UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4661
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DESABE LOUIS MEADOWS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (5:06-cr-00190-1)
Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: March 23, 2009
Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Barron M. Helgoe, VICTOR VICTOR & HELGOE LLP, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States
Attorney, Gerald M. Titus III, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Desabe Meadows, Jr.,
pled guilty to one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). He was
sentenced as an armed career criminal to the statutory minimum
of 180 months’ imprisonment. Meadows appeals, claiming the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and that he was sentenced in violation
of his Sixth Amendment rights. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant
does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 2003).
Once the district court has accepted a defendant’s guilty plea,
the defendant bears the burden of showing a “fair and just
reason” for withdrawing his guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th
Cir. 2007). “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . is one that
essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11
proceeding . . . .” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389,
1394 (4th Cir. 1992).
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In deciding whether to permit a defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea, a district court should consider:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible
evidence that his plea was not knowing or not
voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has
been a delay between the entering of the plea and the
filing of the motion, (4) whether defendant has had
close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether
withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and
(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste
judicial resources.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). The
first, second, and fourth of the Moore factors carry the most
weight in these considerations, as they concern whether the
defendant has a good reason to “upset settled systemic
expectations.” United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th
Cir. 1995). However, an appropriately conducted Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11 proceeding “raise[s] a strong presumption that the plea is
final and binding,” Lambey, 974 F.2d at 1394, as statements made
during a plea hearing “carry a strong presumption of verity,”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Thus, “a
properly conducted Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy leaves a
defendant with a very limited basis upon which to have his plea
withdrawn.” Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414.
Our review of the record confirms Meadows received an
adequate Rule 11 hearing, which creates a strong presumption
that his guilty plea was final and binding. However, Meadows
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argues on appeal, as he did below, that he did not enjoy the
close assistance of competent counsel. We have reviewed
Meadows’ proffered reasons for withdrawal of his guilty plea on
ineffective assistance grounds and we find that the court did
not err in concluding Meadows failed to demonstrate “that his
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” see Lambey, 974 F.2d at 1394 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Meadows failed to present a fair and just reason that his guilty
plea should be withdrawn.
Meadows also reasserts on appeal his objection on
Sixth Amendment grounds to the use of judicial fact finding to
establish the three predicate violent felony offenses that
raised his minimum sentence to fifteen years under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (2006). Meadows acknowledges, however, that this
argument is foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States
v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2005).
We therefore affirm Meadows’ conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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