PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
SHERRY PRESSLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TUPPERWARE LONG TERM DISABILITY
PLAN; THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA, No. 08-1350
Defendants-Appellees,
and
TUPPERWARE US, INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:05-cv-01875-TLW-TER)
Argued: December 4, 2008
Decided: January 21, 2009
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges,
and Rebecca Beach SMITH, United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Smith
joined.
2 PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Stephen J. Wukela, WUKELA LAW FIRM, Flor-
ence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark William Bakker,
WYCHE, BURGESS, FREEMAN & PARHAM, P.A.,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: J.
Theodore Gentry, WYCHE, BURGESS, FREEMAN &
PARHAM, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Sherry Pressley appeals from the district court’s dismissal,
for being time-barred, of her claim against The Prudential
Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") for its failure
to respond to a request for information, in contravention of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA"). See Pressley v. Tupperware
Long Term Disability Plan, No. 4:05-cv-01875 (D.S.C. Sept.
18, 2006) (the "Dismissal Order").1 Pressley also appeals from
the court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration of the Dis-
missal Order. See Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disabil-
ity Plan, No. 4:05-cv-01875 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2008) (the
"Reconsideration Order").2 As explained below, we vacate
and remand.
I.
The operative complaint in these proceedings (the "Com-
plaint") was brought against Prudential; Tupperware US,
Incorporated ("Tupperware"); and the Tupperware Long Term
1
The Dismissal Order is found at J.A. 146-55. (Citations herein to "J.A.
___" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this
appeal.)
2
The Reconsideration Order is found at J.A. 162-86.
PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM 3
Disability Plan (the "Plan").3 According to the Complaint,
Pressley was an employee of Tupperware, and a participant in
the Plan. See Complaint ¶ 7. On July 16, 2002, Pressley "left
work at Tupperware due to medical conditions," and she then
sought benefits under the Plan. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The defendants —
including Prudential, the insurer of the Plan — refused, how-
ever, to approve such benefits for Pressley. See id. ¶ 10.
Moreover, Prudential and Tupperware failed to provide Press-
ley with requested information. See id. ¶¶ 35-37. With spe-
cific regard to Prudential, "[o]n August 20, 2002, and on
numerous dates thereafter, [Pressley] sent a written request
for information," including "a copy of the policy." Id. ¶ 35.4
Pressley submitted a similar request to Tupperware on Febru-
ary 6, 2003. See id. ¶ 36. Nonetheless, "[a]s of the date of
[the] Complaint," Prudential and Tupperware had "yet to sup-
ply the requested information." Id. ¶ 37.
Pressley filed her Complaint in a South Carolina state
court, and this action was thereafter removed to the District
of South Carolina. Among the claims asserted in the Com-
plaint is the one at issue herein: the ERISA claim, initiated
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), for failure to respond to a
request for information (the "§ 1132(c) claim"). Pressley ini-
tially asserted the § 1132(c) claim against all three defendants,
but she later agreed to dismiss the claim as to the Plan.
Prudential and Tupperware each filed a motion, under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss the § 1132(c)
claim.5 By its Dismissal Order of September 18, 2006, the dis-
3
The Complaint — which is found at J.A. 12-20 — is an amended
pleading of May 27, 2005. The parties have since agreed that Pressley
misnamed the Plan in the Complaint; the Plan’s correct name is the Tup-
perware Corporation Benefits Plan.
4
The record reflects that Pressley sent a second request for information
to Prudential on January 2, 2003.
5
By their motions, both Prudential and Tupperware sought, in the alter-
native, a Rule 56 award of summary judgment on Pressley’s § 1132(c)
4 PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM
trict court granted Prudential’s and Tupperware’s motions,
entering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the § 1132(c) claim for
being time-barred. Thereafter, Pressley requested, pursuant to
Rule 59(e), that the court reconsider the Dismissal Order. By
its Reconsideration Order of February 25, 2008, however, the
court denied Pressley’s Rule 59(e) request. The court entered
final judgment that same day, and Pressley then timely noted
this appeal. Because Pressley subsequently released Tupper-
ware from this appeal pursuant to a settlement agreement, the
appeal now concerns only Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim against
Prudential.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lambeth
v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).
"[W]here facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense" —
including "the defense that the plaintiff’s claim is time-
barred" — "are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be
reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6)."
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007)
(en banc).
III.
Here, the district court applied a one-year statute of limita-
tions to Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim. The court concluded that
the § 1132(c) claim was time-barred, because the alleged
requests for information all occurred more than one year
before the filing of the Complaint. Pressley contends, how-
claim. Tupperware premised its motion on the contention that the
§ 1132(c) claim was time-barred. Prudential focused its motion on the
argument that it is not an "administrator" subject to liability on the
§ 1132(c) claim, but also summarily adopted Tupperware’s timeliness
contention.
PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM 5
ever, that a three-year statute of limitations applies, rendering
her § 1132(c) claim timely and necessitating the vacatur of the
judgment in favor of Prudential. We address the timeliness
issue beginning with a discussion of the relevant statutes, fol-
lowed by an overview of the district court’s ruling. Finally,
we explain our own assessment of the applicable statute of
limitations.
A.
The ERISA provision giving rise to Pressley’s § 1132(c)
claim provides, in pertinent part, that
[a]ny administrator . . . who fails or refuses to com-
ply with a request for any information which such
administrator is required by this subchapter to fur-
nish to a participant or beneficiary (unless such fail-
ure or refusal results from matters reasonably
beyond the control of the administrator) by mailing
the material requested to the last known address of
the requesting participant or beneficiary within 30
days after such request may in the court’s discretion
be personally liable to such participant or benefi-
ciary in the amount of up to $100 a day from the
date of such failure or refusal, and the court may in
its discretion order such other relief as it deems
proper.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Section 1132
specifies that "[a] civil action may be brought . . . by a partici-
pant or beneficiary . . . for the relief provided for in subsec-
tion (c) of this section." Id. § 1132(a)(1)(A). Significantly,
§ 1132 does not identify any other person who may bring a
civil action for subsection (c) relief.
Because § 1132 does not contain a statute of limitations,
courts must "borrow the state law limitations period applica-
ble to claims most closely corresponding to the federal cause
6 PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM
of action." White v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 488 F.3d
240, 245 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 266-67 (1985)). Prudential maintains that the state law
limitations period for claims most closely corresponding to
Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim is found in South Carolina Code
Annotated section 15-3-570, which provides that "[a]n action
upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture given, in whole or in
part, to any person who will prosecute for it must be com-
menced within one year after the commission of the offense."6
Pressley, however, urges the application of a different statu-
tory provision — section 15-3-540, providing that "[a]n action
upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture when the action is
given to the party aggrieved or to such party and the State"
must be brought within three years.7
B.
In its Dismissal Order, the district court observed that the
difference between South Carolina Code Annotated sections
15-3-570 and 15-3-540 "is that [section] 15-3-570 applies to
statutory penalties given to ‘any person who will prosecute
for it’ while [section] 15-3-540 applies to statutory penalties
given to ‘the party aggrieved.’" Dismissal Order 4. The court
further noted Pressley’s assertion that an ERISA penalty
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) "is given to the person aggrieved
rather than to anyone who will prosecute for it." Id.
Nonetheless, the district court agreed with Prudential that
the one-year limitations period in South Carolina Code Anno-
6
Section 15-3-570 further provides that, "[i]f the action be not com-
menced within the year by a private party it may be commenced within
two years thereafter in behalf of the State by the Attorney General or the
solicitor of the circuit where the offense was committed, unless a different
limitation be prescribed in the statute under which the action is brought."
7
Subsection (2) of section 15-3-540 — the relevant subsection here —
further provides that the three-year limitation period applies "except when
the statute imposing [the action] prescribes a different limitation." Subsec-
tion (1) relates to actions against sheriffs, coroners, and constables.
PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM 7
tated section 15-3-570 applies to Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim.
In so ruling, the court found support in our unpublished deci-
sion in Underwood v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 95-3036, 1997
WL 33123 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997). There, in calculating the
appropriate penalty for a notice violation pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 1132(c), we observed that, "[u]nder South Carolina
law, private parties must commence an action for statutory
penalties or forfeitures within one year of the triggering
event." Underwood, 1997 WL 33123, at *5 (citing S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-3-570).8 As the district court recognized, however,
there is no indication that the Underwood plaintiff raised, or
that we considered, the possibility that section 15-3-540’s
three-year limitations period applies. See Dismissal Order 4.
The court also properly acknowledged that Underwood, as an
unpublished opinion, does not constitute "binding precedent,"
and that our discussion of the applicable statute of limitations
therein "may be dicta." Id. at 5.
The district court was persuaded to follow Underwood,
however, by Bryant v. Food Lion, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 346
(D.S.C. 2000). Relying on Underwood, the Bryant district
court rejected the contention of ERISA plaintiffs that South
Carolina’s three-year, rather than one-year, limitations period
applied to their claims for notice violation penalties under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(c). See Bryant, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 376-77. The
court recognized that "[t]he statute on which plaintiffs rely"
— South Carolina Code Annotated section 15-3-540 — "was
neither cited nor discussed in Underwood." Id. at 377. Yet,
the court observed, "[t]he Fourth Circuit explicitly held that
[section] 15-3-570 applied to a [§ 1132(c)] penalty claim
8
A notice violation actionable under § 1132(c) involves failing to give
timely notice of rights under ERISA or the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169 ("COBRA"). See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(c)(1)(A). The district court concluded that there is no basis for
applying different limitations periods depending on whether a § 1132(c)
claim was brought under subsection (1)(A) for failure to give notice of
ERISA or COBRA rights, or under subsection (1)(B) for failure to respond
to a request for information. On this issue, we agree with the district court.
8 PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM
brought in South Carolina." Id. Because the plaintiffs "offered
no reason for [the Bryant court] to reach a different conclu-
sion," the district court determined that section 15-3-570’s
one-year limitations period applied. Id. We subsequently
affirmed Bryant in an unpublished opinion that did not dis-
cuss the statute of limitations issue. See Bryant v. Food Lion,
Inc., 8 F. App’x 194 (4th Cir. 2001).
Here, in justifying its reliance on Underwood and Bryant,
the district court explained that Underwood, though unpub-
lished, "provide[s] persuasive authority in light of the fact that
the Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to address the issue
upon the appeal of the district court’s decision in the Bryant
case and declined to do so." Dismissal Order 5. The court also
observed that "[n]o other cases have been cited by the parties
that focus on this precise question" of the applicable statute
of limitations. Id. The court concluded that, "[i]n light of
Underwood and absent any case law outlining the application
of and differences between [section] 15-3-570 versus [sec-
tion] 15-3-540," it was "constrained to follow the conclusion
set forth in Underwood although it may be dicta." Id.
C.
Notwithstanding our prior decisions in Underwood and
Bryant, we now conclude that the three-year statute of limita-
tions found in South Carolina Code Annotated section 15-3-
540 is applicable to Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim. We, of
course, are not bound by Underwood and Bryant in that they
were unpublished. See Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468
F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that "we ordinarily
do not accord precedential value to our unpublished deci-
sions," and that such decisions "are entitled only to the weight
they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning" (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). In the circumstances, we do
not find Underwood and Bryant to be persuasive. As noted
above, there is no indication that the Underwood plaintiff
argued for, or that we considered, the applicability of section
PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM 9
15-3-540 to a § 1132(c) claim. And, we did not acknowledge
or address the statute of limitations issue in Bryant. Having
now had the opportunity to fully consider the relevant stat-
utes, we deem section 15-3-540 to apply to claims most
closely corresponding to Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim.
In so concluding, we observe that, "[u]nder the most basic
canon of statutory construction, we begin interpreting a stat-
ute by examining the literal and plain language of the statute."
Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124, 1133 (4th Cir.
1996). The literal and plain language of section 15-3-540 —
creating a three-year limitations period for "[a]n action upon
a statute for a penalty or forfeiture when the action is given
to the party aggrieved" — fits precisely with a claim for pen-
alties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) for failure to respond to a
request for information, because such claim is given to the
requesting "participant or beneficiary," i.e., "the party
aggrieved."
To be sure, South Carolina Code Annotated section 15-3-
570 — imposing a one-year limitations period on "[a]n action
upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture given, in whole or in
part, to any person who will prosecute for it" — could be read
to include the 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) "participant or beneficiary"
as "any person who will prosecute for" the ERISA penalty.
Section 15-3-570, however, was clearly intended to encom-
pass more persons than only "the party aggrieved" (if it was
meant to encompass "the party aggrieved" at all). To apply
the more general section 15-3-570, and not the more specific
section 15-3-540, to the § 1132(c) claim would contravene the
"basic principle of statutory construction that when two stat-
utes are in conflict, a specific statute closely applicable to the
substance of the controversy at hand controls over a more
generalized provision." Farmer v. Employment Sec. Comm’n
of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274, 1284 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing HCSC-
Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam)).
Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude that it is section
10 PRESSLEY v. TUPPERWARE LONG TERM
15-3-540’s three-year limitations period that applies to Press-
ley’s § 1132(c) claim.9
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the judgment in favor
of Prudential on Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim, and remand for
such other and further proceedings as may be appropriate.10
VACATED AND REMANDED
9
Although the Supreme Court of South Carolina has not directly
addressed the interplay between sections 15-3-540 and 15-3-570, it has
applied those statutes in a manner consistent with our ruling today. See
Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 508 S.E.2d 16, 20 (S.C. 1998) (concluding that
section 15-3-540’s three-year limitations period applied to class action
wherein plaintiffs sought penalties under consumer protection statute for
Pacesetter’s failure to ascertain plaintiffs’ own preferences of attorney and
insurance agent for mortgage closing); Montjoy v. One Stop of Abbeville,
Inc., 478 S.E.2d 683, 684 (S.C. 1996) (applying section 15-3-570’s one-
year limitations period to third party’s action to recover statutory penalty
based on gambling losses of another); Ardis v. Ward, 467 S.E.2d 742, 744
(S.C. 1996) (same).
10
Because the three-year limitations period found in South Carolina
Code Annotated section 15-3-540 applies to Pressley’s § 1132(c) claim,
we need not reach her contention that Prudential’s alleged failure to pro-
vide requested information constituted a continuing offense. We also
decline to address alternative grounds for affirmance raised on appeal by
Prudential, including its contention that it is not an "administrator" subject
to liability on the § 1132(c) claim. See supra note 5. Although we are enti-
tled to sustain the judgment of the district court on any ground apparent
from the record, see Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir.
1996), we deem it appropriate to allow the court to resolve Prudential’s
"administrator" contention in the first instance, see Q Int’l Courier, Inc.
v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 219-20 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2006).