UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4601
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERVIN CALVIN CRAWFORD, a/k/a Early Crawford,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00317-NCT-1)
Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: February 17, 2009
Before MICHAEL and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ervin Calvin Crawford pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement to possession with intent to distribute
4.2 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C) (2006), and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006).
The conditional plea preserved Crawford’s right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(a)(2). He was sentenced to 210 months in prison.
Counsel for Crawford filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Crawford
was notified of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief
but has not done so. The Government has declined to file a
reply brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying a
motion to suppress for clear error, and the legal determinations
de novo. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir.
2007). When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th
Cir. 2006).
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“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). There must be
“at least a minimal level of objective justification for making
[a Terry] stop.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Reasonable
suspicion requires more than a hunch but less than probable
cause, and may be based on the collective knowledge of officers
involved in an investigation. Id. at 123-24; United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).
Courts assess the legality of police conduct during a
Terry stop under the totality of the circumstances. United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989). An officer conducting
a lawful Terry stop may take steps reasonably necessary to
protect his personal safety and to maintain the status quo
during the course of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
408, 413-15 (1997); Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235.
With these standards in mind, and having reviewed the
transcript of the suppression hearing, we conclude the district
court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. We agree
with the district court that the police lawfully stopped the
vehicle based on the tip from the confidential informant and the
officer’s observation of a vehicle matching the description in
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the tip. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-49 (1972)
(finding officer possessed reasonable suspicion to stop person
in vehicle based upon informant’s tip). Moreover, the officers
were permitted to frisk Crawford as they were legitimately
concerned for their safety. See United States v. Raymond, 152
F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 1998). Once the officers found a
firearm in Crawford’s possession, the discovery of the heroin in
Crawford’s pocket pursuant to a lawful search incident to arrest
became inevitable. Thus, the heroin found in Crawford’s back
pocket was admissible. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984); United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 838-39 (4th Cir.
1998). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm,
drugs and Crawford’s statements.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Crawford, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Crawford requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel=s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Crawford.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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