UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4397
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONALD JAMAL WILSON, a/k/a Cash,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00034-1)
Submitted: February 12, 2009 Decided: March 18, 2009
Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jacob A. Manning, DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States
Attorney, R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Jamal Wilson was convicted after a jury trial
of one count of conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of
cocaine base, cocaine, and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2006), and two counts of managing a residence for the
purpose of storing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(2) (2006). Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Wilson appeals, contending that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered at his
apartment because the search warrant was not based upon probable
cause. Finding no error, we affirm.
Legal conclusions underlying the denial of a motion to
suppress are reviewed de novo, while factual findings are
reviewed for clear error. United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d
551, 553 (4th Cir. 2007). When the district court has denied a
defendant’s suppression motion, this court construes the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United
States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
In reviewing the propriety of issuing a search
warrant, the relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The facts
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presented to the issuing judge need only convince a person of
reasonable caution that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found at the place to be searched. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 742 (1983). Moreover, “the determination of probable cause
by the issuing magistrate is entitled to great deference by this
court.” United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted).
Here, the affidavit supporting the search warrant
contained four paragraphs. The first and third paragraphs
described the prior arrests of two other individuals for
possession of controlled substances, one of whom was arrested
shortly after leaving the residence in question. The second
paragraph discussed the surveillance of that residence that was
undertaken as a result of “prior drug information” received
about the apartment. During that surveillance, suspected drug
traffickers were seen entering and exiting the residence.
Finally, the fourth paragraph articulated information given by a
“cooperating witness” who had purchased illegal drugs at the
residence the day before.
The search warrant was obtained in the late night
hours of August 7, 2006, and the search was executed in the
early morning hours of August 8, 2006. Based on this search,
which turned up amounts of illegal drugs and paraphernalia,
police obtained arrest warrants for the defendant. Wilson was
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subsequently arrested, and information obtained during the
arrest was used to obtain a second search warrant for another
residence belonging to Wilson.
Wilson argues that there was nothing to demonstrate
that the information provided by the cooperating witness in the
affidavit was reliable. Wilson also contends that the other
portions of the affidavit contained conclusory statements devoid
of stated factual underpinnings, and in sum the affidavit did
not provide probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime
would be discovered at his residence. Furthermore, Wilson
maintains that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
did not apply here because the affidavit was nothing more than
bare bones assertions. Therefore, Wilson argues, the subsequent
arrest was invalid as the arrest warrants were based on
information obtained during the search that should have been
excluded. Consequently, Wilson contends that any evidence
obtained during not only the first search, but also during the
arrest and the second search, should have been suppressed.
While the information provided by the cooperating
witness was not verified or shown to be reliable, the remainder
of the affidavit demonstrated probable cause for the search
warrant. We therefore conclude the district court did not err
in denying Wilson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained
during the search. As we find probable cause did exist for the
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issuance of the search warrant, we need not address Wilson’s
arguments regarding the application of the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule and his arguments concerning the
subsequent arrest and search.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
denying Wilson’s motion to suppress. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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