Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc.

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BARBARA FORRESTER; GARY 
FORRESTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PENN LYON HOMES, INCORPORATED,
d/b/a Penn Lyon Homes
Corporation; PLH ERECTORS,
INCORPORATED,
 No. 07-2171

Defendants-Appellants,
and
FOWLER HOMES, LLC, a Virginia
Limited Liability Company,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.
John Preston Bailey, Chief District Judge.
(3:05-cv-00117-JPB)

Argued: December 2, 2008

Decided: January 21, 2009

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER
and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
2 FORRESTER v. PENN LYON HOMES
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opin-
ion, in which Chief Judge Williams and Judge Niemeyer
joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas Moore Lawson, LAWSON & SILEK,
P.L.C., Winchester, Virginia, for Appellants. Braun A. Hams-
tead, HAMSTEAD & ASSOCIATES, L.C., Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Brian J.
McAuliffe, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellees.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

Penn Lyon Homes, Inc. and PLH Erectors, Inc. (collec-
tively Penn Lyon) appeal from the district court’s order deny-
ing their motion to stay court proceedings and compel
arbitration of Barbara and Gary Forrester’s claims against
Penn Lyon. Before moving to compel arbitration, Penn Lyon
engaged in extensive litigation measures that caused the For-
resters actual prejudice. For this reason, Penn Lyon has
defaulted the right to arbitration, and we therefore affirm.

I.

On September 29, 2005, the Forresters filed a complaint in
state court against Penn Lyon for claims arising out of the
construction and installation of a modular home. At some
point during the sale of the home, Penn Lyon Homes provided
the Forresters a "One Year Limited Warranty" and an applica-
tion for a "10 Year Manufacturer’s Structural Warranty." The
structural warranty contains an arbitration clause requiring the
parties to submit to arbitration all disputes arising under it, but
 FORRESTER v. PENN LYON HOMES 3
this clause was not included in the application received by the
Forresters.

Count III of the Forresters’ complaint, the count relevant to
this appeal, alleges a breach of implied and express warranty.
It states that Penn Lyon failed to deliver goods in compliance
with "the express warranty provided to" the Forresters. After
removing the suit to federal court, Penn Lyon denied these
allegations in its answer but did not raise arbitration as an
affirmative defense.

For the next 18 months the parties engaged in discovery
and filed an assortment of pretrial motions. For example,
Penn Lyon filed a cross-claim, a motion for extension of time
to complete discovery and file dispositive motions, a motion
to continue trial, a motion to extend time to submit pretrial fil-
ings, a motion for summary judgment, and at least two
motions in limine. The parties also took depositions, engaged
in multiple settlement and mediation proceedings, and filed
their proposed jury instructions, verdict forms, voir dire, and
exhibit and witness lists in anticipation of the scheduled trial.

Throughout the course of these proceedings, the Forresters
repeatedly referred to the structural warranty. In May 2006, in
response to an interrogatory requesting the facts, occurrences,
witnesses, or documents supporting their claim that Penn
Lyon had breached any implied warranty, the Forresters listed
the structural warranty and produced two pages they had
received from Penn Lyon related to it. At that same time, in
response to requests for production of documents including
written warranties, the Forresters again listed and produced
the announcement of the structural warranty that they had
received from Penn Lyon. The Forresters’ opposition to Penn
Lyon’s motion for summary judgment, which they filed in
October 2006, quoted and cited the structural warranty
announcement, although they did not argue for relief under it.
Finally, a month before the scheduled trial the Forresters filed
a proposed verdict form that specifically asked: "Did Defen-
4 FORRESTER v. PENN LYON HOMES
dant Penn Lyon breach the extended ten-year structural war-
ranty made directly to the Plaintiffs . . . ?"

On May 11, 2007, two days after the Forresters filed their
proposed verdict form, the parties reached a settlement agree-
ment, which they re-negotiated in August 2007. On Novem-
ber 5, 2007, after the settlement failed, the Forresters moved
for a scheduling conference. Only then did Penn Lyon indi-
cate its intent to move to compel arbitration. At a hearing on
November 9, 2007, the district court denied Penn Lyon’s oral
motion to compel arbitration and scheduled a trial date. Penn
Lyon then filed a written motion to prohibit claims under the
structural warranty or, alternatively, to compel arbitration and
stay court proceedings.

Although the district court deferred making a decision on
whether the Forresters could make a claim under the struc-
tural warranty until the court could hear relevant testimony at
trial, it denied Penn Lyon’s motion to compel arbitration and
stay judicial proceedings. The court found that Penn Lyon had
defaulted its right to arbitration, reasoning that the complaint
itself refers to the express warranty, that the arbitrable claim
does not pertain to any defendant other than Penn Lyon and
is only one of several claims in the complaint, and that Penn
Lyon waited for two years and until the completion of almost
all pretrial preparations and filings to request arbitration. Penn
Lyon then filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 9 U.S.C.
§ 16 (2006).

II.

We review a district court’s decision as to default of arbi-
tration de novo but defer to the district court’s underlying fac-
tual findings. MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244,
250 (4th Cir. 2001). The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), governs the rights and responsibilities
of the parties with respect to an arbitration agreement. Patten
 FORRESTER v. PENN LYON HOMES 5
Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d
200, 204 (4th Cir. 2004).

Under section 3 of the FAA, a party loses its right to a stay
of court proceedings in order to arbitrate if it is "in default in
proceeding with such arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
Default in this context resembles waiver, but, due to the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration, courts have limited
the circumstances that can result in statutory default. Maxum
Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir.
1985).

For example, simply failing to assert arbitration as an affir-
mative defense does not constitute default of a right to arbitra-
tion. See Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal
Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 96 (4th Cir. 1996). Similarly, delay
and participation in litigation will not alone constitute default.
See MicroStrategy, 268 F.3d at 250-52. But a party will
default its right to arbitration if it "so substantially utiliz[es]
the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitra-
tion would prejudice the party opposing the stay." Maxum
Founds., 779 F.2d at 981. The "heavy burden" of showing
default lies with the party opposing arbitration. Am. Recovery
Corp., 96 F.3d at 95.

Penn Lyon argues that the district court erred when it held
that Penn Lyon had defaulted its right to compel arbitration.
It asserts that it did not know until May 9, 2007—when the
Forresters filed their proposed verdict form—that the For-
resters intended to make a claim under the structural warranty.
Because the parties reached a settlement on May 11, 2007 and
did not return to court until November 2007, Penn Lyon
argues that it moved to compel arbitration without delay.

The record reveals, however, that Penn Lyon was on notice
of the structural warranty claim long before it moved to com-
pel arbitration. As described at length above, the Forresters
referred to the warranty several times during the course of the
6 FORRESTER v. PENN LYON HOMES
litigation, including in their complaint, among their discovery
responses, and in their opposition to summary judgment. Penn
Lyon has not adequately explained how it could have over-
looked the structural warranty claim.

Although Penn Lyon was, or should have been, aware of
the Forresters’ reliance on the structural warranty at an early
stage in the litigation, Penn Lyon waited until the eve of trial
to file its motion to compel arbitration. By that time, over two
years of litigation had occurred in which the Forresters had
engaged in extensive pretrial preparations including multiple
depositions, a motion for summary judgment, motions in
limine, and submission of an array of pretrial filings. "To per-
mit litigants to participate fully in discovery, make motions
going to the merits of their opponent’s claims, and delay
assertion of a contractual right to compel arbitration until the
eve of trial defeats one of the reasons behind the federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration . . . ." Com-Tech Assocs. v. Computer
Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 938 F.2d 1574, 1577 (2d Cir. 1991) (cita-
tions omitted).

This use of the litigation process by Penn Lyon caused the
Forresters actual prejudice. It required the Forresters to
expend significant time and money responding to Penn
Lyon’s motions and preparing for trial, permitted Penn Lyon
to defeat several of the Forresters’ claims on summary judg-
ment, and forced the Forresters to reveal their trial strategy.
Moreover, before it moved to compel arbitration, Penn Lyon
had the opportunity to witness how a jury might respond to
a claim under the structural warranty in another lawsuit in the
same district court, where a jury found Penn Lyon liable to a
homeowner under the warranty at issue in this case. See Ish-
man v. Penn Lyon Homes, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-21 (N.D. W. Va.
Jun. 15, 2007). Penn Lyon, therefore, has defaulted its right
to arbitration. See Fraser v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding actual
prejudice when the party opposing arbitration had to respond
 FORRESTER v. PENN LYON HOMES 7
to multiple dispositive motions and "prepare repeatedly for
trial rather than for arbitration").

None of the cases on which Penn Lyon relies requires a
contrary holding. None involves equally extensive pretrial fil-
ings, resolution of a motion for summary judgment, or an
indication that the delayed request for arbitration provided the
party seeking arbitration a strategic advantage. See, e.g., Pat-
ten Grading, 380 F.3d at 206-07 (finding no default where the
party favoring arbitration waited four months and until some
discovery had occurred before filing a motion to compel arbi-
tration but where no party had taken a deposition or filed
motions regarding the merits); Carolina Throwing Co. v. S &
E Novelty Corp., 442 F.2d 329, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1971) (find-
ing no default where the party favoring arbitration filed an
answer and counterclaim and waited four months before filing
a motion to compel arbitration).

Nor, contrary to Penn Lyon’s assertion, does Micro-
Strategy, 268 F.3d at 250-54, provide support for its position
that by not specifically litigating the structural warranty claim
prior to filing its motion to compel arbitration, it did not
default its right to arbitration. In MicroStrategy, we found no
default although MicroStrategy, the party seeking arbitration,
had previously initiated litigation against Lauricia. Id. at
247-48. Those previous lawsuits involved claims legally and
factually distinct from the later claims for which Micro-
Strategy sought arbitration. Id. at 250. Here, in contrast, the
structural warranty claim is factually intertwined with the For-
resters’ other claims and, perhaps more importantly, is part of
the lawsuit that Penn Lyon chose for two years to litigate in
court rather than in arbitration.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is

AFFIRMED.