Schaffer Ex Rel. Schaffer v. Weast

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN SCHAFFER, a minor, by his 
parents and next friends, Jocelyn
and Martin Schaffer; JOCELYN
SCHAFFER; MARTIN SCHAFFER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.  No. 07-2038
JERRY WEAST, Superintendent
Montgomery County Public
Schools; BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, Senior District Judge.
(8:99-cv-00015-PJM)

Argued: December 2, 2008

Decided: January 29, 2009

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER,
Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Michael and Judge Traxler joined.
2 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michael Eig, MICHAEL J. EIG & ASSO-
CIATES, P.C., Chevy Chase, Maryland, for Appellants.
Audrey Jane Anderson, HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Zvi Greis-
mann, MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Rockville, Maryland; Maree F. Sneed, Jessica L. Ellsworth,
HOGAN & HARTSON, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for
Appellees.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Brian Schaffer and his parents seek reimbursement for
Brian’s private school tuition in the eighth grade under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1482 ("IDEA"). Brian, who graduated from high
school in 2003, had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
and other learning disabilities as a student. Brian’s parents
rejected an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") that the
Montgomery County Public School System ("MCPS") pro-
posed for Brian’s eighth-grade year. The Schaffers later
accepted an IEP that MCPS proposed for Brian’s tenth-grade
year. The Schaffers introduced the tenth-grade IEP in district
court as "additional evidence," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii),
that they say demonstrates the inadequacy of the eighth-grade
IEP. The district court did not attach weight to the tenth-grade
IEP, and the court granted summary judgment for MCPS.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to penalize MCPS for revising Brian’s IEP in the
tenth grade, we affirm.
 SCHAFFER v. WEAST 3
I.

A.

Brian Schaffer struggled academically in his studies at
Green Acres School, a private institution, through the seventh
grade. After officials at Green Acres told Mrs. Schaffer that
the school could not properly accommodate Brian’s learning
disabilities, she contacted MCPS and requested that Brian be
placed in a special-education program for his eighth-grade
year in 1998-99.

MCPS convened a committee to evaluate Brian’s disability
and to create an IEP, as the IDEA requires. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414.* The committee held two meetings that were attended
by MCPS officials, the Schaffers, and the Schaffers’ attorney.
At those meetings, the committee discussed evaluations by
three MCPS officials who had met with Brian, observed him
in the classroom, and administered tests to assess his disabili-
ties and needs. The committee also considered the results of
two private evaluations obtained by the Schaffers. The private
evaluators had concluded that Brian had an auditory process-
ing disorder and that he would do best in small special-
education classes.

Based on all of the available information, the committee
concluded that Brian had a learning disability and proposed
an IEP. The IEP set a number of goals for Brian, the first
being "[t]o demonstrate improved auditory perception and
comprehension." And the IEP provided that Brian would
receive numerous forms of special-education support at Her-

*For consistency, all citations are to the current version of the IDEA,
enacted in 2004. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647. The proceedings in this
case have spanned the 2004 reenactment. While Congress renumbered
some of the relevant sections in 2004, the substance of those sections has
not changed.
4 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
bert Hoover Middle School, a public school near Brian’s
home.

At Herbert Hoover, Brian would have attended "inclusion
model" classrooms for half of his courses (English, Science,
and World Studies), totaling 15.3 hours per week. Inclusion
model classes are designed to include special-education stu-
dents within the general-education environment: one teacher
oversees the entire class, and a second, special-education
teacher focuses solely on a handful of disabled students. Brian
also would have received 45 minutes of speech-language ther-
apy per week. And in place of learning a foreign language, he
would have been given 45 minutes per day of reading and
writing support in a self-contained special-education class-
room. Brian would have attended general-education classes
for his remaining courses (Art, Math, and Physical Educa-
tion). In all of his classes, Brian would have received accom-
modations that included the use of a computer, copies of
lecture notes, preferential seating, repetition of directions, and
test-taking with extended time and in small groups.

The Schaffers objected to the proposed IEP. They told
MCPS that the class sizes at Herbert Hoover were too large
to meet Brian’s needs. MCPS then offered to place Brian at
Robert Frost Middle School, another nearby public school. In
addition to all of the services proposed at Herbert Hoover,
Brian would have attended a small special-education class for
English at Robert Frost, rather than the inclusion model.
There also would have been only three other special-
education students in Brian’s inclusion-model classes at Rob-
ert Frost (compared to four or five at Herbert Hoover).

The Schaffers remained dissatisfied. They decided to reject
the IEP and to send Brian to the private McLean School of
Maryland for his eighth-grade year. The Schaffers had applied
to McLean shortly after requesting that MCPS evaluate Brian.
Before the Schaffers received MCPS’s proposed IEP, Brian
was accepted at McLean, and the Schaffers paid the enroll-
 SCHAFFER v. WEAST 5
ment fee to reserve a spot for Brian at McLean at that time.
After receiving the IEP and deciding on McLean, the Schaf-
fers requested a due process hearing to challenge the IEP and
to seek reimbursement for Brian’s tuition and expenses at the
private school in the 1998-99 school year. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f).

B.

An Administrative Law Judge in Maryland’s Office of
Administrative Hearings held a three-day hearing to deter-
mine whether the eighth-grade IEP would have provided
Brian the necessary "free appropriate public education" under
the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The ALJ heard testi-
mony from Mrs. Schaffer, the Schaffers’ two private evalua-
tors, and four MCPS officials who had worked on Brian’s
IEP. He found that the case was close and that the "assign-
ment of the burden of proof [was] critical" to the outcome. He
assigned the burden to the Schaffers. And, applying the stan-
dard expressed by the Supreme Court in Board of Education
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the ALJ held that the eighth-
grade IEP offered Brian a free appropriate public education
because the IEP was "reasonably calculated by MCPS to pro-
vide educational benefit and to meet [Brian’s] educational
needs."

The Schaffers then filed a civil action to challenge the
ALJ’s decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The district
court reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ should
have assigned the burden of proof to MCPS. Brian S. v.
Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 545 (D. Md. 2000). A series of
appeals and remands followed. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004); Schaffer v. Vance, 2 Fed. Appx. 232
(4th Cir. 2001); Weast v. Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D.
Md. 2002). In the interim, the ALJ reconsidered the case and
—after denying a request by the Schaffers to introduce addi-
tional evidence—decided that reversing the burden of proof
also reversed the outcome. However, the Supreme Court
6 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
eventually held that the Schaffers had the burden of proof in
the administrative hearing because they were the party seek-
ing relief. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005). The
Supreme Court then remanded the case for a decision on the
merits under the correct burden of proof.

Before the district court could reach the merits, however,
the Schaffers moved to introduce "additional evidence" under
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). The evidence included letters
between the Schaffers and MCPS in 2000, the transcript of an
IEP meeting in 2000, and an IEP created in 2000 for Brian’s
tenth-grade year. The evidence showed that MCPS had
offered, and the Schaffers had accepted, a tenth-grade IEP
that placed Brian in the Secondary Learning Center at Walter
Johnson High School. At Walter Johnson, Brian attended
small special-education classes for all of his courses other
than physical education and an elective in the arts. The tenth-
grade IEP also stated that Brian’s academic difficulties were
due to "auditory processing and memory." According to the
Schaffers, the new language and services in the tenth-grade
IEP amounted to a concession by the school system that
Brian’s eighth-grade IEP was inadequate.

The district court accepted briefing and held a hearing on
the Schaffers’ additional evidence. The court then admitted
the evidence. The court also allowed MCPS to offer addi-
tional evidence in rebuttal. MCPS did so, offering two decla-
rations from MCPS officials who stated that Brian’s tenth-
grade IEP was based on both new assessments of his
disability—in particular, Brian scored differently in 2000 on
the same IQ test that he took in 1998—and Brian’s transition
from middle school to high school. MCPS’s evidence also
showed that Brian had attended more general-education
classes over time and that he had graduated from Walter John-
son in 2003 with a 3.4 grade point average in his final term.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The parties
again briefed and orally argued the relevance of the Schaffers’
 SCHAFFER v. WEAST 7
additional evidence. The district court then granted summary
judgment in favor of MCPS in a bench ruling. The court dis-
cussed the Schaffers’ evidence and the relevant case law,
focusing on our analysis of the limitations on "additional evi-
dence" in Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d
659 (4th Cir. 1998). The court then stated that it was "not pre-
pared to conclude that, two years after the fact, the position
that [MCPS] may have taken, vis-a-vis the child, would
reflect on whether what [it] did two years earlier was appro-
priate or not." The court therefore decided that it would not
attach weight to the Schaffers’ additional evidence when
assessing the adequacy of the 1998 IEP. Turning to the merits,
the court granted deference to the ALJ’s original decision
made under the correct assignment of the burden of proof, and
the court held that the eighth-grade IEP was sufficient under
the IDEA.

II.

A.

The Schaffers appeal the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to MCPS. The Schaffers’ primary claim is that the
district court erred by "refusing to consider" their evidence
regarding the tenth-grade IEP proposed by MCPS. Brief for
Appellants at 2. The Schaffers argue that their evidence was
admissible under the language of the IDEA, which provides
that the district court "shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). They also
rely on our decision in Springer v. Fairfax County School
Board, 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1998), as well as the First Cir-
cuit’s decision in Town of Burlington v. Department of Edu-
cation, 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984), to argue that the tenth-
grade IEP constituted admissible "additional evidence." And
the Schaffers argue that their evidence should have been deci-
sive in this otherwise close case. They claim that the tenth-
grade IEP was an admission by the school system that Brian
had a severe auditory processing problem and needed small
8 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
classes all along, and that the eighth-grade IEP was therefore
inappropriate.

The Schaffers’ claims regarding their additional evidence
fail for a straightforward reason. The district court did "hear"
the Schaffers’ evidence of events occurring two years after
the ALJ’s original hearing and decision. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). But the court properly exercised its discre-
tion to discount that evidence because the evidence promoted
a hindsight-based review that would have conflicted with the
structure and purpose of the IDEA.

In fact, the district court devoted substantial attention to the
Schaffers’ additional evidence. When the Schaffers offered
their evidence, the court accepted briefing and held a hearing
regarding the evidence and its relevance. The court then
admitted the evidence. The court also admitted rebuttal evi-
dence from MCPS. The court then received more briefing on
the evidence in the parties’ summary judgment motions. And
at the summary judgment hearing, the court heard even more
argument from the parties regarding the proper weight to be
given to the Schaffers’ evidence.

In the end, however, the Schaffers failed to convince the
district court that their additional evidence should determine
the merits of the case. The district court’s treatment of the evi-
dence presents a question not of admissibility, but of weight.
Indeed, it is difficult to discern what more the district court
could have done with the Schaffers’ evidence—other than
weigh it differently. The Schaffers are therefore arguing
beside the point when they insist that their evidence was
admissible under the IDEA’s broad language, as well as under
Springer and Burlington. The district judge did admit the
Schaffers’ post-hearing evidence, but he declined to use that
evidence to Monday-morning quarterback the school system.
And in doing that, the district court acted well within its dis-
cretion.
 SCHAFFER v. WEAST 9
Our decision in Springer, consistent with the law in other
circuits, recognized that district courts have the discretion to
tailor their proceedings and to limit the introduction of "addi-
tional evidence" under the IDEA. See 134 F.3d at 666-67 (cit-
ing cases). That authority was necessary, we held, to protect
the role of the administrative hearing as the primary forum in
which to resolve disputes regarding IEPs—to avoid turning
the administrative hearing into a "mere dress rehearsal" fol-
lowed by an "unrestricted trial de novo" in the district court.
Id. at 667 (quoting Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910
F.2d 983, 997 (1st Cir. 1990)). Indeed, state administrative
hearings under the IDEA are entitled to "due weight." Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). But if parties
could always introduce additional evidence in the district
court "to patch up holes in their administrative case,"
Springer, 134 F.3d at 667, administrative proceedings would
no longer receive the weight that they are due.

The Schaffers’ evidence demonstrates this problem. Their
evidence is not identical to that in Springer: the Schaffers’
evidence arose only after the initial administrative hearing and
thus could not have been presented there. But this type of
post-hearing evidence still risks diminishing the role of
administrative proceedings under the IDEA. In the Schaffers’
view, the district court in this case should have overturned the
ALJ’s original decision based on evidence that did not even
exist at the time that the school district’s decision was made.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in treating
such evidence cautiously. It is inevitable that additional infor-
mation will become available after an administrative hearing
—be it changes in the child’s academic performance,
improvements in diagnostic techniques, newly available edu-
cation programs, and so on. Indeed, the IDEA requires school
districts to reevaluate children’s disabilities periodically, 20
U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2), and to review and revise IEPs on an
annual basis, id. § 1414(d)(4)(A). Thus, not only does the
IDEA recognize that children change over time, CM v. Bd. of
10 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
Educ., 241 F.3d 374, 380 (4th Cir. 2001), but the statute affir-
matively requires school districts to create and analyze new
information—which would become fodder for endless litiga-
tion if district courts were compelled to give significant
weight to new evidence whenever it arose. See, e.g., West
Platte R-II Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, 439 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.
2006) (holding that there was no "solid justification" for intro-
ducing evidence that arose after the administrative hearing
because a "vast and detailed administrative record" already
existed and because courts in IDEA cases "normally deter-
mine these issues based solely on the administrative record").

As we recognized in Springer, prolonged litigation and a
lack of finality disserve the IDEA’s purpose of including dis-
abled students in the public education system as quickly as
possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Springer, 134 F.3d at 667;
see also CM, 241 F.3d at 380. And perpetual litigation due to
the introduction of new evidence also would force school dis-
tricts to divert scarce resources to the already substantial costs
of IDEA litigation, a concern recognized by the Supreme
Court in this very case. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,
58-59 (2005). As the Court observed, the IDEA does not itself
decide whether "marginal dollars should be allocated to litiga-
tion and administrative expenditures or to educational ser-
vices," but "a great deal is already spent" by school districts
on administration and litigation under the IDEA. Id. The dis-
trict judge obviously did not err in taking the Supreme Court’s
concern into account.

Assigning dispositive weight to evidence that arises only
after the administrative hearing presents one additional and
important danger: turning district court review of IEPs into a
second-guessing game that will only harm the interests of the
disabled children the statute was intended to serve. Judicial
review of IEPs under the IDEA is meant to be largely pro-
spective and to focus on a child’s needs looking forward;
courts thus ask whether, at the time an IEP was created, it was
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educa-
 SCHAFFER v. WEAST 11
tional benefits." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207; Burlington, 736
F.2d at 788; Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir.
1999). But this prospective review would be undercut if sig-
nificant weight were always given to evidence that arose only
after an IEP were created. Cf. Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v.
J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming the district
court’s conclusion that evidence of a later IEP was "irrelevant
to the issue of the appropriateness of" prior IEPs). Judicial
review would simply not be fair to school districts, whose
decisions would be judged in hindsight "based on later assess-
ments of a student’s needs at [a] later point in time." Brief for
Appellees at 28; see also Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70
F.3d 751, 762 (3d Cir. 1995). And more importantly, if ser-
vices added to a later IEP were always used to cast doubt on
an earlier one, school districts would develop a strong disin-
centive against updating their IEPs based on new information.
This scenario is the exact opposite of what Congress intended
when it provided for regular review and revision of IEPs, see
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A), and it would do little to help the
interests of disabled children.

B.

The Schaffers’ evidence illustrates well the unfortunate
incentives created by excessive hindsight-based judging of
IEPs. The Schaffers argue that Brian’s tenth-grade IEP dem-
onstrates that Brian had a severe auditory processing problem
and needed small classes all along, and they therefore argue
that the eighth-grade IEP was a mistake at the time it was pro-
posed. As a factual matter, the Schaffers’ argument is untena-
ble. Brian’s own academic history makes clear that his profile
did not remain static over time. MCPS submitted a declaration
from Janan Slough, the Assistant Principal at Walter Johnson,
who stated that "[a] student’s needs can change from school
year to school year and even during a school year." And she
stated that Brian exemplified these sorts of changes because
he "pursued an increasingly mainstreamed program at Walter
Johnson, while continuing to achieve academic success."
12 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
It is also clear that the tenth-grade IEP was based on pre-
cisely these sorts of changes in Brian’s profile. The Schaffers’
evidence—particularly the transcript of the IEP meeting in
2000—shows that the school system’s IEP team carefully
considered both new assessments of Brian and the Schaffers’
concerns regarding Brian’s recent academic performance, as
well as Brian’s needs in high school. The IEP team then chose
to place Brian at Walter Johnson based on Brian’s changed
circumstances. Another declaration submitted by MCPS sup-
ports the same conclusion. David Cross, an MCPS special
educator, stated that the IEP team took "into consideration the
special education services available and appropriate for a high
school setting," as opposed to the middle school setting of the
1998 IEP. Cross also stated that Brian performed differently
in 2000 on the same IQ test that had been administered to him
in 1998—Brian showed an increased discrepancy in 2000
between his verbal and performance IQ scores—and that this
new assessment and others "were relevant to and the reason
for the IEP Team’s suggestion that Brian be placed at the
Walter Johnson Learning Center."

Thus, the evidence demonstrates that MCPS took careful
measures in 2000 to reassess Brian’s disability and to offer
him the special-education services that were appropriate for
him at the time. In particular, the tenth-grade IEP team recog-
nized that Brian had continued to struggle with reading and
that his grades at the private McLean School in eighth and
ninth grades had worsened over time; that information influ-
enced the special-education offerings that Brian was accorded
at Walter Johnson. To interpret the tenth-grade IEP as an
admission of fault as to the eighth-grade IEP would discour-
age MCPS and other school systems from reassessing and
updating IEPs out of fear that any addition to the IEP would
be seen as a concession of liability for an earlier one. And it
would thereby prevent students like Brian from receiving
appropriate services as their profiles changed. District courts
are free to exercise their discretion in a manner that avoids
such results.
 SCHAFFER v. WEAST 13
As we have made clear, the dangers of post-hearing evi-
dence are significant. But we deal here with matters of degree,
not absolutes. We recognize that some evidence arising after
an administrative hearing might do minimal harm to the role
of the ALJ or would not serve to prolong litigation. And judi-
cial review under the IDEA does look backward to some
extent, so evidence arising after an administrative hearing
might bear on the suitability of an earlier IEP without turning
the process into an overly retrospective one. We have held
that where an IEP is accepted, evidence of educational prog-
ress under that IEP is useful in deciding whether the IEP was
appropriate. See MM v. Sch. Dist., 303 F.3d 523, 532 (4th Cir.
2002). Because they can view the evidence first-hand, district
courts are in the best position to make these judgment calls
and to grant proper weight to additional evidence without
contradicting the structure and purposes of the IDEA.

Based on all of these considerations, the district court
plainly exercised appropriate discretion in deciding that the
Schaffers’ post-hearing evidence should not determine the
appropriateness of the eighth-grade IEP. As its bench ruling
makes clear, the district court examined the Schaffers’ evi-
dence and understood their argument that the tenth-grade IEP
demonstrated that the eighth-grade IEP was inappropriate. But
the district court then took into account the problems with
relying on evidence like the Schaffers’. The court correctly
recognized that review of IEPs must be largely prospective,
whereas the Schaffers’ evidence encouraged a hindsight-
based review of the eighth-grade IEP. And the district court
concluded that the Schaffers’ evidence on what the school
system did in 2000 should not "reflect on whether what
[MCPS] did two years earlier was appropriate or not." This
treatment of the Schaffers’ evidence respected Brian’s chang-
ing needs and was well within the district court’s discretion.
We thus have no reason to question the district court’s deci-
sion to grant the Schaffers’ evidence little weight.
14 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
III.

We turn now to the merits of the case: whether the eighth-
grade IEP satisfied the IDEA by offering Brian a free appro-
priate public education. We conclude that it did.

The ALJ found that the eighth-grade IEP was adequate
when he assigned the burden of proof to the Schaffers in the
original due process hearing. As the Supreme Court later held,
that assignment of the burden of proof was correct. Schaffer,
546 U.S. at 62. The ALJ’s findings in the first hearing were
therefore "regularly made" and entitled to due weight, or a
"presumption of correctness." County Sch. Bd. v. Z.P., 399
F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Doyle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1991)); see
also MM, 303 F.3d at 530-31. The district court properly
deferred to these findings in granting summary judgment to
MCPS. And we see no reason to overturn the findings of the
ALJ or the district court’s deference to them.

Indeed, numerous features of the eighth-grade IEP sup-
ported the ALJ’s conclusion that the IEP was "reasonably cal-
culated by MCPS to provide educational benefit and to meet
[Brian’s] educational needs" and thus offered Brian a free
appropriate public education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
The IEP recognized Brian’s auditory processing problem
when it listed as the first of a number of goals: "[t]o demon-
strate improved auditory perception and comprehension." The
original IEP for Herbert Hoover Middle School proposed that
Brian would receive 15.3 hours per week of inclusion model
courses, 45 minutes per week of speech-language therapy, and
45 minutes per day of reading and writing support in a
special-education classroom. Brian also would have received
additional accommodations that included the use of a com-
puter, copies of lecture notes, preferential seating, repetition
of directions, and test-taking with extended time and in small
groups. And when the Schaffers questioned Brian’s placement
at Herbert Hoover due to the sizes of the classes, MCPS tried
 SCHAFFER v. WEAST 15
to accommodate the Schaffers with a placement at Robert
Frost Middle School, where Brian would have received even
more special-education support.

Four MCPS officials testified before the ALJ that these fea-
tures of the eighth-grade IEP would have appropriately
addressed Brian’s disability. The ALJ deemed these officials
to be "well qualified witnesses," and he deferred to their pro-
fessional judgment. We owe them deference as well. See MM,
303 F.3d at 531, 533.

The ALJ also presented valid reasons for assigning compar-
atively less weight to the testimony of the Schaffers’ experts,
who claimed that the eighth-grade IEP would not have
addressed Brian’s disability. For example, neither of the
Schaffers’ experts had personally observed the inclusion
model classes at Herbert Hoover or Robert Frost, so the ALJ
discounted the experts’ testimony that the classes at those
schools would not have been appropriate for Brian. The ALJ
also questioned the testimony of one of the experts, Dr. Ruth
Spodak, because she had met with Brian for only ten minutes.
And while the Schaffers have argued throughout this litigation
that their other expert, Dr. Carol Kamara, was well-qualified
to diagnose Brian with a severe auditory processing problem
because she was an audiologist, the ALJ observed that MCPS
had reviewed Dr. Kamara’s evaluation, had conducted its own
assessment of Brian’s auditory processing problem, and had
reached a different conclusion. The ALJ also attempted to rec-
oncile Dr. Kamara’s testimony with that of the MCPS offi-
cials when he found that Brian had "moderate difficulty with
auditory processing skills." And the ALJ then concluded that
the eighth-grade IEP appropriately addressed Brian’s existing
auditory processing problem. We presume these findings of
the ALJ to be correct, and we see no reason to overturn them
based on the evidence available at the time.

In the end, the ALJ recognized the primary flaw in the
Schaffers’ arguments and the testimony of their experts: the
16 SCHAFFER v. WEAST
Schaffers sought more than the IDEA requires. As the ALJ
observed, the Supreme Court has held that an IEP need not
provide the best possible education; instead, it need only pro-
vide "some educational benefit," or a "basic floor of opportu-
nity." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-01; see also MM, 303 F.3d at
526. The ALJ realized, however, that the Schaffers and their
experts were seeking small classes for Brian in order to maxi-
mize his potential. For example, the ALJ observed that Dr.
Spodak’s written evaluation of Brian prior to the hearing
stated that Brian would "do best" in small classes, not that
they were necessary to provide him an educational benefit.
Although the ALJ recognized that Brian might have received
a greater educational benefit at McLean than from the IEP,
the Schaffers failed to persuade him that the eighth-grade IEP
was not reasonably calculated to provide some educational
benefit to Brian. Granting due weight to the proceedings
before the ALJ, we agree that the eighth-grade IEP would
have provided Brian a free appropriate public education. The
Schaffers’ claim for reimbursement therefore fails, and the
judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED