88 F.3d at 28; see also United States v. Harris, 215 F. App’x
262, 272 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (applying Leon good
faith exception, despite officers’ omission from affidavit (1)
that Harris resided in targeted premises and (2) their grounds
for believing that Harris lived there, because "[t]he apartment
to be searched is prominently identified in the affidavit, and
it is easy to read the affidavit and not realize that the officers
failed to connect the final dots specifically linking Harris to
the apartment" (citing Procopio, 88 F.3d at 28)).12
III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse the district court’s
October 24, 2007 Order granting Williams’s and Thomas’s
motions to suppress, and remand for such other and further
proceedings as may be appropriate.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
12
We find it unnecessary to accept the government’s invitation to con-
sider the October 12, 2007 hearing testimony of Special Agent Neikirk in
which he explained to the district court how he came to believe that the
targeted dwellings were Williams’s and Thomas’s residences. See Bynum,
293 F.3d at 199 (declining to resolve the "difficult question" of whether
"additional facts, which the government proved were known to the affiant
police officer, but not revealed to the magistrate prior to issuance of the
search warrant, could be considered in the Leon analysis"). That is,
"[w]holly apart from the information known to [Neikirk] but not included
in his affidavit[s], th[ose] affidavit[s] contained sufficient indicia of proba-
ble cause so as not to render reliance on [them] totally unreasonable." Id.