UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-7630
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MAURICE EDGAR MCKENZIE, a/k/a Cappo, a/k/a Cappa, a/k/a
Richard Knight, a/k/a Emanuel Askew,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District
Judge. (9:97-cr-00032-SB-1)
Submitted: February 5, 2009 Decided: March 18, 2009
Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Maurice Edgar McKenzie, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Hayden
Bickerton, Peter Thomas Phillips, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Edgar McKenzie appeals from the district
court’s order granting in part his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006)
motion for reduction of sentence based on the crack cocaine
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, McKenzie
asserts that the district court failed to conduct a proper
analysis of his motion. Because the district court’s order
contains insufficient reasoning to permit appellate review, we
vacate and remand.
At sentencing, McKenzie’s Guidelines range was
calculated to be 262 to 327 months in prison. The district
court sentenced him to 327 months imprisonment. In June 2008,
McKenzie, through appointed counsel, filed the instant motion to
reduce his sentence. McKenzie stated that application of the
amendments would lower his Guidelines range to 210-262 months in
prison. McKenzie requested a sentence of 210 months, and the
Government consented.
The district court did not hold a hearing. Instead,
the court granted the motion in part and entered a sentence of
262 months. The order contained no reasoning or explanation.
The court merely stated that the “defendant is subject to a
reduced sentencing range . . . . Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the previously imposed sentence of 327 months is
reduced to 262 months.”
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We review the district court’s decision to modify a
sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. See United
States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 727 (4th Cir. 2000). In
deciding whether to grant a motion to reduce sentence based upon
a Guideline amendment, the district court must “consider[] the
factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) [(2006)] to the
extent that they are applicable” and must determine whether
“reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
A district court need not engage in a “ritualistic incantation”
in order to establish its consideration of the motion. Instead,
it is presumed that the court considered the § 3553 factors, as
well as the issues presented for determination, when issuing its
ruling. Legree, 205 F.3d at 728-29.
We find that the circumstances of the instant case
overcome the presumption that the court properly considered the
statutory factors and other issues relevant to the motion, and
we conclude that, under the specific facts of this case, the
district court’s failure to provide reasoning was an abuse of
discretion. First, unlike in Legree, in this case, the
Government agreed to the sentencing reduction sought by
McKenzie. The parties jointly recommended a sentence over five
years shorter than the one McKenzie received. The court did not
hold a hearing and gave no reasons for granting the motion in
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part, but rejecting the parties’ recommendation of the
appropriate sentence. While the parties’ agreement was not
binding on the district court, the court’s reasons for rejecting
the agreement are simply absent.
Second, the motion in Legree was denied; here, the
motion was granted in part. One could logically conclude from
the decision in Legree that the reasons underlying the original
sentence remained the district court’s reasoning. See 205 F.3d
at 729. Here, however, the court clearly determined that the
§ 3553 factors merited a partial reduction in sentence; however,
the court provided no insight into its thought process as to the
appropriate reduction. Any determination by this court as to
the basis of the district court’s decision would be purely
speculative.
Finally, while in both Legree and the instant case,
the judge presiding over the § 3582 motion was the same judge as
at the original sentence, the elapsed time in this case was
significantly longer. In Legree, the time between the two
events was approximately three years, see id. at 721-27, while
in this case over nine years elapsed between sentencing and the
§ 3582 motion. It is not clear whether the judge, in
considering McKenzie’s § 3582 motion, recalled factors presented
at the original sentencing. The original sentencing transcript
is not included in the record on appeal, so it is also unclear
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whether the court was even able to review it or how thoroughly
McKenzie’s background was initially examined.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand the case for the district court to provide adequate
reasoning for its decision. We express no opinion on the length
of an appropriate sentence. We decline to address the merits of
McKenzie’s remaining claims on appeal. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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