UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-7853
MICHAEL SCOTT MCRAE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL EASLEY; BOYD BENNETT; MICHAEL S. HAMDEN; NORTH
CAROLINA OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICE; H. L. JACKSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:08-cv-00353-GCM)
Submitted: January 15, 2009 Decided: January 23, 2009
Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Michael Scott McRae, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Scott McRae seeks to appeal the district
court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint
for failure to state a claim and the court’s order denying his
motions to amend and to appoint counsel. We dismiss in part and
affirm in part.
Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of
the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal,
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends
the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period
is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of
Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)).
The district court’s order dismissing the complaint
was entered on the docket on August 11, 2008. The notice of
appeal ∗ was filed, at the earliest, on October 3, 2008. Because
McRae failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an
∗
Although McRae did not mention specifically the order
dismissing the complaint in his notice of appeal, he attempts to
challenge that order in his informal appellate brief. See
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992) (holding that document
filed within appeal period and containing information required
by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), is functional equivalent of notice of
appeal).
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extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss this
portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Turning to the district court’s order denying McRae’s
motions to amend and to appoint counsel, we note the McRae
failed to challenge that order in his informal appellate brief.
Thus, McRae has waived appellate review of those issues. See
4th Cir. R. 34(b) (“The Court will limit its review to the
issues raised in the informal brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s order.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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