PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-4715
TOBY FRANKLIN HEATH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.
Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.
(4:06-cr-00046-BO)
Argued: December 5, 2008
Decided: March 12, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON
and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Williams wrote
the majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson joined. Judge
Gregory wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Ronald Cohen, Wilmington, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
2 UNITED STATES v. HEATH
lee. ON BRIEF: George E. B. Holding, United States Attor-
ney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Chief Judge:
I.
Toby Franklin Heath pleaded guilty to interfering with
commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951
(West 2000) ("Count One"), and possessing a firearm after
being convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(g)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) ("Count Two"). The
district court sentenced him to a 240-month prison term for
Count One, approximately double the Guidelines’ advisory
range of 100-125 months, and a concurrent 120-month prison
term for Count Two. On appeal, Heath argues that the district
court failed to adequately explain its reasons for making the
upward departure in Count One. We placed Heath’s case in
abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) and now affirm.
II.
On January 12, 2005, Heath robbed a convenience store at
gunpoint and stole $797. Less than two weeks later, on Janu-
ary 24, Heath stole four shotguns and six rifles from a house
where he had previously been employed as a painter. On July
5, 2006, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of
North Carolina returned a seven-count indictment charging
Heath with, among other offenses, interfering with commerce
by robbery and possessing a firearm after being convicted of
a felony. Heath pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to Counts One and Two.
UNITED STATES v. HEATH 3
Prior to Heath’s sentencing, a Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR")
was prepared that calculated his offense level at twenty-seven.
The PSR also detailed Heath’s extensive criminal history.
Specifically, the report related that Heath had previously com-
mitted several felonies and misdemeanors, as well as numer-
ous violent infractions while he was in prison. The first felony
conviction was for assault with a deadly weapon that inflicted
serious injury, stemming from Heath stabbing another man in
the chest with a knife. The second set of felony convictions
arose from Heath’s shooting of a police officer three times in
the back and shoulders.
The PSR further noted that Heath accrued thirty-one infrac-
tions while in prison. Several of these infractions were vio-
lent: assaulting staff with a weapon, assaulting another person
with a weapon, threatening by fire, assaulting staff by throw-
ing liquids, starting a non-threatening fire, provoking an
assault, two incidents of fighting, and four incidents of mak-
ing verbal threats. Other non-violent infractions included
seven incidents of possessing illegal substances; two counts of
committing sexual acts; using profane language; five inci-
dents of disobeying staff orders; bartering, trading, or lending
money; being in an unauthorized area; gambling; and possess-
ing unauthorized funds.
Heath’s PSR also listed his misdemeanor convictions for
driving while impaired, driving on the wrong side of the high-
way, larceny of livestock, second degree trespass, larceny of
property, two counts of injury to a public building and facili-
ties, injury to wire and fixtures of the telephone company, and
simple assault. Finally, Heath’s PSR detailed a parole viola-
tion. These past acts resulted in eight criminal history points
and a criminal history category of IV. Given this criminal his-
tory calculation and an offense level of twenty-seven, the PSR
calculated Heath’s advisory Guidelines range as 100-125
months imprisonment for Count One and 100-120 months
imprisonment for Count Two.
4 UNITED STATES v. HEATH
At his sentencing hearing, the Government moved for an
upward departure pursuant to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 4A1.3 (2006), arguing that Heath’s criminal his-
tory was underrepresented by the criminal history category
and that Heath had a high likelihood of recidivism. The dis-
trict court granted the motion and sentenced Heath to a 240-
month prison term for Count One and a 120-month term for
Count Two, to be served concurrently. The district court also
imposed a three-year term of supervised release and ordered
Heath to pay $797 in restitution to his victim. Heath timely
appealed his sentence for Count One, and we have jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a) (West 2000) and 28
U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006).
III.
We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Curry, 523 F.3d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 2008).
Review under the abuse of discretion standard is a two-part
inquiry. "First, we examine whether the district court commit-
ted a significant procedural error in imposing the sentence
under § 3553. If no procedural error was committed, this court
can only vacate a sentence if it was substantively unreason-
able in light of all relevant facts." Curry, 523 F.3d at 439
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Gall "un-
equivocally" establishes that "an appellate court must defer to
the trial court and can reverse a sentence only if it is unreason-
able, even if the sentence would not have been the choice of
the appellate court." United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155,
160 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
We first examine whether the district court committed a
significant procedural error. A district court commits a signif-
icant procedural error by
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as manda-
tory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, select-
UNITED STATES v. HEATH 5
ing a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sen-
tence—including an explanation for any deviation
from the Guidelines.
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
Here, the district court adopted the PSR, which correctly
calculated the sentencing guidelines range. The district court
also allowed both sides to argue for the sentence that each
considered appropriate. The record clearly shows that the
court carefully considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a)(1)-(6) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) to determine
whether a departure was appropriate and whether Heath’s par-
ticular circumstances warranted the extent of the departure
that the court chose to impose. The district court also consid-
ered the range of sentences suggested under the Guidelines
for defendants with higher criminal history categories.
Finally, the court determined that Heath should be ordered to
pay restitution to his victim in an amount equivalent to that
which he stole. In sentencing Heath, the district court pro-
vided adequate explanations to allow for meaningful appellate
review. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. As such, we find no evidence
that the district court made any procedural error.
Because we find no significant procedural error, the only
issue left for us to consider is whether Heath’s sentence is
substantively unreasonable. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. We find
that it is not.
When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,
the reviewing court must
take into account the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guide-
lines range. If the sentence is within the Guidelines
range, the appellate court may, but is not required to,
apply a presumption of reasonableness. But if the
6 UNITED STATES v. HEATH
sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court
may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It
may consider the extent of the deviation, but must
give due deference to the district court’s decision
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.
Id. at 596 (emphasis added). Heath admits that he "has the
proverbial record as long as your arm and has acted violently,
possessed weapons and, in common parlance, has been a bad
actor all his life." (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) Heath began, at 18,
by stabbing a victim in the chest with a knife. Within a year
of his release from prison for that offense, Heath was found
guilty of committing two counts of larceny. Heath’s larceny
sentence was suspended in favor of three years’ probation
time. This suspended sentence was revoked when he shot at
a police officer three times, wounding him in the back and
shoulders. Heath served twelve years of the twenty-year sen-
tence imposed for shooting the police officer. While in prison,
Heath accrued some thirty-one infractions, many of which
were for violent behavior.
Against this criminal history backdrop, the district court
decided that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justified the
extent of the variance from the Guidelines. The district court
discussed Heath’s criminal history and noted that his recidi-
vism "shows that he should be punished at a level that’s con-
sistent with the crimes in this case and that reflects the
seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, [and an appro-
priate level of] punishment for the offense." (J.A. at 64.) The
district court also found that the Guideline range failed to ade-
quately address the criminal history detailed above, did not
adequately deter others from committing similar crimes, and
did not adequately protect the public from other crimes by
Heath. In addition, the district court determined that the "need
to provide [Heath] with education and vocational training is
important." Id. at 65. Finally, the district court found that the
UNITED STATES v. HEATH 7
"violent [and] predatory" nature of Heath’s crime further war-
ranted an upward departure. Id.
Given these facts and the district court’s explanation, we
cannot say the district court’s upward departure was unrea-
sonable. After all, "[t]he sentencing judge is in a superior
position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a)
in the individual case. The judge hears and sees the evidence,
makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the
facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record." Gall,
128 S. Ct. at 597. Importantly, "[i]t has been uniform and
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing
judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and
every case as a unique study in the human failings that some-
times mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punish-
ment to ensue." Id. at 598. Heath’s tendency towards
recidivism, as evidenced by his behavior in and out of prison
over the past twenty years, provides sufficient justification for
the district court’s sentence.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
GREGORY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
There is no way to circumvent the fact that Heath, by all
accounts, is a perpetual criminal. He has wasted away his life
in prison for the numerous illegal acts that he committed each
time he was set free. Yet this case requires us to focus on
whether Heath’s current sentence is reasonable in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
586 (2007). I believe it is not.
8 UNITED STATES v. HEATH
I have already expounded upon my views of Gall in United
States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 167 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory,
J., concurring). But the facts of this case compel me to reiter-
ate my position that substantive reasonableness must encom-
pass more than the rote recitation of § 3553(a) factors that the
Court has condoned in numerous post-Gall cases,* and which
it continues to condone today.
At Heath’s sentencing hearing, the district court had only
the following to say in justifying Heath’s sentence: First,
Heath’s recidivism after serving the sentences for his previous
crimes "shows that he should be punished at a level that’s
consistent with the crimes in this case and that reflects the
seriousness of the offense." (J.A. 64.) The judge found that
the guideline range would not fulfill that purpose and would
not deter or protect the public from future crimes. Moreover,
imprisonment would presumably provide Heath with educa-
tional and vocational training. These justifications correspond
to § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
Next, the court concluded that "[t]he nature of the circum-
stance, being a violent predatory crime, again warrants an
upward departure." (J.A. 65.) This roughly corresponds to
§ 3553(a)(1). The court continued, "[t]he sentencing range
established by the guideline is deficient in terms of his crimi-
nal history and the severity of it. I think that the role of the
victims in paragraph seven and the impact of the sentence on
the victims warrants a more serious sentence." (Id.) This argu-
ably corresponds with § 3553(a)(4) and (7).
Finally, the district court determined that the guideline
range would "fail to satisfy the need for a sentence that is
reflective of the purposes of sentencing under section 3553(a)
and the seven factors, and that the statutory provision would
be appropriate." (J.A. 65.) This is basically a recitation of the
*See, e.g., United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007).
UNITED STATES v. HEATH 9
first sentence of § 3553(a) and arguably an application of
§ 3553(a)(3).
From these statements, the majority has determined that the
district court’s justification for Heath’s sentence is sufficient
to satisfy Gall. For the sake of argument, I will assume for a
moment that the district court satisfied the procedural prong
of Gall. But can the very same statements from which the dis-
trict court narrowly divined procedural reasonableness, with-
out more, also be used to bless the sentence substantively? If
so, then there is no such thing as substantive reasonableness;
there is only procedural reasonableness, or vice versa. Or, per-
haps, there is simply "reasonableness," and the Supreme
Court carelessly made a distinction without a difference when
it said, "the appellate court should . . . consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed," Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
597, and we lower federal courts are not obliged to take them
at their word. Absurd as this result may seem, it is the only
conclusion that may logically follow from the approach this
Court has taken, and continues to take, post-Gall.
The majority concludes, "Heath’s tendency towards recidi-
vism, as evidenced by his behavior in and out of prison over
the past twenty years, provides sufficient justification for the
district court’s sentence." See supra at 7. But if the majority
is basing its substantive reasonableness determination on
Heath’s recidivism, the antecedent question is what makes
Heath’s recidivism so unusual as to justify an upward depar-
ture of 92% to the statutory maximum? Neither the majority
nor the district court addressed this question. Providing a
laundry list of Heath’s crimes is not a assessment of "reason-
ableness"—a relative, not absolute, term. While we may
review the district court’s conclusion only for an abuse of dis-
cretion, those words cannot be a legal incantation that pre-
vents meaningful substantive review of the district court’s
sentence.
One might argue that the number and seriousness of
Heath’s crimes relative to those of other criminals justifies a
10 UNITED STATES v. HEATH
severe upward departure. Yet, the calculation of Heath’s
guideline sentence under § 4A1 of the Guidelines Manual
already encapsulates his criminal history, including the seri-
ousness of the offenses he committed. Why was that calcula-
tion insufficient? Again, this question goes unanswered. The
Supreme Court has instructed us that, "[a]s a matter of admin-
istration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines
should be the starting point and the initial benchmark." Gall,
128 S. Ct. at 596. The district court "must consider the extent
of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently
compelling to support the degree of the variance." Id. at 597.
Moreover, it is "uncontroversial that a major departure should
be supported by a more significant justification than a minor
one." Id.; see also United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424,
434 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The farther the court diverges from the
advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for
the divergence must be."). In this case, however, no "signifi-
cant justification" was provided for Heath’s 92% upward
departure to the statutory maximum—undeniably
"major"—aside from a recitation of the § 3553(a) factors. But
since the Supreme Court itself differentiated between a con-
sideration of the § 3553(a) factors and a significant justifica-
tion, the former clearly cannot act as a substitute for the
latter—we need more.
The district court failed to articulate a sufficient justifica-
tion for imposing the statutory maximum upon Heath, and my
independent review of the record finds it similarly devoid of
any such justification. Therefore, I believe Heath’s sentence
to be both procedurally and substantively unreasonable,
respectively. In Moreland, after examining the record before
it to determine whether a downward departure was substan-
tively reasonable, this Court stated: "If Moreland’s circum-
stances are so compelling as to warrant a two-thirds reduction
from the bottom of the advisory guideline range, it is difficult
to imagine any meaningful limit on the discretion of the dis-
trict court." Moreland, 437 F.3d at 437. The rigor with which
we assessed reasonableness in finding a floor for downward
UNITED STATES v. HEATH 11
departures must necessarily be applied in finding a ceiling for
upward departures. Therefore, given the record in this case, I
must conclude that if Heath’s circumstances are so compel-
ling as to warrant a 92% upward departure to the statutory
maximum, it is difficult to imagine any meaningful limit on
the discretion of the district court.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has not provided us with
further guidance on these undoubtedly important sentencing
issues. But a close reading of Gall reveals careful distinctions
that logic and justice cannot ignore—yet, the majority does so
today. With all due respect to my colleagues, I cannot join
their opinion. Therefore, I dissent.