UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1767
DONNA MARIE CONNER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION; ANTOINETTE S. CLARINGTON,
case administrator; MR. RHODES, Arbitrator; MR. HOPKINS;
LINDA BEYEA; AUTHOR SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a
Authorhouse,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cv-00021-RLW)
Submitted: January 21, 2009 Decided: February 6, 2009
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Donna Marie Conner, Appellant Pro Se. Philip Clark Baxa, MERCER
TRIGIANI, LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Bryan William Horn, FLORANCE,
GORDON & BROWN, Richmond, Virginia; Judy L. Woods, BOSE MCKINNEY
& EVANS, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donna Marie Conner appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her civil action on the motions to dismiss filed by
the Appellees. Conner filed a Complaint in the district court
arising out of an arbitration proceeding between Conner and 1st
Books Library a/k/a AuthorHouse (“AuthorHouse”), which was
administered by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).
The underlying basis for the Complaint was to have vacated and
set aside the December 18, 2007 arbitration Award issued by
Richard S. Rhodes (“Rhodes”), as arbitrator, in the matter of
Donna Marie Conner v. AuthorHouse, American Arbitration
Association No. 52 143 Y 000308 07. Conner named as Defendants
the AAA; Antoinette S. Clarington, Case Administrator for the
AAA; Linda Beyea, Assistant Vice President of the AAA; and
Rhodes (collectively the “AAA Appellees”). 1 While not identified
as Defendants in the caption of the Complaint, 2 Author Solutions,
Inc. d/b/a AuthorHouse (“AuthorHouse”) and Eugene Hopkins
(collectively referred to as the “AuthorHouse Appellees”),
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Conner also named Bryan H. Babb, a partner with the law
firm that represented the AuthorHouse Appellees as outside
counsel in the Arbitration. Babb was dismissed as a Defendant
by the district court on April 18, 2008, and Conner has not
appealed that order.
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Nor did Conner make any allegation against them or seek
relief from them in the body of her Complaint.
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parties to the underlying arbitration proceeding, have been
listed as Appellees as well.
The arbitrator found that Conner failed to sustain her
burden of proof relative to most of her claims. He further
found that while AuthorHouse did, in fact, ultimately terminate
the Contract in compliance with Conner’s request, it did so
after a delay which constituted a breach of contract. Rhodes
determined, however, that the delay caused no damage to Conner,
thus precluding any entitlement to relief. Both parties to the
arbitration were directed to share the administrative fees and
expenses of the AAA, as well as the compensation and expenses of
the arbitrator. Conner sought to overturn the arbitration Award
on the ground that Rhodes purportedly rendered an “unethical
decision.”
Following a hearing on the collective motions to
dismiss, the district court dismissed Conner’s action. Finding
a myriad of jurisdictional infirmities, as well as the failure
to state a legal claim for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), we affirm.
It is clear that the underlying purpose of Conner’s
Complaint was to have the Award rendered in favor of AuthorHouse
set aside. For relief, Conner requested that AuthorHouse be
forced to pay the monies owed to her for its breach of the
Contract between them, which monies she sought as relief in the
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arbitration proceeding. She also sought a ruling that
AuthorHouse pay the fees associated with the arbitration
proceeding. While she complained of a “conspiracy” between
Rhodes and AuthorHouse, and claimed that Rhodes’ decision was
“unethical,” she sought no relief from Rhodes or the AAA
directly.
When stripped of its hyperbole, Conner’s Complaint is
a clear-cut attempt to appeal the adverse arbitration Award. As
such, the AAA Appellees are correct in their position that they
are not indispensible, necessary, or proper parties to the
litigation. See, e.g., Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th
Cir. 1977). In addition, when parties agree to submit to AAA
arbitration and mediation proceedings, they are deemed to have
consented to the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules, which rules
provide that neither the AAA nor any arbitrator in a proceeding
under such rules is a necessary or proper party in a judicial
proceeding relating to the arbitration, nor are they liable to
any party in any action for damages or injunctive relief for any
act or omission in connection with any arbitration.
Moreover, review of arbitral awards is limited.
Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994).
See also International Med. Group, Inc. v. American Arbitration
Ass’n, 312 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2003); Austern v. Chicago Bd.
Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990); Tamari v.
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Conrad, 552 F.2d at 780; Cahn v. International Ladies’ Garment
Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962).
Here, Conner failed to articulate any factual or legal
underpinnings to support her vague and conclusory claims against
the AAA Appellees, including her assertion that Rhodes’ decision
was unethical. As such, those claims fail.
Nor did the district court err in dismissing Conner’s
Complaint against the AuthorHouse Appellees. We find that the
action suffered a number of infirmities as to those Defendants,
including, but not limited to, lack of jurisdiction,
insufficient service of process pursuant to the legal
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, and failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
While a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is
clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts
that could be proved consistent with the allegations, Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and a plaintiff does
not need to make detailed factual allegations in a complaint,
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964
(2007), a complaint requires more than labels and conclusions,
and thus a complainant must do more to state purported grounds
of her entitlement to relief. Id. at 1964-65.
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We find that Conner's Complaint fails to meet the most
basic requirements of pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is not a short and plain statement of the grounds
for the claim showing that Conner is entitled to the relief she
seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rather, it is little more than a
collection of cursory allegations of unethical behavior
associated with an incorrect result relative to the arbitration
proceeding. Conner’s conclusory allegations that she has been
wronged by virtue of Rhodes’ decision in the arbitration
proceeding, together with her failure to make specific
allegations against or request specific relief that could be
provided by the AuthorHouse Appellees, are insufficient under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Her Complaint therefore
fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted by either
AuthorHouse or Hopkins. Accordingly, the district court’s
dismissal of the Complaint as against the AuthorHouse Appellees
was proper pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In summary, Conner has pled no facts to support a
finding that she stated a claim for which relief may be granted
by any of the named Defendants. As her Complaint is merely a
compilation of irrational statements and self-serving
conclusions, it is insufficient under any interpretation to
support a finding that Conner stated a claim sufficient to
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withstand a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the district
court’s dismissal of Conner’s Complaint was proper.
Conner also seeks to have this court discipline Bryan
Horn, attorney for Defendant Babb, for his involvement in the
case following the stipulated dismissal of Babb from the
litigation. As this issue was not first presented to the
district court, and is, in any event, frivolous, it is not
properly before this court on appeal.
Accordingly, we deny Conner’s motion for appointment
of counsel, we decline to consider issues not first presented to
the district court, and we affirm the district court’s order
dismissing Conner’s action. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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