UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4491
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MONTRELLE LAMONT CAMPBELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:07-cr-01123-PMD-1)
Submitted: December 5, 2008 Decided: January 15, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Montrelle Lamont Campbell appeals the district court’s
judgment entered pursuant to his guilty plea to possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(c) (2006). Counsel for
Campbell filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are no meritorious
issues for appeal, but asks this court to review the adequacy of
the plea hearing, the district court’s imposition of a four-
level offense level enhancement, and the reasonableness of
Campbell’s sentence. Campbell was notified of the opportunity
to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has failed to do so.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1), the district court
must address the defendant in open court and inform him of the
following: the nature of the charge; any mandatory minimum
sentence and the maximum possible sentence; the applicability of
the Sentencing Guidelines; the court’s obligation to impose a
special assessment; the defendant’s right to an attorney; his
right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury with the
assistance of counsel; his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses; his right against self-incrimination; and his right
to testify, present evidence, and compel the attendance of
witnesses. The defendant also must be told that a guilty plea
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waives any further trial and that his answers at the proceeding
may be used against him in a prosecution for perjury. Under
Rule 11(b)(2), the court must address the defendant to determine
that the plea is voluntary. The court must determine a factual
basis for the plea under Rule 11(b)(3) and require disclosure of
any plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(2). Because Campbell did
not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, any
challenges to the Rule 11 hearing are reviewed for plain error.
See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-25 (4th Cir.
2002).
After a thorough review of the record, we find there
were no errors with respect to the Rule 11 plea colloquy.
During the plea hearing, the district court properly informed
Campbell of the rights he was forfeiting as a result of his plea
and the nature of the charges and penalties he faced, found that
Campbell was competent and entering his plea voluntarily, and
determined there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea.
Therefore, the record establishes Campbell knowingly and
voluntarily entered into his guilty plea with a full
understanding of the consequences, and there was no error in the
district court’s acceptance of his plea.
Campbell next asks this court to review whether the
district court erred in imposing a four-level offense level
enhancement for possession or use of a firearm in connection
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with another felony offense. The purpose of the enhancement
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2K2.1(b)(6)
(2007) is “to ensure that a defendant receives more severe
punishment if, in addition to committing a firearms offense
within the scope of § 2K2.1, he commits a separate felony
offense that is rendered more dangerous by the presence of a
firearm.” United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir.
2003) (citing former USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2001)). To determine
whether the enhancement should apply, the district court must
consider whether the defendant committed a separate felony
offense and whether the firearm underlying the conviction was
possessed in connection with the additional felony. Id. at 406-
07. The district court’s factual findings concerning sentencing
factors need only be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir.
2005).
According to the presentence report, the four-level
enhancement was warranted on the ground that Campbell used or
possessed a firearm in connection with his possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. At sentencing, Campbell
asserted there was insufficient evidence that the firearm was
possessed in connection with a drug trafficking crime. However,
the substantial quantity of drugs recovered, in conjunction with
his possession of a handgun, constituted sufficient evidence of
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Campbell’s involvement in narcotics distribution. See United
States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 730-31 (4th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, the weapon was possessed to facilitate, or had a
tendency to facilitate, the felony distribution offense, as its
presence was not the result of accident or coincidence. See
Blount, 337 F.3d at 411 (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2000). Finally,
as the Government noted at sentencing, Campbell’s brandishing of
the firearm would be sufficient to support a state felony charge
for assault of a high and aggravated nature. See South
Carolina v. Murphy, 471 S.E.2d 739, 740-41 (S.C. App. 1996).
Therefore, we find the district court did not err in imposing a
four-level offense level enhancement for use or possession of a
firearm in connection with another felony offense.
Finally, Campbell asks this court to review the
reasonableness of his sentence. Following United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court must engage in a
multi-step process at sentencing. First, it must calculate the
appropriate advisory Guidelines range. It must then consider
the resulting range in conjunction with the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) and determine an appropriate
sentence. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007).
We review the district court’s imposition of a sentence for
abuse of discretion. Id. at 597; see also United States v.
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Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). This court “must
first ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting
a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence--including an explanation
for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S. Ct.
at 597.
If there are no procedural errors, we then consider
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.
“Substantive reasonableness review entails taking into account
the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any
variance from the Guidelines range.” Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, this
court may presume a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
reasonable. Id. Mere disagreement with the district court’s
exercise of sentencing discretion does not permit us to
substitute our judgment for that of the lower court. Id. at
473-74. “Even if we would have reached a different sentencing
result on our own, this fact alone is ‘insufficient to justify
reversal of the district court.’” Id. at 474 (quoting Gall, 128
S. Ct. at 597).
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Aside from his objection to the four-level enhancement
for possession or use of a firearm in connection with a felony
offense, Campbell raised no further objections at the sentencing
hearing. The district court appropriately treated the
Sentencing Guidelines as advisory, considered the relevant
factors under § 3553(a), and sentenced Campbell below the
statutory maximum and within the properly calculated Guidelines
range of 84 to 105 months. Campbell has failed to demonstrate
that his sentence is either procedurally or substantively
unreasonable, as his 105-month term of incarceration was within
the Guidelines range. Therefore, we find the sentence imposed
by the district court was reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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