UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHARIFF YSALAM CAUGHMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:07-cr-00307-BO-1)
Submitted: October 23, 2008 Decided: March 24, 2009
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shariff Ysalam Caughman pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement to one count of possession with intent to
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and one count of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). The district court
sentenced Caughman to a 131-month term of imprisonment. On
appeal, Caughman’s counsel has filed an Anders ∗ brief, noting
that Caughman waived the right to appeal his sentence in the
plea agreement and that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. However, counsel questions whether Caughman’s sentence
is longer than necessary to achieve the objectives of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006). Caughman has filed a pro se supplemental
brief raising several issues. The Government has moved to
dismiss the appeal based on Caughman’s waiver of appellate
rights. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that
waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Amaya-
Portillo, 423 F.3d 427, 430 (4th Cir. 2005). Generally, if the
district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver
of his right to appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy,
∗
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2
the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v.
Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). The question of
whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a
question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Blick,
408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Caughman knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal
his sentence. Moreover, the sentencing claim Caughman’s counsel
raises on appeal falls within the scope of the waiver. We
therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss this portion
of the appeal.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
insulates Caughman’s sentence from appellate review, the waiver
does not preclude our consideration of any errors in Caughman’s
convictions that may be revealed by our review pursuant to
Anders. In accordance with Anders, then, we have examined the
entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues
not covered by the waiver. Our review of the transcript of the
plea colloquy leads us to conclude that the district court
substantially complied with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
in accepting Caughman's guilty plea and that any omissions did
not affect his substantial rights. The district court ensured
that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and was
3
supported by an independent factual basis. See United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). Moreover,
none of the issues in Caughman’s pro se supplemental brief raise
meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm Caughman’s convictions and
dismiss the appeal of his sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
4