UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4083
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM ARTHUR BROWN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:92-cr-00270-GCM-1; 3:04-cv-00594-GCM)
Submitted: January 22, 2009 Decided: March 9, 2009
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram,
First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Arthur Brown was granted relief in part on his
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2008) motion. The district court
corrected Brown’s drug conspiracy sentence for Count 2 by
lowering his sentence for that count to 240 months of
imprisonment from 360 months. The court granted relief as the
record reflected that counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to note that Brown’s prior qualifying drug offense had
been dismissed. Without the prior qualifying offense, Brown’s
statutory maximum sentence dropped from thirty to twenty years.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2006). In its order granting
Brown § 2255 relief, in part, the court specifically noted that
it was only lowering Brown’s sentence for Count 2 and that all
his other sentences, terms and conditions remained the same. *
Brown appeals from the amended criminal judgment,
raising two issues: (1) whether the district court erred by not
holding a resentencing hearing prior to entering the amended
judgment; and (2) whether his six-year term of supervised
release for Count 2 was erroneous. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
*
Brown was also serving four 240-month concurrent sentences
for money laundering.
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We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to correct Brown’s sentence without holding a new
sentencing hearing. United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 667
(4th Cir. 2007) (stating review standard). Next, Brown argues
that his six-year term of supervised release for Count 2 is
improper under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) (2006), which states that
a Class C felony allows a maximum term of three years of
supervised release. We have previously rejected this argument,
noting that the applicable term of supervised release is
contained in the statute governing his offense of conviction.
See United States v. Pratt, 239 F.3d 640, 647-48 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that § 3583(b)(2) does not cap the period of supervised
release that a district court may impose under § 841(b)(1)(C)).
Accordingly, we affirm Brown’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3