Martin v. Harris

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM L. MARTIN, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RICHARD O. HARRIS, in personam;
CHERYL P. HARRIS, in personam;  No. 07-1610
THE OIL SCREW FINTASTIC, OFFICIAL
NUMBER 587095, her engines,
equipment, tackle and apparel, in
rem,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.
Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.
(2:05-cv-00019-BO)

Argued: September 25, 2008

Decided: March 11, 2009

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and
Richard L. VOORHEES, United States District Judge for
the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by
designation.

Affirmed as modified by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Voorhees
joined.
2 MARTIN v. HARRIS
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Bryan K. Meals, MCGUIREWOODS, L.L.P.,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellants. Stevenson Lee Weeks, Sr.,
WHEATLY, WHEATLY, WEEKS & LUPTON, P.A., Beau-
fort, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jonathan H.
Edgar, MCGUIREWOODS, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Caro-
lina; William H. Baxter, II, MCGUIREWOODS, L.L.P.,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Shortly after 4:30 a.m. on May 31, 2002, before departing
to sea from the Oregon Inlet Fishing Center in Cape Hatteras
National Seashore Park, North Carolina, as Captain Richard
Harris and Mate William Martin prepared the oil screw Fin-
tastic for a fishing charter, Martin slipped and fell on fish
slime and gurry, which had been left on the dock, injuring his
back.1

Martin commenced this action against Richard Harris,
Cheryl Harris, and the Fintastic, claiming that Richard Harris
was liable to Martin in negligence under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2006) (now codified with minor
changes at 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a)), and that the Fintastic was
unseaworthy. After a bench trial, the district court found, on
the Jones Act claim, that Harris was negligent in not keeping
the dock around the Fintastic free of slime and gurry and that
his negligence caused Martin’s injuries. The court entered
judgment against the defendants in the amount of $150,000,
plus prejudgment interest. On the unseaworthiness claim, the
court ruled against Martin out of a concern over whether the
1
"Slime" is the secretion on the scales of fish designed to prevent infec-
tion, and "gurry" is the processing waste of fish, which can include slime.
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 3
unseaworthiness doctrine extended to the dock next to a ves-
sel. From the district court’s judgment, dated June 4, 2007,
the defendants appealed.2

In his appeal, Harris contends that the district court erred
(1) in finding the evidence sufficient under the Jones Act to
hold him liable for Martin’s injuries; (2) in declining to render
a judgment on partial findings at the end of Martin’s case,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c); (3) in admitting
into evidence a photograph of the dolphin fish catch laid out
on the dock behind the Fintastic, taken on the evening before
Martin’s fall; (4) in awarding prejudgment interest on the
Jones Act claim; and (5) in not reducing the damages award
by the amounts that Harris paid Martin for maintenance and
cure.

We conclude that the district court erred in awarding pre-
judgment interest on the Jones Act claim and vacate that part
of the judgment, and we affirm the judgment as so modified.

I

In January 2002, William Martin went to work as a ship-
mate for Richard Harris, who was the charter captain, owner,
and operator of the fishing vessel Fintastic. The Fintastic is
a 50-foot vessel designed for charter-party fishing in the
waters of the Atlantic Ocean off Cape Hatteras. In furtherance
of his business, Captain Harris leased a slip from Oregon Inlet
Fishing Center, and the lease agreement required Harris to
keep the dock space surrounding the slip free of trash, litter,
2
Because the district court entered judgment against all three defen-
dants, all three have appealed. But in their brief, they address arguments
only on behalf of Richard Harris because "[o]nly Richard Harris played
any role in this case below." With respect to Cheryl Harris and the Fintas-
tic, they state that they "join[ed] the arguments generally, and as specifi-
cally pertaining to Richard Harris, herein." For convenience, therefore, we
refer to the defendants collectively as Harris, focusing, however, only on
Harris’ conduct.
4 MARTIN v. HARRIS
debris, and other clutter, and to spray the boardwalk after a
charter catch had been removed at the end of the trip. As Cap-
tain Harris expressed the duty, "They ask that every day after
our fish are cleaned, or picked up by the fish cleaners, or the
parties themselves dispose of the fish themselves, that we
spray the dock off, keep it free of any slime."

Each morning Martin would arrive at the fishing center at
approximately 4:30 a.m. to begin prevoyage preparation by
loading ice on the vessel, releasing the lines to bring the ves-
sel closer to the dock, and placing boarding stairs from the
dock to the vessel to enable charter parties to board. At the
end of the day, Martin would offload the day’s catch onto the
dock immediately behind the vessel and arrange the fish in a
line so that a photographer could photograph the day’s catch
for use on the fishing center’s website. After the photograph
was completed, Captain Harris and Martin would clean the
vessel and the dock. Harris normally cleaned the inside of the
vessel and Martin, the outside. After the fish were removed
from the dock, either Martin or Harris would hose the dock
to wash away fish slime and gurry.

On May 30, 2002, Martin took the day off, and Keith Biggs
served as Captain Harris’ mate on the Fintastic. That day, the
charter group caught approximately 30 dolphin fish. When the
vessel returned to the dock, Biggs offloaded the fish and
placed them on the dock behind the stern of the Fintastic for
the customary photograph. After the photograph was taken,
however, Captain Harris testified that he could not remember
who then cleaned the dock off, if anyone.

The next day when Martin arrived at the Fintastic at 4:30
a.m. to prepare for the day’s charter trip, he noticed that fish-
ing lures and rods had been left out from the previous day and
that the cockpit had not been washed down. There was
sargassum—or offshore seaweed—in the fish box along with
bags of ice and blood. Martin testified, "Just everything was
left out from the day before." When Captain Harris arrived,
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 5
Martin told him about the vessel’s condition, and Harris
responded that Biggs had just gotten back from Florida and
was more interested in socializing with his buddies up and
down the dock than cleaning the vessel.

As Martin prepared for that day’s trip, he untied the lines
to move the vessel closer to the dock to enable him to lay
down the temporary steps. As he walked on the dock near the
stern of the vessel, he slipped on fish slime or gurry immedi-
ately behind the vessel, landing hard on his buttocks. Martin
testified, "Both of my feet came out from under me and I
slammed down on the dock on my tail bone." As the district
court observed, "[b]ecause of the early pre-dawn hour and
limited lighting, Martin could not see the slime as he
worked." Martin said that he "got up as fast as [he] could and
tried to shake it off," but he had pain, figuring that he had just
bruised his tail bone. He also had slime "all over [his] back-
side," a fact that Captain Harris later observed while they
were at sea. When Harris, who saw Martin fall, asked Martin
if he was all right, Martin responded that he thought he was
okay; he thought he had been bruised but could walk it off.
But as the day progressed, Martin had difficulty doing his job
because he was suffering significant pain in his back. When
he complained to Harris about it, Harris told him not to per-
form his usual post-trip duties and to go home and rest.

Martin sought medical attention the next day, and his doc-
tor instructed him to apply ice and take pain medication. The
pain persisted over the days that followed, and Martin was
given an MRI, which revealed that Martin had suffered a disc
herniation at the L5/S1 level of the lower spine and that a
fragment in Martin’s spinal canal was causing pressure on his
sciatic nerve. A neurosurgeon performed a microdiskectomy,
which eased the pain in Martin’s leg, but not in his back. Mar-
tin underwent physical therapy and, in October 2002, was
injected with steroids. By November 2002, Martin was
released by his doctor to return to work, but with limitations.
His doctor recommended that Martin not return to work on a
6 MARTIN v. HARRIS
fishing vessel but thought that Martin could engage in other
work, provided he did not lift in excess of 30 pounds or bend
frequently.

Martin incurred medical expenses totaling $25,539.32, all
but $2,634 of which were paid by Harris as part of his cure
obligation. Harris also paid Martin $8,000 for his maintenance
obligation.

Martin commenced this action under the Jones Act for Har-
ris’ negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work and
under general maritime law for the ship’s unseaworthiness.
After a bench trial, the district court found Harris liable to
Martin under the Jones Act and awarded him damages in the
amount of $150,000, plus prejudgment interest. In finding
negligence, the court stated:

On May 30, 2002, either Harris or his employee,
Keith Biggs, had negligently failed to remove slime
and gurry from the dock. The slime and gurry made
for an unreasonably safe condition, which in turn
caused Martin’s slip and fall on May 31, 2002. . . .

Harris’s negligence both directly and proximately
caused Martin’s injuries. Martin suffered a disk
herniation at the L4/L5 and L5/S1 levels of his spine,
substantial physical pain and mental suffering, as
well as permanent limitations. Martin additionally
suffered a loss of earnings and diminished earnings
capacity. These mental, physical and economic inju-
ries entitle Martin to recover damages in the amount
of $150,000 plus pre-judgment interest from May
31, 2002 until March 13, 2007, and post judgment
interest from the date of this order until the judgment
is satisfied.

From the district court’s judgment, entered on June 4, 2007,
the defendants filed this appeal.
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 7
II

For his principal argument, Harris contends that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support a finding of negligence and
causation, as required for a violation of the Jones Act. He
argues that "[t]he district court’s factual finding is simply an
impermissible inference based upon multiple inferences that
this Court should not countenance." He notes particularly,
"The district court committed ‘clear error’ when it impermiss-
ibly inferred the existence of fish slime on the dock from the
previous day’s catch. It inferred that the fish slime that caused
Martin’s fall was left there by the fish from the previous day’s
catch in the complete and total absence of any facts that sug-
gest, let alone establish, that conclusion."

The Jones Act allows a seaman to recover for injury suf-
fered during the course of his employment, providing:

Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may, at his election, main-
tain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common-
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply.

46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2006) (recodified in 2006 with minor
changes at 46 U.S.C. § 30104, Pub. L. No. 109-304 § 6, 120
Stat. 1485, 1510 (2006)). The Jones Act expressly incorpo-
rates the "judicially developed doctrine of liability" of the
Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et
seq. Hernandez v. Trawler Miss Vertie Mae, Inc., 187 F.3d
432, 436 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Kernan v. Am. Dredging
Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As such, the Act "gives seamen rights that parallel
those given to railway employees under the FELA." Id.

To prevail on a Jones Act negligence claim against his
employer, a seaman must show (1) that he is a seaman under
8 MARTIN v. HARRIS
the Act; (2) that he suffered injury in the course of his
employment; (3) that his employer was negligent; and (4) that
his employer’s negligence caused his injury at least in part. Id.
To establish negligence by his employer, a Jones Act plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
employer "breach[ed] . . . a duty to protect against foreseeable
risks of harm." Id. at 437. The employer’s duty under the
Jones Act "is to provide seamen with a safe place to work."
Estate of Larkins v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 806 F.2d 510, 514
(4th Cir. 1986) (citing Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc.,
364 U.S. 325, 327-28 (1960)). And this duty extends from the
vessel to the shore, provided the seaman is acting "in the
course of his employment." O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39, 43 (1943).

Although the elements of duty, breach, and injury draw on
common-law principles, the standard of causation in a Jones
Act negligence action is relaxed. See Hernandez, 187 F.3d at
436-37. Thus, an employer is liable if his "negligence played
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death
for which damages are sought." Id. at 436 (quoting Consol.
Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But the standard must not be
relaxed to the point that the Jones Act becomes in effect a
workers’ compensation statute. See id. at 436-37. "[T]he basis
of liability under the FELA, and derivatively the Jones Act,
remains grounded in negligence and not merely on ‘the fact
that injuries occur.’" Id. at 437 (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S.
at 543)).

In reviewing a district court’s factual findings, we apply the
clearly erroneous standard, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the appellee. See Evergreen Int’l, S.A. v.
Norfolk Dredging Co., 531 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (cit-
ing Ente Nazionale Per L’Energia Electtrica v. Baliwag Navi-
gation, Inc., 774 F.2d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1985)). "A finding
is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to sup-
port it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 9
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted." Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In an admiralty case, questions of negligence,
including causation, are factual issues and are thus reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. (citing U.S. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 966 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir.
1992); Ente Nazionale, 774 F.2d at 654).

In this case, the district court found that Harris had a duty
to provide Martin "with a safe place to work," Estate of
Larkins, 806 F.2d at 514, and that this duty applied not only
to the vessel, but also to the dock surrounding the slip where
the vessel was moored, see O’Donnell, 318 U.S. at 39, 43.
Moreover, under the lease agreement with Oregon Inlet Fish-
ing Center, Harris was contractually obligated to keep the area
behind his vessel free of trash and debris and to spray off the
boardwalk after the charter party’s catch had been removed.
The court held that Harris breached this duty, finding that
"[o]n May 30, 2002, either Harris or his employee, Keith
Biggs, had negligently failed to remove slime and gurry from
the dock," that "[t]he slime and gurry made for an unreason-
ably safe condition, which in turn caused Martin’s slip and
fall of May 31, 2002," and that "Harris’s negligence both
directly and proximately caused Martin’s injuries." The court
awarded Martin damages in the amount of $150,000.

In light of the record in this case, we cannot conclude that
the district court’s findings of negligence and causation were
clearly erroneous. Construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Martin, we are not "left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." Evergreen
Int’l, 531 F.3d at 308 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

First, the evidence supports the district court’s finding that
Harris breached his duty by negligently failing to remove fish
slime from the dock. The court based this finding on the fol-
10 MARTIN v. HARRIS
lowing facts. After the charter group returned with their catch
on May 30, 2002, which amounted to approximately 30 dol-
phin fish, the catch was removed and placed on the dock at
the stern of the Fintastic. Photographs of the catch confirmed
this. And although it was the normal practice then to clean the
vessel inside and out, as well as the dock, it was apparent the
next morning, several hours later, that the normal practice had
not been followed. When Martin arrived at 4:30 a.m. on May
31, 2002, he observed that lures and rods had been left out
from the day before, that the back of the boat had not been
washed down, that offshore seaweed remained in the fish box
along with bags of ice and blood, and that rigs had been left
out and various items were left on the countertop: "Just every-
thing was left out from the day before." Harris himself testi-
fied that the vessel had not been properly cleaned, and he
could not remember specifically if anyone had cleaned off the
dock. When Martin said something about the vessel being left
in a mess, Harris responded that mate Biggs was more inter-
ested in going up and down the dock talking to his buddies
than doing his job. From these facts a court could find that
slime and gurry that may have been on the dock were not
removed by Harris or his mate.

The court could also reasonably find that slime was indeed
on the dock and that Martin slipped on it. Martin slipped and
fell at the stern of the vessel—exactly where the catch of dol-
phin fish had been placed the previous day—and when he got
up from his fall, he had slime on his backside, a fact con-
firmed by Harris’ own observation. Moreover, immediately
after Martin fell, Harry Baum on the vessel Rebait, hollered
at Captain Harris that he needed to keep his dock cleaner.

Finally, the district court could reasonably find that Harris’
failure to clean the dock, or to ensure that his mate, Biggs, did
so, resulted in slime being left on the dock—the same slime
that caused Martin’s fall and resulting back injuries. Harris
himself recognized that fish have slime on them and therefore
that after the catch is removed from the dock at the stern area
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 11
of the vessel, the dock must be hosed down to keep it clean
of slime and gurry. If the dock had not been hosed down on
the evening of May 30, 2002, after the catch was removed, as
may be inferred from the condition of the vessel the next
morning, it is not unreasonable to assume that the dock
remained in the same condition overnight, until 4:30 a.m.,
especially when the Fintastic remained moored in its slip dur-
ing that time. Under the relaxed standard of causation for
Jones Act actions, the district court was not clearly erroneous
in finding that Harris created the unsafe condition and that
Martin injured himself as a result of that condition.

In short, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
Martin, we conclude that the district court’s findings of negli-
gence, causation, and injury were not clearly erroneous.

Harris devotes a substantial portion of his brief to pointing
to the absence of evidence that he had notice of the dangerous
condition. Although notice might be a separately required ele-
ment when some third party creates the dangerous condition,
it is not required when Harris, or his agent Biggs, created the
unsafe condition, as the district court found.

III

Harris also contends that the district court erred in declin-
ing to grant his motion to render a judgment on partial find-
ings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), on the
ground that "Martin failed to carry his burden of proving a
prima facie case of negligence under the Jones Act." When
Harris made the Rule 52(c) motion, the district court informed
the parties that it was "disinclined to grant judgment as a mat-
ter of law on the case now" and deferred ruling on the motion
until the close of the evidence.

Rule 52(c) gives the district court discretion to "decline to
render any judgment until the close of the evidence." We can-
not find that in this case the district court abused its discre-
12 MARTIN v. HARRIS
tion, especially in light of our affirmance of the district
court’s factual findings of negligence.

IV

Harris next contends that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in admitting a photograph of the Fintastic’s dolphin
fish catch, as laid out on the dock, taken on May 30, 2002,
when Mate Biggs was substituting for Martin. Harris argues
that the photograph was inadmissible because it was hearsay,
lacked a foundation, and lacked proper authentication.

Harris, however, never objected to the photograph at trial.
Indeed Harris’ counsel presented evidence through questions
directed to Harris about the photograph. Harris pointed out
how the photograph showed that the dolphin fish were fresh
because the photograph showed that the fins were sticking up
and the color was good. Using the photograph, Harris also
identified Biggs and the stern of the Fintastic, behind which
the day’s catch was laid out on the dock. And, using the pho-
tograph, Harris pointed out where Martin fell the next day. In
these circumstances, Harris certainly waived any right to
object to the photograph on appeal, especially where the
grounds for his objection could have been obviated at the time
through some preliminary questioning. See Fed. R. Evid.
103(a)(1).

In addition, the photograph had been listed as an exhibit in
the proposed pretrial order, first served some 10 months prior
to the trial and formally adopted as the pretrial order govern-
ing trial by the court on February 15, 2007. As required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(B), Harris did not
timely object to the photograph. Although Harris did seek to
amend the pretrial order to reflect his objection to the photo-
graph after the 14-day period, Harris made no showing of
good cause that would excuse his failure to object timely. The
court never acted on the request, and the pretrial order
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 13
remained in the form adopted by the court, which included the
photograph as an exhibit.

In these circumstances, Harris cannot now complain about
the photograph’s admission into evidence.

V

Harris contends that the district court erred in awarding
Martin prejudgment interest in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Monessen Southwestern Railway Co. v. Morgan,
486 U.S. 330, 336-39 (1988), which held that prejudgment
interest is not available under the FELA. Martin argues, on
the other hand, that the district court properly exercised dis-
cretion in awarding prejudgment interest because the Jones
Act claim was brought on the admiralty side of the court,
where prejudgment interest is generally awarded as a matter
of discretion. See Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 333
F.2d 676, 677 (4th Cir. 1964).

The Jones Act incorporates by reference the rights and rem-
edies afforded railroad employees under the FELA. See 46
U.S.C. app. § 688(a); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375,
391-92 (1924). And the Supreme Court has held that the
Jones Act incorporates not only the statutory provisions of
FELA, but also "the entire judicially developed doctrine of
liability under the [FELA]," Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U.S. 443, 456 (1994) (quoting Kernan, 355 U.S. at 439)
(internal quotation marks omitted), which includes damages
rules, see Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32-33
(1990). In Miles, the Court incorporated into the Jones Act the
"pecuniary limitation on damages" for loss of society in
wrongful death actions, taken from its FELA decision in
Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 69-
71 (1913). Miles, 498 U.S. at 32-33. Similarly in Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 156 (1964), the
Court incorporated into the Jones Act its decision in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co.,
14 MARTIN v. HARRIS
275 U.S. 161, 163 (1927), defining the class of potential bene-
ficiaries to whom damages are payable.

Although the Supreme Court has asserted that the Jones
Act would not automatically incorporate FELA jurisprudence,
the Court has almost always incorporated FELA principles
into the Jones Act unless the FELA principle is analytically
limited to railroads or is otherwise inapposite to the sea. See,
e.g., Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1955) (holding that
the death of an employer would not defeat Jones Act claim
even though FELA did not provide for survival actions
against deceased tortfeasors because such an action is unnec-
essary in the railroad context where employers are corpora-
tions that never die); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110,
123-24 (1936) (holding that FELA’s assumption-of-risk rule
tied to railroad-specific legislation did not apply under Jones
Act); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367,
377-78 (1932) (holding that a seaman had claim under Jones
Act that he was injured because his employer negligently
failed to furnish maintenance and cure even though railroad
employers under FELA had no similar duty). But the avail-
ability of prejudgment interest, vel non, is not a principle ana-
lytically limited to railroads or to the sea, and therefore any
FELA principle addressing prejudgment interest would be
incorporated into the Jones Act under the specific directive in
the Jones Act. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a). Thus the holding
in Monessen that prejudgment interest is not available in an
FELA case is explicitly incorporated into the Jones Act.

In Monessen, the Court ruled that "the proper measure of
damages [under the FELA] is inseparably connected with the
right of action, and therefore is an issue of substance." 486
U.S. at 335 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted). And the "proper measure of damages"
under the FELA "includes the question whether prejudgment
interest may be awarded to a prevailing FELA plaintiff." Id.
Because Congress did not amend the FELA in the face of a
virtual unanimity of court holdings over a period of more than
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 15
70 years that prejudgment interest is not available in FELA
cases, the Court concluded that "[i]f prejudgment interest is to
be available under the FELA, then Congress must expressly
so provide." Id. at 339.

This substantive law of FELA is explicitly made applicable
to Jones Act claims because the Jones Act provides that in
such cases, "all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of per-
sonal injury to railway employees [i.e., through the FELA]
shall apply." 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a); see also Michael F.
Sturley & David C. Frederick, Prejudgment Interest in Sea-
men’s Personal Injury Cases: Supreme Court Precedent Lost
in a Sea of Procedural Confusion, 33 J. Mar. L. & Com. 423,
450 (2002).

Moreover, even though a Jones Act claim can be brought
either at law or in admiralty, because the allowance of pre-
judgment interest is a substantive provision, the rule would be
applicable regardless of whether the Jones Act case claim is
brought at law or in admiralty. See, e.g., Panama R.R., 264
U.S. at 391 (holding that a substantive rule under the Jones
Act would apply whether the action is at law or in admiralty),
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224
(1958) (holding that the substantive rule regarding statute of
limitations would apply "whether the action is at law or in
admiralty, in the state or the federal courts"); see also Sturley
& Frederick, supra, at 455. Thus, when Monessen held as a
matter of substantive law that prejudgment interest is not
available in FELA cases, it overruled Gardner, 333 F.2d 676,
which had theretofore given district courts discretion to award
prejudgment interest on Jones Act cases brought in admiralty.

The rule we recognize—that the FELA rule denying pre-
judgment interest is applicable in Jones Act cases—does not,
however, affect the availability of prejudgment interest in
other cases under general maritime law. See City of Milwau-
kee v. Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195
16 MARTIN v. HARRIS
(1995) (holding prejudgment interest generally should be
awarded in maritime collision cases); U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 966
F.2d at 828 (holding that in a collision case under general
maritime law, "the awarding of prejudgment interest is the
rule rather than the exception, and, in practice, is well-nigh
automatic" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because prejudgment interest is not available under the
Jones Act in light of Monessen, regardless of whether the
Jones Act claim is brought at law or in admiralty, the district
court erred in awarding such interest to Martin. Accordingly,
we vacate that portion of the district court’s judgment.

VI

Finally, Harris contends that the district court erred by not
reducing the final judgment by amounts that he already paid
Martin for maintenance and cure. Because amounts paid for
maintenance and cure, however, are obligations that are not
duplicated by the award of damages for breach of Harris’ duty
to provide Martin "with a place safe to work," we affirm the
$150,000 damages award.

Under the general maritime law, a seaman is entitled to
maintenance and cure at the expense of the vessel. Mainte-
nance is the right to sustenance and unearned wages for the
period from the onset of the injury to the end of the voyage;
cure is the right to medical care until the seaman reaches the
point of maximum cure. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303
U.S. 525, 527-30 (1938); see also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines
Co., 374 U.S. 16, 19 n.7 (1963); Farrell v. United States, 336
U.S. 511, 513-19 (1949). An award for maintenance and cure
is independent of any recovery under the Jones Act. The obli-
gation to pay maintenance and cure arises under maritime law
whenever the seaman is injured, regardless of any negligence
or fault on the part of the owner or employer. See Calmar S.S.
Corp., 303 U.S. at 527. And although there must be no dupli-
cation in the final award, see Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 19 n.6
 MARTIN v. HARRIS 17
(recognizing the potential overlap in recoveries under the
Jones Act and the maintenance and cure claim and the need
to avoid duplication of damages), maintenance is broader
than, and thus not a substitute for, lost wages, see, e.g., Col-
burn v. Bunge Towing, Inc., 883 F.2d 372, 378 (5th Cir.
1989).

In this case, Harris paid $31,305 to Martin for maintenance
and cure, which included $8,000 for the remaining four
months of the fishing season that Martin was unable to work
after his injury and $23,305 for Martin’s medical bills. These
amounts, however, were not duplicated in the district court’s
award. The district court found:

Martin suffered from a disk herniation at the L4/L5
and L5/S1 levels of his spine, substantial physical
pain and mental suffering, as well as permanent limi-
tations. Martin additionally suffered a loss of earn-
ings and diminished earnings capacity. These
mental, physical and economic injuries entitle Mar-
tin to recover damages in the amount of $150,000
plus pre-judgment interest.

Although the final judgment did include "loss of earnings,"
maintenance is not a substitute for lost wages. Nor did the
final award include medical costs that were paid for by Harris
as part of his cure obligation. As such, the district court did
not err in not crediting Harris for amounts paid under his
maintenance and cure obligation.

VII

In sum, we affirm the district court’s finding of liability
under the Jones Act and its award of $150,000 in damages;
we vacate the district court’s award of prejudgment interest;
and we affirm the judgment, as so modified.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED