UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-7681
RASHID QAWI AL-AMIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LINDA SHEAR, in her individual and official capacities;
RUFUS FLEMING, in his individual and official capacities; G.
P. WILLIAMS, in his individual and official capacities; D.
M. FERGUSON, in his/her individual and official capacities;
S. J. ADVENT, in his individual and official capacities;
CHARLIE DAVIS, in his individual and official capacities; M.
L. POPE, in his individual and official capacities; CLYDE
ALDERMAN, in his individual and official capacities; C.
BAYLOR, in his individual and official capacities; BLAINE
BROCK, Food Service Manager,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
GENE JOHNSON, in his official capacity; NATHANIEL FARROW,
Food Service Staff,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:04-cv-00346-RAJ-FBS)
Submitted: March 6, 2009 Decided: April 10, 2009
Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Rashid Qawi Al-Amin, Appellant Pro Se. Mark R. Davis, Assistant
Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia; Paul Graham Beers, GLENN,
FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke, Virginia; Peter M.
Coppinger, Gregory D. Cote, MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Rashid Q. Al-Amin, a Virginia prisoner, appeals from
the district court’s orders granting summary judgment to
Defendants in Al-Amin’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and
vacate and remand in part.
I.
Al-Amin’s first claim is that Defendants violated
RLUIPA by requiring him to use both his committed name and his
legal name to access his inmate account. Al-Amin alleged that
he legally changed his name from Tracy Jones in 1991. He
asserted that he is a practicing Muslim who sincerely believes
the name “Jones” is offensive to his religious beliefs. In
addressing Al-Amin’s claim, the district court relied on
Thacker v. Dixon, 953 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1992), an unpublished
case decided prior to the enactment of RLUIPA. However, Thacker
does not apply the appropriate RLUIPA test.
RLUIPA prohibits prisons from imposing a substantial
burden on an inmate’s religious exercise unless prison officials
can demonstrate that the burden (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C.
3
§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2000). The plaintiff bears the initial
burden of showing (1) that he seeks to engage in an exercise of
religion and (2) that the challenged practice substantially
burdens that exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2000). Once
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendants
bear the burden of persuasion on whether their practice is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
interest. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 2006).
“Religious exercise” includes an exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000). A “substantial
burden” on the free exercise of religion is one that forces
adherents of a religion to modify behavior, to violate beliefs,
or to choose between forfeiting governmental benefits and
abandoning a religious precept. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187.
Thus, the district court’s conclusion, via Thacker,
that Al-Amin had alternative ways to practice his religion and
that the prison would be burdened if it had to change its filing
system does not address the applicable RLUIPA test. Al-Amin
alleged that his given name is religiously offensive to him and
that the prison’s requirement that he use his given name forced
him to either violate his beliefs or forego accessing his prison
account. Thus, we conclude that he has presented a prima facie
case that the prison violated RLUIPA. The district court made
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no findings as to the sincerity of Al-Amin’s beliefs or whether
the regulation was the least restrictive method of furthering a
compelling government policy. Because the district court did
not apply the correct legal standard, we vacate the district
court’s order and remand for further proceedings for the
district court to apply the RLUIPA test.
II.
The district court dismissed Al-Amin’s claims
regarding Ramadan of 2001 as barred by the two-year statute of
limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Virginia. 1 However,
Al-Amin’s complaints regarding Ramadan in 2001 were also brought
under RLUIPA.
RLUIPA does not contain its own statute of limitations
period. However, for civil actions “arising under an Act of
Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990],” the appropriate
limitations period is four years. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006);
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004)
(holding that four year statute of limitations applies if the
plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was made possible by a
post-1990 enactment). RLUIPA was enacted in September 2000; it
1
Al-Amin’s complaint was signed in May 2004 and filed in
June 2004.
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created a new right of action which Al-Amin seeks to invoke in
this complaint. Thus, the proper limitations period is four
years, and the district court improperly dismissed Al-Amin’s
RLUIPA claims regarding Ramadan of 2001. Accordingly, we vacate
the dismissal of this claim and remand for consideration of the
merits of the cause of action.
III.
The district court dismissed on statute of limitations
grounds Al-Amin’s claim that prison officials discriminated
against Islamic materials in the chaplain’s library in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the court found
that a two-year limitations period applied 2 and that the latest
date alleged by Al-Amin regarding this claim was his assertion
that Defendants returned materials he attempted to donate and
rejected his related grievance in April 2002.
In his informal brief, Al-Amin asserts that he alleged
an ongoing violation in his complaint and that certain of his
allegations specifically concerned actions in June 2002, within
the limitations period. Al-Amin is correct. In his complaint,
2
The parties do not dispute that Virginia’s two-year
statute of limitations applied to this equal protection claim.
See Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d 733, 735 (4th
Cir. 1991).
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Al-Amin averred that Defendant Williams “[c]onsistently denied,
and continues to deny, approval for donations of Islamic videos
and audio tapes purchased by Muslim inmates.” Moreover, in the
materials submitted in opposition to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, Al-Amin submitted documents showing that his
attempt to donate four videotapes was denied in June 2002 and
that his related grievance was denied in July 2002.
Because Al-Amin specifically alleged unconstitutional
actions within two years prior to filing the complaint, his
claim was improperly dismissed as untimely. While it may be
that certain aspects of the claim are barred by the statute of
limitations, the district court incorrectly dismissed all of
Al-Amin’s complaints regarding the donation of Islamic materials
to the chaplain’s library. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal
of this claim and remand for further proceedings.
IV.
Al-Amin asserted that prison officials refused to
accommodate his diet requirements during Ramadan in 2002 and
2003. Specifically, Al-Amin is a Sunni Muslim. As such, he
eats only Halal (or Kosher) foods. In addition, during the
Ramadan fast, he can only eat prior to sunrise and after sunset.
Al-Amin appears to allege that Defendants gave him two choices:
(1) Kosher food (“Common Fare”) without any special
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consideration for ceremonial meals or (2) non-Kosher, ceremonial
food (“Ramadan menu”).
The district court asserted that Al-Amin was alleging
“that he did not receive the meals he wanted, not that he failed
to receive meals that conformed to his religious beliefs.” The
district court concluded that Al-Amin chose the “Ramadan menu”
and, thus, could not complain that he no longer received his
Common Fare meals.
Neither Al-Amin nor the district court is clear as to
the legal basis for his claim. However, the district court
examined whether Al-Amin showed that his free exercise was
“substantially burdened.” Thus, it appears that the district
court considered the claim under RLUIPA. 3 Al-Amin does not
challenge the district court’s legal framework on appeal.
Al-Amin has raised shifting allegations regarding
these claims. However, construing his allegations and evidence
liberally, it appears that he is claiming that prison officials
removed him from his Common Fare diet during Ramadan 2002 and
2003, without his consent. His 2002 claims are easily dispensed
3
RLUIPA provides more protection to inmates’ free exercise
rights than does the First Amendment. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at
199-200.
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with due to the form he completed asking for the Ramadan menu. 4
His 2003 claims are more complex, since there is a material
issue of fact as to whether he asked to be removed from his
Common Fare diet. The Defendants assert that he did, but
provide no proof. Al-Amin claims that he did not and submits
affidavits of other inmates in support.
Assuming that Al-Amin was removed from his Common Fare
diet without consent during Ramadan 2003, the question becomes
whether removal from Common Fare constituted a substantial
burden on Al-Amin’s exercise of his religion. Assuming that
Al-Amin’s religion requires him to eat Kosher food, the denial
of such food for a month would constitute a substantial burden.
Essentially, he would face the choice of violating a religious
tenet or going without food. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d
112, 125 (5th Cir.) (finding that denying Kosher food to an
observant Jew was a substantial burden), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 707 (2007). The burden would then shift to Defendants to
show that the denial of Kosher food during Ramadan 2003 was the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
4
The form is certainly unclear. Al-Amin crossed through
the sentence requesting Common Fare meals; however, his text
requested Kosher Ramadan meals. It appears that Al-Amin was
attempting to receive some sort of special “ceremonial” meal as
opposed to the regular Common Fare meals. However, he fails to
offer any specifics or to allege how the denial of ceremonial
meals impacted the exercise of his religion.
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interest. Since Defendants assert that Al-Amin chose to be
removed from his Common Fare diet, they have not addressed this
prong.
Accordingly, while we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Al-Amin’s claims regarding Ramadan
2002, we conclude that there is a material issue of fact
preventing summary judgment – namely, whether Al-Amin requested
to be removed from his Common Fare diet during Ramadan 2003. If
he did, the analysis ends, as the denial of Common Fare food was
his own choice. If he did not, the district court should then
complete the RLUIPA inquiry. Accordingly, we vacate the grant
of summary judgment with regard to Al-Amin’s claims concerning
Ramadan 2003 and remand for further proceedings.
V.
We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to all
other claims for the reasons stated by the district court.
Al-Amin v. Shear, No. 2:04-cv-00346-RAJ-FBS (E.D. Va. Mar. 21 &
July 25, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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