UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4239
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD DEWAYNE JEFFRIES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00056-LHT-1)
Submitted: November 19, 2008 Decided: December 29, 2008
Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Reita P. Pendry, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Adam Morris,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Dewayne Jeffries appeals from his convictions
for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and possession of a firearm by
a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Jeffries
contends the district court erred by permitting the Government
to submit evidence of uncharged offenses and prior bad acts that
were not relevant to the subject charges. Jeffries asserts that
testimony regarding his previous possession of narcotics, as
well as a prior sale of crack cocaine to an undercover officer,
was irrelevant and prejudicial. Jeffries also contends that
evidence he was banned from the public housing complex where the
relevant events occurred should not have been admitted.
Finally, Jeffries contends there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
Because the district court committed no reversible error and
there was sufficient evidence to support the charges, we affirm.
Jeffries concedes that, because he failed to object to
the admission of the Government’s evidence, his claims must be
reviewed for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). Four conditions
must be met before this court will notice plain error: (1) there
must be error; (2) it must be plain under current law; (3) it
must affect substantial rights, typically meaning the defendant
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is prejudiced by the error in that it affected the outcome of
the proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Id. at 732-37.
Evidence of other acts is not admissible to
demonstrate bad character or criminal propensity, but such
evidence is admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also United States v.
Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1997). Rule 404(b) is an
inclusive rule, allowing evidence of other crimes or acts except
those which tend to prove only criminal disposition. Id. at
994-95; United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir.
1988). Evidence of prior acts is admissible under Rule 404(b)
and Fed. R. Evid. 403, if: (1) the evidence is relevant to an
issue other than the general character of the defendant; (2)
necessary to prove an element of the crime charged; (3)
reliable; and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. Queen, 132
F.3d at 997.
Jeffries’ first contention is the evidence regarding
the public housing ban against him was not relevant to any of
the elements of the charged offenses, was not reliable due to a
lack of evidence regarding the underlying offenses, and was
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unduly prejudicial. However, evidence that is intrinsic to the
story of the alleged crime is not prohibited pursuant to Rule
404(b), as the Government is permitted to provide context
relevant to the criminal charges. United States v. Cooper, 482
F.3d 658, 663 (4th Cir. 2007); Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. During
each of his encounters with police in March 2007, Jeffries was
approached by officers because he was banned from the housing
complex and was therefore trespassing. The fact that Jeffries
was banned was appropriately admitted to provide the context and
setting of the case, as such evidence was relevant in explaining
why Jeffries was approached by the officers and why he fled on
March 27, 2007. See United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1466
(4th Cir. 1995). Because such evidence was necessary to
complete the story surrounding the charged offenses and Jeffries
has failed to demonstrate that he was subject to unfair
prejudice as a result, the district court did not err in
permitting testimony on this matter.
Jeffries next contends the testimony relating to his
involvement in an undercover drug deal in July 2006 should not
have been admitted, as his previous sale of crack cocaine was
not relevant to the subject charge of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. However, evidence of this prior drug
transaction was probative of Jeffries’ knowledge and intent to
distribute narcotics in March 2007. See United States v.
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Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United
States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2004)).
Furthermore, while the previous offense involved a completed
sale of crack cocaine, it was sufficiently similar in nature to
the charged offense of possession of powder cocaine with intent
to distribute. See Queen, 132 F.3d at 996. Accordingly, such
evidence was permissible under Rule 404(b).
Jeffries further asserts that the officers’ testimony
regarding his arrests on March 17 and 18, 2007, was not
admissible, as these prior incidents were not similar to the
charged offense and were not relevant to the element of intent
to distribute. However, at trial, Jeffries testified that he
did not possess or discard any cocaine on March 27, 2007.
Accordingly, because the Government was required to establish
the element of possession, the testimony regarding the events of
March 17 and 18 provided evidence of intent, opportunity, and
lack of mistake as to Jeffries’ possession of cocaine on March
27.
Even assuming this evidence was not admissible
pursuant to Rule 404(b), Jeffries has failed to demonstrate
sufficient prejudice under Olano. Any prejudice suffered by
Jeffries is tempered by the fact the Government provided him
with notice of its intent to use this evidence at trial. See
Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. The district court also provided a
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limiting instruction to the jury at the close of the trial,
noting that evidence of prior acts could not be considered as
bearing on Jeffries’ character or his propensity to commit any
acts alleged in the indictment. See id. Finally, as explained
infra, the Government provided substantial and convincing
evidence that Jeffries was guilty of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. See Branch, 537 F.3d at 342; United
States v. Myers, 280 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2002). In light of
the considerable evidence of Jeffries’ guilt, any prejudice
suffered failed to affect the outcome of the proceedings.
Jeffries’ final claim is that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. This court must affirm a conviction
challenged for sufficiency of the evidence if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996). A defendant challenging a
conviction for sufficiency of the evidence bears a “heavy
burden,” United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th Cir.
1995), and “a decision [to reverse for insufficient evidence]
will be confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978). An
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appellate court must “consider circumstantial as well as direct
evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all reasonable
inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021
(4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
While Jeffries contends there was insufficient proof
of his intent to distribute narcotics, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Government, there was adequate
direct and circumstantial evidence to support Jeffries’
conviction. First, Jeffries’ prior sale of narcotics to an
undercover officer in July 2006 served as evidence of similar
intent to distribute in the present case. See Branch, 537 F.3d
at 341-42. Furthermore, the substantial quantity of drugs
recovered, as well as Jeffries’ possession of a handgun,
constituted additional circumstantial evidence of his
involvement in narcotics distribution. See United States v.
Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 730-31 (4th Cir. 1990). Finally, while
Jeffries testified that the cocaine recovered by police was not
his and the handgun was used for personal protection, the jury
clearly did not consider his testimony to be credible.
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, we find the jury was provided with sufficient
evidence to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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