PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
OLIVIA WALLER, Administrator of
the Estate of Rennie Edward Hunt,
Jr., deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF DANVILLE, VIRGINIA, A
municipal corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
T. NEAL MORRIS, Chief of Police
of the City of Danville, Virginia,
in both his individual and official
No. 07-2099
capacities; HUGH WYATT, in his
individual and official capacity as
City of Danville Police Officer;
GERALD FORD, in his individual
and official capacity as City of
Danville Police Officer; DENNIS
HALEY, in his individual and
official capacity as City of
Danville Police Officer; JASON
PRESLEY, in his individual and
official capacity as City of
Danville Police Officer;
2 WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE
OFFICER GRAHAM, in his individual
and official capacity as City of
Danville Police Officer; JOHN
DOES, Police officers of the City
of Danville Police Department, the
identity and number of whom is
presently unknown; RICHARD ROES,
Supervisory police officers of the
City of Danville, the identity and
number of whom is presently
unknown, in both their individual
and official capacities; TODD
BROWN, in his individual and
official capacity as City of
Danville Police Officer; KENNETH
FITZGERALD; WILLIAM CHANEY; B.
C. ELLIOTT,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.
(4:03-cv-00039-jlk)
Argued: December 4, 2008
Decided: February 12, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and TRAXLER,
Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Traxler joined.
WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE 3
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Charles Edelman Borden, O’MELVENY &
MYERS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Martha
White Medley, DANIEL, MEDLEY & KIRBY, P.C., Dan-
ville, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lani R. Miller,
Amber Taylor, O’MELVENY & MYERS, L.L.P., Washing-
ton, D.C., for Appellant. James A. L. Daniel, M. Brent
Saunders, H. Clay Gravely, IV, DANIEL, MEDLEY &
KIRBY, P.C., Danville, Virginia, for Appellee.
OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Olivia Waller appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to defendants on her claim under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Appellant argues
that the Danville Police Department failed to reasonably
accommodate Rennie Hunt’s mental illness while Hunt held
a woman hostage in his apartment, leading to a violent con-
frontation with police that left Hunt dead. We hold that any
duty of reasonable accommodation that existed under the
ADA was satisfied in these circumstances. We therefore
affirm the judgment.
I.
A.
We briefly review the facts in this case, which are set out
in our earlier opinion, Waller v. City of Danville, 212 F.
App’x 162 (4th Cir. 2006).
At 9:23 p.m. on May 10, 2002, the Danville Police Depart-
ment ("DPD") received a 911 call from Teressa Jennings. Jen-
4 WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE
nings was concerned about her friend, Virginia Evans, and
said she had not been able to reach Evans for two days despite
calling and knocking on her door. Jennings reported that
Evans had a live-in boyfriend, Rennie Hunt, whom Jennings
described as a "mental patient" who had been "in and out of
the hospital."
In response to the 911 call, three DPD officers met Jen-
nings at Hunt’s apartment, where Hunt refused to let them in.
Evans called from inside the house that she was "okay" but
that Hunt would not let her come to the door. When officers
called out to Hunt, he told them "not to be concerned with"
Evans and to "leave [him] alone." Officers thought Hunt
sounded mentally disturbed. After failing to confirm Evans’s
safety, they contacted their supervisor, Captain David Stowe,
who came to the scene. Hunt refused to let Stowe check on
Evans and said, "If you come in here, I’ve got something for
you," leading Stowe to think he had a weapon.
Stowe then returned to police headquarters and conferred
with the shift commander. He also ran Hunt’s criminal history
and found that Hunt had prior arrests for public drunkenness,
disorderly conduct, and assault on Evans. Stowe further con-
ferred with his direct superior, Major B.C. Elliott, telling
Elliott that Hunt had been in and out of mental institutions. In
response, Elliott instructed Stowe to call Lieutenant Hugh C.
Wyatt, a DPD hostage negotiator. In the meantime, Evans’s
sister had arrived at the apartment and told officers she had
not heard from Evans in several days and that Hunt had sev-
eral times been admitted to mental institutions.
When Wyatt arrived at the apartment, almost two hours had
elapsed since the original 911 call. When Wyatt spoke to
Hunt through the back door, Hunt yelled, "I’m going to blow
your goddamned head off." This threat led Wyatt to cease
negotiations, and officers decided to seek an arrest warrant
against Hunt for assault. DPD then deployed its Emergency
Response Team ("ERT"), which eventually forced its way
WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE 5
into the apartment through the back door. After Hunt came
toward the officers twice, swinging what appeared to be a
scythe and brandishing what looked like a knife, three officers
shot and killed him.
B.
In April 2003, Hunt’s sister, Olivia Waller ("plaintiff-
appellant"), personally and as administrator of Hunt’s estate,
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of
Danville, DPD, and individual officers ("defendants"). The
complaint alleged inter alia that defendants had violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Reha-
bilitation Act. Specifically, Count IV of the complaint alleged
that the City of Danville had discriminated against Hunt on
the basis of his disability by unlawfully arresting him, using
excessive force, and failing to properly train officers in deal-
ing with the disabled.
The district court granted officers qualified immunity on
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims. In December 2005, the
district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all
of plaintiff’s claims and dismissed as moot plaintiff’s request
for further discovery. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary
judgment to this court.
This court affirmed the district court’s ruling on plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claim, holding that "the use of deadly
force by [officers] was objectively reasonable . . . in light of
the facts and circumstances presented to [them] at the time."
Waller, 212 F. App’x at 171. We noted that Hunt and Evans
had been secluded for several days, that police had recently
arrested Hunt for domestic assault on Evans, and that Hunt
had implied to officers "that he had a weapon and was pre-
pared to use it." Id. at 170.
6 WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE
We reversed and remanded the grant of summary judg-
ment, however, on appellant’s claims of disability and race dis-
crimination.1 We concluded that "it certainly appears that the
officers sought to seize Hunt not because of his mental illness
but because of his ‘objectively verifiable misconduct’ towards
the officers and Evans." Id. at 173. But we found that the
"precise nature of the discrimination claim" was unclear, that
the parties had not fully briefed the merits of the claim, and
that appellant had not been able to conduct discovery on the
claim. Id. We therefore remanded "for further delineation of
the discrimination claims by the plaintiff, inquiry by the dis-
trict court and, if necessary, discovery into the claims as artic-
ulated by plaintiff." Id. at 173-74.
On remand, the parties conducted extensive discovery on
the ADA claim. The district court then granted summary
judgment to defendants, holding that exigent circumstances
present throughout the investigation absolved DPD of any
duty to reasonably accommodate Hunt’s mental illness. Wal-
ler v. City of Danville, 515 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (W.D. Va.
2007). The court noted that Evans had been missing for days,
that Hunt would not let the officers see her, and that Hunt
used threatening language toward the officers. Id. The court
concluded that requiring officers to concern themselves with
ADA compliance in such circumstances would unnecessarily
endanger innocent lives. Id. (citing Hainze v. Richards, 207
F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000)). Regarding the failure to train
claim, the court concluded that the ADA’s plain language
does not support a claim for failure to train. Id. at 665. Plain-
tiff now appeals. We review a grant of summary judgment de
novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
the non-prevailing party.
1
The parties later stipulated to dismissal of the race discrimination claim
with prejudice.
WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE 7
II.
A.
Plaintiff’s chief claim in the instant appeal is that DPD vio-
lated the ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate Hunt in
the two hour standoff prior to Hunt’s threat against Wyatt.
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. "Discrimination" under the statute includes "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . ." Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The district court held
that no duty of reasonable accommodation arose under these
circumstances and plaintiff contends vigorously not only that
such a duty existed but that it was breached in this case.
In the context of arrests, courts have recognized two types
of Title II claims: (1) wrongful arrest, where police arrest a
suspect based on his disability, not for any criminal activity;
and (2) reasonable accommodation, where police properly
arrest a suspect but fail to reasonably accommodate his dis-
ability during the investigation or arrest, causing him to suffer
greater injury or indignity than other arrestees. See Gohier v.
Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 1999); see also
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a paraplegic arrestee could make out a reason-
able accommodation claim under the ADA after being injured
in a police van not equipped with wheelchair restraints).
Some courts, however, including the district court here,
have held that Title II contains an "exigent circumstances"
exception that absolves public entities of their duty to provide
any reasonable accommodation. See Waller, 515 F. Supp. 2d
at 663-64; see also Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir.
8 WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE
2000). In Hainze, the Fifth Circuit held that "Title II does not
apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to reported distur-
bances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls
involve subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s
securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to
human life." 207 F.3d at 801. Requiring officers to consider
ADA compliance in such situations would risk public safety;
in Hainze, for example, the suspect came toward police across
a parking lot, brandishing a knife and refusing orders to halt.
Id. at 797, 801. Therefore, officers had no duty to accommo-
date his mental illness before securing the scene and ensuring
public safety. Id. at 801.
The DPD relies on Hainze to argue that the ADA’s duty of
reasonable accommodation did not apply during the standoff
at Hunt’s apartment. Whether or when an "exigent circum-
stances" constraint upon the ADA exists, however, is a
broader proposition than is needed to decide this case. For it
is clear that exigency is not irrelevant. Reasonableness in law
is generally assessed in light of the totality of the circum-
stances, and exigency is one circumstance that bears materi-
ally on the inquiry into reasonableness under the ADA.
Accommodations that might be expected when time is of no
matter become unreasonable to expect when time is of the
essence.
In this case, plaintiff argues that officers were not working
in a compressed timeframe because they had two hours to
assess the state of affairs in Hunt’s apartment. But "exigency"
is not confined to split-second circumstances. Although the
officers did not face an immediate crisis, cf. Hainze, 207 F.3d
at 801-02, the situation was nonetheless unstable: the officers
could not see or speak to Evans, Hunt implied that he had
weapons, and Hunt was growing more and more agitated. The
standoff could have taken a dark turn quickly and led to the
loss of Evans’s life. If officers were not actually making split-
second decisions, they were nonetheless operating under the
pressure of time from the start. Just as the constraints of time
WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE 9
figure in what is required of police under the Fourth Amend-
ment, they bear on what is reasonable under the ADA. See
Bates v. Chesterfield County, 216 F.3d 367, 372 (4th Cir.
2000) ("[T]he volatile nature of a situation may make a pause
for psychiatric diagnosis impractical and even dangerous."). A
reasonable belief on the part of officers "that this was a poten-
tially violent hostage situation" may not resolve the ADA
inquiry, but it cannot help but inform it. Waller, 515 F. Supp.
2d at 664.
B.
Plaintiff suggests several possible courses of action that she
argues would have constituted "reasonable accommodation"
under the ADA during the standoff. First, she criticizes offi-
cers for banging on Hunt’s door and yelling, noting that these
actions could have further agitated Hunt. She also argues that
officers could have called mental health professionals, con-
tacted Hunt’s family members, or sought to administer medi-
cations to Hunt. Plaintiff maintains that these actions could
well have led to a more benign outcome.
We shall assume for purposes of argument that a duty of
reasonable accommodation existed. See § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Given the circumstances presented to the officers, however,
we conclude that it was unreasonable to expect the sorts of
accommodations that plaintiff proposes. To say that officers
should have taken certain other actions during the standoff is
to lean far in the direction of impermissible hindsight. See
Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801-02. And plaintiff’s list of potential
responses — summoning mental health professionals and
family members and administering medication — is itself
problematic.
First, it would be unclear to officers which of plaintiff’s
various alternatives they would be required to pursue. Offi-
cers would be second-guessed for pursuing one over the other,
on grounds that there was always something more or different
10 WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE
that could have been done. Moreover, the delay involved in
getting the proper professionals or medications or determining
which family member to call, for instance, might itself be
considerable. See, e.g., Bates, 216 F.3d at 372. As to mental
health professionals, it is unclear even now which or how
many professionals should have been called or what the offi-
cers were required to permit them to do once they arrived.
Officers were likewise in no position to know what sort of
relationships existed within Hunt’s family, and if they had
called to the scene a family member from whom Hunt was
alienated or estranged, they could have escalated the situation
rather than defusing it. As for medications, there is no indica-
tion that Hunt would have taken medicines the police or any-
one else provided. Officers in particular are not trained as
medical doctors, and nothing in the record suggests that they
knew which medications Hunt should take, whether he had
recently taken medications, or what dosage would be appro-
priate, or that they could have easily obtained the relevant
medical information while monitoring Evans’s safety as well
as their own. Given the circumstances of the standoff, we
believe the sorts of suggestions proposed by plaintiff go
beyond what is meant by "reasonable accommodation." See
Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801-02.
There is also the danger in third party hostage situations
that an excessive focus on avoiding civil liability could skew
the officers’ assessments. Officers were balancing two aims
here, not one: they wanted to defuse the situation and help
Hunt regain a sense of composure, but they also hoped to save
Evans from serious harm. In this regard, a hostage situation
is unlike that of most ADA claims, where employers or public
entities are accommodating individuals with whom they have
a history of association or at least with whom they can com-
municate. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131. But Hunt was behind
closed doors and barely speaking. The notion that officers
should have done more to accommodate him overlooks the
impediments involved.
WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE 11
Instead, any duty of reasonable accommodation that might
have existed was satisfied in several ways. First, officers
spoke with their supervisors and with persons close to the sit-
uation: Jennings, who placed the 911 call, and Evans’s sister.
Both confirmed that Hunt had a history of mental illness.
Officers also called in a DPD hostage negotiator, Lieutenant
Wyatt. Wyatt’s qualifications were not in dispute: he had
served with DPD since 1965, working as a hostage negotiator
and as head of the ERT.2 He also prepared DPD’s procedures
for hostage negotiations and had trained other officers on
proper methods for negotiating with hostage-takers.
At deposition, Wyatt testified that he repeatedly requested
that Hunt let him see Evans to confirm her safety, but Hunt
kept Evans away from the door and yelled at Wyatt to "get
away." Further, Wyatt testified that the late hour of the stand-
off would have made it difficult to reach mental health profes-
sionals at the hospital, even if time had allowed for such
consultation. Nothing in the record suggests that Wyatt acted
toward Hunt in a manner that escalated tensions; rather, Wyatt
considered all plausible options, attempted to speak with
Hunt, and tried to verify Evans’s safety.
Second, it bears notice that police attempted to calm the sit-
uation by waiting at least two hours before entering the apart-
ment. Several officers attempted to speak with Hunt through
the apartment door, and, as plaintiff notes, officers made at
least nine phone calls during the standoff: they summoned
supervisors, spoke further with Jennings, contacted Evans’s
sister, and ran a criminal background check on Hunt. All of
these actions reflect the officers’ considered judgment that a
period of waiting might calm Hunt and bring a peaceful reso-
2
Following oral argument, plaintiff submitted a motion to supplement
the record with portions of Wyatt’s deposition. Plaintiff argues that this
testimony raises doubts about the extent of Wyatt’s disability training. We
note that even if it were proper to supplement the record, the additional
information would make no difference to our decision.
12 WALLER v. CITY OF DANVILLE
lution to the standoff. To be sure, as Hunt grew more agitated,
officers decided that waiting further posed unacceptable risks,
most especially to Evans. But the decision to wait was a
sound exercise of discretionary judgment that bears on the
reasonableness of any accommodation required.
We note that "reasonable accommodation" in this case
bears a resemblance to how police might have addressed a
hostage situation that did not involve a disabled individual. In
any potentially violent standoff, the officers may have sum-
moned a hostage negotiator and may have waited several
hours before entering the apartment. Having now had the ben-
efit of further discovery and argument, we think plaintiff has
not indicated what the officers reasonably might be expected
to do that they in fact did not do. The loss of any life is a trag-
edy, never to be discounted. But we cannot see that this
injury, unfortunate as it was, flowed from any violation of the
ADA.3
AFFIRMED
3
Because we conclude that any duty of reasonable accommodation was
met in these circumstances, we do not reach the question of whether the
ADA supports a claim for failure to train. While plaintiff attempts to pose
training in dealing with those with mental health problems as an "accom-
modation," it is well-settled that the failure to train must have caused some
violation of law for an action against a municipality to lie. City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Bates, 216 F.3d at 373 n.3.