UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4213
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CEDRIC CAMERON CLARK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:07-
cr-00281-RWT-1)
Submitted: November 19, 2008 Decided: February 9, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc L. Resnick, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Emily N. Glatfelter, Deborah
A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cedric Cameron Clark appeals his conviction by a jury
of one count of possession of a firearm after having been
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). We
affirm.
On appeal, Clark argues that the district court erred
in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, and
that the court erred in denying his motion for a new jury pool.
The Government responds, arguing that Clark’s conviction should
be affirmed.
This court reviews the district court’s denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. See United States v.
Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2003). A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy
burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.
1997). “[A]n appellate court’s reversal of a conviction on
grounds of insufficient evidence should be confined to cases
where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v.
Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984).
A jury’s verdict must be upheld on appeal if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support it. Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In determining whether
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the evidence in the record is substantial, this court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and
inquires whether there is evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this
court does not review the credibility of the witnesses and
assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions in the
testimony in favor of the government. United States v. Romer,
148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
The elements of a violation of § 922(g)(1) are: “(1)
the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) the
defendant knowingly possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the
possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had
traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.” United States v.
Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Clark
stipulated to a disqualifying prior conviction and does not
contest the interstate or foreign commerce element. He argues
the evidence did not show he exercised dominion or control over
the firearm at any time. Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that Clark’s argument is without merit and that his
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reliance on United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992),
is misplaced. The evidence was sufficient.
Clark next argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion for a new jury pool because African-Americans
were underrepresented in the pool to the extent that the pool
did not represent a fair cross-section of the community.
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the
fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must
show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a
‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which
juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is
due to a systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). The district court
focused on the third element under Duren in denying Clark’s
motion for a new panel. We conclude that the district court did
not err in its decision. United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431
(4th Cir. 1988). Clark’s motion before the district court and
his argument on appeal fail to satisfy the requirements of Duren
to demonstrate a violation of the fair cross-section
requirement.
Accordingly, we affirm Clark’s conviction. We deny
his motion for appointment of new counsel. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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