UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4715
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SIR MARQUIS BATTLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00236-MR-1)
Submitted: March 12, 2009 Decided: April 1, 2009
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Raquel K. Wilson,
Matthew R. Segal, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F.
Shappert, United States Attorney, Cortney Escaravage, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sir Marquis Battle appeals his conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) (2006). Battle argues § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause in light of United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)
(1994)), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000)
(reversing conviction under federal arson statute because
private residence was not used in interstate commerce). Finding
that Battle’s claim is foreclosed by Circuit precedent, we
affirm his conviction.
This court has previously considered and rejected a
challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) based upon
Lopez, in United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810-11 (4th Cir.
1996). We have further held that Jones does not affect our
decisions regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g). United
States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, any argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional
must fail. See also United States v. Nathan, 202 F.3d 230, 234
(4th Cir. 2000) (upholding § 922(g)(1)); United States v.
Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding § 922(g)(8)
and stating that “jurisdictional element applies to all nine
subsections included in Section 922(g)”).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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