UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-6212
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANETTE LAVAINE MAYFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:01-cv-00083-RLV; 5:98-cr-00164-
RLV-11)
Submitted: February 9, 2009 Decided: April 8, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael L. Waldman, Brian A. Pérez-Daple, ROBBINS, RUSSELL,
ENGLERT, ORSECK, UNTEREINER & SAUBER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Adam
Morris, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Danette Mayfield appeals from the district court’s
order denying her 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2008) motion.
Previously, we resolved all of Mayfield’s claims but one: that
her attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to object to the inclusion of two juvenile convictions
in the calculation of her criminal history category. As to that
claim, we found that the district court had improperly dismissed
it as untimely, and we remanded for consideration of the claim
on its merits. See United States v. Mayfield, No. 06-6282 (4th
Cir. Dec. 7, 2006) (unpublished).
On remand, the district court sua sponte entered a
final order, finding that Mayfield could not show prejudice from
any error of counsel. Specifically, the court stated that,
because Mayfield pled guilty, she was required to show that “but
for counsel’s alleged errors, this petitioner would have
insisted on a trial,” citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59
(1985). The court then went on to note that Mayfield had
“[i]ncredibly” “not bothered to assert or even to hint that but
for this alleged error, she would have insisted upon going to
trial.” Finding that there was little likelihood that Mayfield
would have demanded a trial absent counsel’s alleged error, the
court rejected Mayfield’s claim.
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On appeal, the parties agree that the district court
applied the wrong legal standard. While ineffective assistance
claims in the guilty plea context are usually evaluated under
the standards announced in Hill, Mayfield does not challenge her
counsel’s actions in relation to the entry of her guilty plea.
Instead, because Mayfield argues that her attorney was
ineffective at sentencing, the standard Strickland analysis is
appropriate. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (movant must show that attorney’s conduct fell below
objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a
reasonable probability that, absent these errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different); see also Royal v.
Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 248-49 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that Hill
standard applies only during “challenge to guilty plea” and
applying Strickland to ineffective assistance at sentencing
claim, requiring only that “sentence would have been more
lenient” absent counsel’s errors).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand for consideration of Mayfield’s claim under the proper
standard. Although the parties suggest that we may decide the
matter on the record before us in the first instance, we find
that there is a factual issue which must be determined by the
district court prior to the application of the Strickland legal
analysis. Specifically, on remand, the district court must
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determine when Mayfield commenced her conduct for the offense of
conviction, in accordance with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4A1.2(d)(2) (1998). Once this factual dispute is resolved,
the district court can proceed to address whether counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the inclusion of the
juvenile convictions in Mayfield’s criminal history category
calculation. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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