UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4564
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EIUNIKE TAMARA JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 08-4565
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CYNTHIA DENISE HUNTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr.,
District Judge. (6:07-cr-01346-GRA-1; 6:07-cr-01346-GRA-2)
Submitted: November 13, 2008 Decided: January 15, 2009
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Greenville, South Carolina; David B. Betts, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID
B. BETTS, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. David
Calhoun Stephens, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Cynthia Denise Hunter and Eiunike Tamara Jones pled
guilty to bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344
(2006), and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1) (2006). They were sentenced to 26 months and 42
months’ imprisonment, respectively. On appeal, counsel have
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), in which they state there are no meritorious issues for
appeal, but question whether the district court complied with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Hunter’s guilty plea and
whether the sentence it imposed on Jones was reasonable. Hunter
and Jones were informed of their right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but neither has done so. We affirm.
Because Hunter did not move in the district court to
withdraw her guilty plea, her challenge to the adequacy of the
Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. See United States
v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of
the transcript of the plea colloquy leads us to conclude that
the district court substantially complied with the mandates of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Hunter’s guilty plea and that
any omissions did not affect her substantial rights.
Critically, the district court ensured that the plea was entered
knowingly and voluntarily and was supported by an independent
factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116,
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119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, Hunter does not suggest that
she would have declined to plead guilty had the district court’s
Rule 11 colloquy been more exacting. Accordingly, we discern no
plain error.
Turning to Jones’ sentence, Jones conceded at the
sentencing hearing that the Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months’
imprisonment for the bank fraud conviction was properly
calculated and that she was subject to a statutorily mandated
consecutive sentence of 24 months for each of the aggravated
identity theft convictions. The district court explicitly
treated the Guidelines as advisory, and sentenced Jones after
considering the Guidelines range, the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2006 & Supp. 2008) factors, counsel’s arguments, and
Jones’ allocution. Thus, we conclude that Jones’ within-
Guidelines sentence for the bank fraud conviction and
statutorily required consecutive sentence for the identity theft
convictions ∗ are reasonable. See United States v. Farrior, 535
F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Go, 517 F.3d
216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
∗
As authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(4) (2006), the
district court permitted the two 24-month sentences imposed upon
Jones’ identity theft convictions to run concurrently.
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appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform their clients,
in writing, of their right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If the client requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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