PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
LISA CHAMPION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BLACK & DECKER (U.S.)
INCORPORATED; THE BLACK &
DECKER DISABILITY PLAN, No. 07-1991
Defendants-Appellees,
and
THE BLACK & DECKER LIFE
INSURANCE PLAN,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.
Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
(0:06-cv-01548)
Argued: September 23, 2008
Decided: December 19, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge, and T. S. ELLIS, III,
Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion, in which Senior Judge Hamilton and Senior Judge
Ellis joined.
2 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Nekki Shutt, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBIN-
SON, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. David
L. Woodard, POYNER & SPRUILL, Raleigh, North Caro-
lina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Susanna K. Gibbons,
POYNER & SPRUILL, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
lees.
OPINION
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we review an ERISA plan’s discretionary
determination denying disability benefits to an employee
where the plan’s administrator is alleged to have operated
under a conflict of interest. Before the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 128
S. Ct. 2343 (2008), we would have either applied a modified
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to neutralize any effect
of the conflict of interest, see, e.g., Stanford v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008), or we would have
concluded that no conflict existed at all, see Colucci v. Agfa
Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431 F.3d 170, 179-80 (4th Cir.
2005). But now, under Glenn, we must take a new approach.
Applying Glenn, we conclude that in this case a conflict of
interest did indeed exist; that we nonetheless review the
plan’s determination under the familiar abuse-of-discretion
standard; and that we consider the conflict only as a factor,
among several, in determining whether the plan’s determina-
tion was reasonable. Conducting our review in this manner,
we find that the plan in this case did not abuse its discretion,
and accordingly we affirm.
I
Lisa Champion, a former employee of Black & Decker
(U.S.) Inc. ("Black & Decker"), commenced this action under
CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER 3
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA") against the Black & Decker Disability Plan ("the
Plan") and Black & Decker as the sponsor and administrator
of the Plan. She challenges the Plan’s termination of her dis-
ability benefits after the Plan paid her benefits for a period of
30 months.
When Champion began working for Black & Decker in
1995, she came under the Plan, which Black & Decker both
funds and administers. As authorized by the Plan, Black &
Decker employed CIGNA Integrated Care as its claims
administrator, but Black & Decker retained ultimate authority
to make determinations of whether to pay disability benefits.
The Plan grants to the "Plan Manager," a Black & Decker
executive, specific powers and duties, including the responsi-
bility "to decide all questions concerning the Plan and the eli-
gibility of any person to participate in the Plan or to receive
benefits." It requires that the Plan Manager base his determi-
nations on "suitable medical evidence and a review of the Par-
ticipant’s prior employment history that the Plan Manager
deems satisfactory in its sole and absolute discretion."
In the proceedings before the district court, the parties stip-
ulated (1) that the Plan gives discretion to the Plan Manager
to make determinations, such as whether Champion is to
receive the disability benefits claimed in this case, and (2) that
judicial review of any determination is to be conducted under
the abuse-of-discretion standard. The parties reserved, how-
ever, the right to argue whether the standard must be adjusted
for a conflict of interest.
Substantively, the Plan provides for the payment of disabil-
ity benefits, using two different definitions of disability,
depending on how long the employee has been ill or injured.
One definition applies to benefits payable up to 30 months,
and another applies to benefits payable after 30 months. Dur-
ing the first 30 months, an employee is considered disabled
and eligible for benefits if the illness or injury results in the
4 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
employee’s "complete inability . . . to engage in his regular
occupation with the Employer." (Emphasis added). After 30
months, the employee is considered disabled and eligible for
benefits only if the employee is completely unable "to engage
in any gainful occupation or employment with any employer
for which the Employee is . . . reasonably qualified by educa-
tion, experience or training." (Emphasis added). Additionally,
after 30 months, the Plan terminates disability benefits if the
disability was "initially attributable to a Mental Health . . .
Disability" or later "substantiated on a Mental Health . . . Dis-
ability Diagnosis."
In 1999, Champion was diagnosed with a "complex partial
seizure disorder," based in part on "epileptiform activity in the
left temporal region." Her actual epileptic seizures were
mostly of the petite mal or "absence" variety and were there-
after controlled with medication. Treating physicians noticed
that Champion also reported seizure-like events that were not
epileptic seizures. These events were sometimes characterized
as panic attacks and sometimes as "pseudoseizures." Pseu-
doseizures are a recognized medical diagnosis with symptoms
closely resembling epilepsy, causing physicians often to mis-
diagnose one as the other. Champion was also diagnosed with
various emotional and psychiatric conditions including anxi-
ety, depression, panic attacks, and post-traumatic stress disor-
der.
In January 2002, Champion had a seizure at work that
required emergency room care. Thereafter, she never returned
to work at Black & Decker. She did, however, apply for short-
term disability benefits under the Plan. CIGNA Integrated
Care assessed Champion’s condition and denied her applica-
tion. Champion appealed to the Plan’s Appeals Committee,
composed entirely of Black & Decker employees, and the
Committee reversed CIGNA’s denial and awarded benefits,
which continued for 30 months.
After 30 months, CIGNA terminated benefits, concluding
that Champion’s disability resulted from mental illness and
CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER 5
therefore, under the Plan, no benefits were payable after 30
months. On Champion’s appeal to the Plan’s Appeals Com-
mittee, the Committee affirmed CIGNA’s decision. Champion
then retained counsel, who requested a second appeal. The
Appeals Committee granted counsel’s request and considered
additional evidence submitted by Champion, but again denied
further benefits.
Champion commenced this action under § 502 of ERISA,
29 U.S.C. § 1132, seeking disability benefits beyond the first
30 months. The district court initially found that the Plan had
abused its discretion by failing to determine whether Champi-
on’s disabilities actually fell within the Plan’s explicit defini-
tion of "Mental Health Disability." The Plan defined a mental
health (or substance abuse) disability as one "with a primary
diagnosis in the range of 290 to 319 under the International
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modifica-
tion (ICD-9-CM) promulgated by the World Health Organiza-
tion." But, because the district court was also unable to find
evidence sufficient to grant Champion benefits outright, it
ordered a remand to the Plan (1) to determine the proper ICD-
9-CM classification of Champion’s disability, and (2) to give
Champion the opportunity to submit additional evidence.
On remand, the Plan’s two consulting physicians reviewed
the record, including the records provided by Champion’s
treating physicians, and concluded that Champion’s pseu-
doseizures were properly classified as 300.11 under the ICD-
9-CM, thus falling within the Plan’s 290 to 319 range for a
mental health disability. The physicians also concluded that
when they considered only Champion’s non-mental-health
conditions, she would be able to work because her physical
seizures were infrequent and manageable with medication.
Champion also submitted additional evidence, including a
physician’s opinion that she was indeed totally disabled by
her epilepsy and pseudoseizures. With this evidence before it,
the Plan determined that Champion’s pseudoseizures had a
mental health diagnosis and therefore her disability was sub-
6 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
stantiated on a mental health disability. It reaffirmed its termi-
nation of Champion’s benefits after the initial 30-month
period.
The district court again reviewed the Plan’s determination
in light of the augmented record and concluded that the Plan
had not abused its discretion in denying further benefits.
Champion appealed and now contends that (1) the Plan oper-
ated under a conflict of interest and therefore judicial review
should be modified to give the Plan less deference; (2) in any
event, the Plan’s determination was unreasonable; and (3) the
district court abused its discretion in ordering a remand to the
Plan to allow for augmentation of the record.
II
After the district court decided this case and Champion
appealed, the Supreme Court decided Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008), which clarified
when a conflict of interest exists and how a conflict is to be
taken into account. Glenn altered several aspects of judicial
review of ERISA plan determinations in the Fourth Circuit.
In Glenn, the Court began by restating the foundational
principles of judicial review of ERISA plan determinations.
First, it pointed out, a reviewing court must be guided by
principles of trust law, taking a plan administrator’s determi-
nation as "a fiduciary act (i.e., an act in which the administra-
tor owes a special duty of loyalty to the plan beneficiaries)."
128 S. Ct. at 2347. Second, courts must "review a denial of
plan benefits under a de novo standard unless the plan pro-
vides to the contrary." Id. at 2348 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Third, when the plan grants the admin-
istrator "discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits, . . . a deferential standard of review is appropriate."
Id. (emphasis and citations omitted). And fourth, "[i]f a bene-
fit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who
is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be
CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER 7
weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse
of discretion." Id. (internal quotation marks, citations, and
emphasis omitted).
Focusing particularly on the fourth principle, the Glenn
Court held that when the plan administrator serves in the dual
role of evaluating claims for benefits and paying the claims,
the dual role itself creates a conflict of interest. 128 S. Ct. at
2346, 2348. The Court found in the case before it that because
an insurance company served as both administrator and
insurer of the plan—as administrator it had discretionary
authority to determine claims and as insurer it paid the claims
—the insurance company had a conflict of interest. Id. at
2346. But it also noted that the same conflict is created when
an employer serves in a similarly dual role. Id. at 2348.
The Court held, however, that the presence of a conflict of
interest did not change the standard of review from the defer-
ential review, normally applied in the review of discretionary
decisions, to a de novo review, or some other hybrid standard.
128 S. Ct. at 2350. Indeed the Court stated that the conflict of
interest should not otherwise lead to "special burden-of-proof
rules, or other special procedural or evidentiary rules, focused
narrowly upon the evaluator/payor conflict." Id. at 2351.
Rather, it held that when reviewing an ERISA plan adminis-
trator’s discretionary determination, a court must review the
determination for abuse of discretion and, in doing so, take
the conflict of interest into account only as "one factor among
many" that is relevant in deciding whether the administrator
abused its discretion. Id. The process that the Court envi-
sioned is similar to that followed by courts generally in apply-
ing any multiple-factor test to review for reasonableness. As
the Court said:
In such instances, any one factor will act as a tie-
breaker when the other factors are closely balanced,
the degree of closeness necessary depending upon
the tiebreaking factor’s inherent or case-specific
8 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
importance. The conflict of interest at issue here, for
example, should prove more important (perhaps of
great importance) where circumstances suggest a
higher likelihood that it affected the benefits deci-
sion, including, but not limited to, cases where an
insurance company administrator has a history of
biased claims administration.
Id.
The principles announced in Glenn alter some of our
court’s earlier approaches to reviewing discretionary determi-
nations made by ERISA administrators allegedly operating
under a conflict of interest. For example, before Glenn, when
we found a conflict of interest, we applied a "modified"
abuse-of-discretion standard that reduced deference to the
administrator to the degree necessary to neutralize any unto-
ward influence resulting from the conflict of interest. See,
e.g., Stanford, 514 F.3d at 357. And before Glenn we defined
a conflict of interest more narrowly. See Colucci, 431 F.3d at
179-80.
As it now stands after Glenn, a conflict of interest is readily
determinable by the dual role of an administrator or other
fiduciary, and courts are to apply simply the abuse-of-
discretion standard for reviewing discretionary determinations
by that administrator, even if the administrator operated under
a conflict of interest. Under that familiar standard, a discre-
tionary determination will be upheld if reasonable. See Guth-
rie v. Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Assoc. Long-Term Disability
Plan, 509 F.3d 644, 650 (4th Cir. 2007). And any conflict of
interest is considered as one factor, among many, in determin-
ing the reasonableness of the discretionary determination. In
Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare
Plan, 201 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2000), we identified eight nonex-
clusive factors that a court may consider, including a conflict
of interest:
CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER 9
(1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and
goals of the plan; (3) the adequacy of the materials
considered to make the decision and the degree to
which they support it; (4) whether the fiduciary’s
interpretation was consistent with other provisions in
the plan and with earlier interpretations of the plan;
(5) whether the decisionmaking process was rea-
soned and principled; (6) whether the decision was
consistent with the procedural and substantive
requirements of ERISA; (7) any external standard
relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8) the
fiduciary’s motives and any conflict of interest it
may have.
Id. at 342-43 (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, we review the Plan’s determination in this
case for abuse of discretion, taking into account any conflict
of interest as one of the factors considered in determining rea-
sonableness.
III
Turning to Champion’s appeal, she devotes the first half of
her brief to arguing that a conflict of interest exists in this case
because Black & Decker "had a significant financial interest
in the decision to terminate disability benefits to Champion."
She argues accordingly that under our pre-Glenn decisions,
judicial review of the Plan’s determination should be under a
"modified abuse of discretion standard." See, e.g., Stanford,
514 F.3d at 357. She contends that the conflict of interest was
substantial and was manifested by the Plan’s several proce-
dural deficiencies in determining her claim.
In view of Glenn, decided after the district court had ruled
and this appeal had been taken, we conclude that the Plan did
indeed operate under a conflict of interest. The Plan sponsor,
Black & Decker, served in the dual role of both evaluating
10 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
and paying Champion’s claims. This dual role alone fulfills
the requirements for finding a conflict under Glenn. See 128
S. Ct. at 2346, 2348. But the consequence of this finding is
not to modify the standard of review, as urged by Champion,
but rather to consider the conflict as but one among many fac-
tors in determining the reasonableness of the Plan’s discre-
tionary determination. We do this by considering the relevant
factors, as identified in Booth. See 201 F.3d at 342-43.
IV
Acting under the discretion conferred by the Plan’s terms,
the Plan terminated payment of disability benefits to Cham-
pion after 30 months, concluding in its final affirmation of the
decision (1) that "her physical condition — her seizure disor-
der — did not render her unable to engage in a gainful occu-
pation," as her physical seizures were "infrequent" and often
followed her failure to comply with her medication regimen;
(2) that she also suffers from a range of mental health condi-
tions, including pseudoseizures, for which the proper ICD-9-
CM code was 300.11, "which is within the range of the defini-
tion of Mental Health in the Plan"; and (3) that while Champi-
on’s pseudoseizures and depression "may have rendered her
unable to engage in a gainful occupation after the initial 30
month period of Disability," she was not entitled to benefits
under the Plan after the 30-month period because such bene-
fits for a disability "substantiated by a Mental Health condi-
tion," were limited to 30 months. Thus, the validity of the
Plan’s determination to deny Champion further benefits turns
on whether the 300.11 classification was proper.
The district court concluded that there was substantial evi-
dence to justify the Plan’s characterization of Champion’s
pseudoseizures as a mental health disability, i.e., a condition
falling within the ICD-9-CM code range of 290 to 319, and
that Champion could not demonstrate that she was unable to
engage in "any gainful occupation" absent consideration of
her pseudoseizures and other mental health problems. While
CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER 11
the court considered the opinions of various doctors that were
submitted to the Plan, it found Dr. Ebeling’s opinion most
enlightening on the matter. As the court stated:
Dr. Ebeling provided a full and persuasive explana-
tion of his reasons for characterizing Champion’s
pseudoseizures as psychiatric in origin. Most criti-
cally, he referred to Dr. Gettlefinger’s contempora-
neous characterization of the cause of the
pseudoseizures as being related to other mental
health causes (anxiety and depression). He also:
noted Champion’s own statements which suggest her
pseudoseizures were of psychological origin; sup-
ported his opinion as to the nature of the pseudosei-
zures with a specific reference to a medical text; and
explained how his characterization of the pseudosei-
zures fit with Champion’s significant psychiatric dif-
ficulties.
In light of Dr. Ebeling’s opinion and the other evidence in the
record, the court concluded that "it was not unreasonable for
the Plan to conclude that Champion’s pseudoseizures should
be characterized as psychiatric in origin . . . . Given this con-
clusion, it follows that the Plan acted within its discretion in
determining that Champion’s pseudoseizures came within the
Plan’s definition of a mental health condition," thus making
it reasonable for the Plan to find that "Champion was not dis-
abled by any non-mental health condition."
On Champion’s appeal, we review the district court’s deci-
sion de novo, employing the same standards governing district
court review of a plan administrator’s discretionary decision.
See Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514
F.3d 315, 321 (4th Cir. 2008).
There is no dispute that if Champion’s pseudoseizures fall
within the ICD-9-CM code range of 290 to 319, they are
treated as a mental health disability that affects whether Plan
12 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
benefits continue after 30 months. But the parties vigorously
dispute whether her pseudoseizures fall within the 290 to 319
range. And the record on this issue is ambiguous.
During the extensive diagnostic monitoring of Champion
performed at the Medical College of Georgia, physicians
observed seizures both psychogenic and physical in origin.
The professionals treating her over the years used a wide
range of ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes. Some fell between 290
and 319, and some did not, while many of the professionals
did not assign ICD-9-CM codes at all. Champion’s primary
neurologist wrote in 2004, "she continues to have spells, the
dilemma is which of them are epilepsy and which of them are
pseudoseizures related to anxiety and depression." (Emphasis
added).
The Plan’s consulting physician Dr. Ebeling analyzed
Champion’s medical record, which included the notes of her
treating physicians, and he found that code 780.39, which
Champion contends should have applied to her pseudosei-
zures, was inappropriate as an actual diagnosis. He explained
that the 780 to 799 code range refers to "symptoms, signs and
ill-defined conditions," and the ICD-9-CM diagnosis guide
submitted by Champion confirms that this is, indeed, the
heading for the entire 780 to 799 range. Dr. Ebeling found her
treating physicians’ notations and her overall medical history
most consistent with a 300.11 diagnosis for her pseudosei-
zures.
Champion did produce extensive evidence that her seizures
and pseudoseizures were attributable to physical causes,
including past physical abuse. But that evidence did not
advance her argument that the pseudoseizures themselves
should not fall within the code range of 290 to 319. The
Plan’s definition of mental health disability unambiguously
states that the 290 to 319 range governs "regardless of under-
lying cause for such disorder, whether such underlying cause
CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER 13
is mental health, substance abuse, organic, physical or medi-
cal in origin." (Emphasis added).
In view of this record, it was reasonable for the Plan to
have concluded that her pseudoseizures fell within the Plan’s
mental health diagnosis definition. But this still leaves the
question of whether the Plan properly terminated benefits
after 30 months on the ground that Champion’s inability to
work was "substantiated on" a mental health disability diag-
nosis.
Champion produced no evidence showing or tending to
show that she could substantiate her disability claim on just
her epilepsy. She produced persuasive evidence that she is
disabled by her pseudoseizures and epilepsy. But because the
Plan reasonably concluded that her pseudoseizures fell within
the definition of mental health disability, her evidence does
not support a claim that her epilepsy alone rendered her
unable to work within the Plan’s definition of disability.
In contrast, the Plan provided substantial reasons to believe
that Champion would not be disabled without her mental
health disabilities. Dr. Ebeling concluded from the record that
Champion’s physical seizures were "relatively infrequent, not
intractable, and would not preclude her from any occupation
which does not require her to operate machinery or work at
unprotected heights." In accepting this conclusion, the Plan
acted reasonably, especially when Champion’s own corre-
spondence with the Plan supports the conclusion.
Taking into consideration the first seven Booth factors, to
the extent they are relevant, we find no evidence to support
Champion’s claim that the Plan abused its discretion. The
Plan applied the language defining benefits, as well as the
limitations on those benefits; it considered the materials sup-
plied by the professionals who treated Champion; it fully
cured any initial procedural irregularities; and it engaged in a
14 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
decisionmaking process that was ultimately reasoned and
principled.
This brings us to the eighth and final Booth factor —
whether the Plan’s determination is rendered unreasonable by
the effects of its conflict of interest. Although the district
court did not address the effect of any alleged conflict of
interest, it did find that the Plan did not act in a biased man-
ner. It noted that even though the Plan initially made proce-
dural errors requiring a remand, "[t]he errors [did] not . . .
appear to have been based on any improper intent." The court
found it significant that
Plaintiff’s initial claim was denied by a [third party
administrator] which lacked a direct financial inter-
est in the matter, and that the initial denial was
reversed by the Plan based on only minimal submis-
sions by Plaintiff. It is also significant that the Plan
allowed Plaintiff an additional untimely appeal, after
her appeals were otherwise concluded and upon the
appearance of counsel. During the final appeal, the
Plan presented the issue to two independent experts
whose advice the Plan followed in its ultimate denial
decision. While the court has found errors in the pro-
cess and in Plan interpretation, it finds no evidence
of bad faith or improper intent.
When we heed Glenn’s instruction on considering the con-
flict factor, we can find no evidence raising a concern that
would increase the weight of the conflict. See 128 S. Ct. at
2351. Indeed, when the Plan overruled the initial denial of
short-term disability benefits by CIGNA, the third-party
administrator, it manifested an approach demonstrating an
unbiased interest that favored Champion, making the conflict
factor "less important (perhaps to the vanishing point)." Id. In
the same vein, the Plan also voluntarily granted Champion a
second appeal after she hired a lawyer, allowing her to present
further matters. This second appeal, which was not required
CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER 15
by the Plan language, increased the likelihood of an accurate
final decision, thereby also reducing the conflict factor "to the
vanishing point." Id. Champion provides no contrary evidence
tending to show that the Plan’s dual role "affected the benefits
decision." Id.
Thus, the evidence does not support giving such weight to
the conflict that it "act[s] as a tiebreaker when the other fac-
tors are closely balanced." Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2351. Indeed,
the factors are not closely balanced here, and the conflict fac-
tor in particular approaches "the vanishing point." Id. The
Plan provided a well-reasoned justification for its decision
denying further benefits, based on the record and the Plan lan-
guage. Utilizing the combination-of-factors method employed
by Booth and endorsed in Glenn, we conclude that the Plan
did not abuse its discretion in terminating Champion’s disabil-
ity benefits after 30 months.
V
Champion also contends that the district court erred by
ordering a remand to the Plan to determine the appropriate
ICD-9-CM code for her pseudoseizures, rather than simply
ordering that the Plan continue her benefits after the 30-month
period.
We agree that "remand should be used sparingly." Elliott v.
Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 609 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). But we review a dis-
trict court’s decision whether to remand for abuse of discre-
tion. Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 32 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 1994). In conducting such a
review, we recognize that district courts require flexibility to
augment records, as "[s]ome ERISA cases involve complex
medical issues crucial to the interpretation and application of
plan terms." Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America,
987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993).
16 CHAMPION v. BLACK & DECKER
The district court here faced just such an issue in ascertain-
ing the appropriate ICD-9-CM classification code for Cham-
pion’s pseudoseizures. The court also recognized that if the
pseudoseizures were a mental health problem, then the record
justifying benefits beyond 30 months was sparse and inade-
quate. Accordingly, it ordered the remand to permit the Plan
to make the proper classification and to permit Champion to
supplement the record. We find that in the circumstances of
this case, the district court acted within its discretion in
remanding to the Plan, and therefore we reject Champion’s
argument.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.