UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4766
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO OWENS, a/k/a Tonio,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
RANDY MARTIN; LUTHER BRYAN; ALISIA H. AKBAR; LACARIA BROWN;
GEORGEAN MCCONNELL; GUSSIE D. NOLLKAMPER; FLORENCE
NOLLKAMPER; CHRISTOPHER M. MORRIS; LAVACA COUNTY TEXAS;
JOSEPH E. MCCONNELL; JOHN M. WARTHER; WELLS FARGO HOME
MORTGAGE, INCORPORATED; CHERYL L. AMAKER; DONNA C. ADKINS;
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Parties-in-Interest.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:02-cr-00548-CMC-26)
Submitted: March 19, 2009 Decided: April 6, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and John
Preston BAILEY, Chief United States District Judge for the
Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey M. Brandt, ROBINSON & BRANDT, P.S.C., Covington,
Kentucky, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States
Attorney, Jane B. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Antonio Owens was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006), and was sentenced to life in prison. Owens appealed,
challenging his conviction and sentence. We affirmed Owens’
conviction and rejected claims relating to Owens’ sentence, but
because he was sentenced under the then-mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines, vacated and remanded for resentencing consistent
with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United
States v. Davis, 270 F. App’x 236 (4th Cir. March 17, 2008)
(unpublished).
On remand, the district court imposed a 300-month
variant sentence on Owens and he timely appealed. Owens claims
that while the district court correctly imposed a variant
sentence upon him, the district court’s variance was
insufficient because: (i) Owens had a disadvantaged childhood;
(ii) his Guidelines range was based overwhelmingly on drug
weight, thereby making the range unreasonably high; and (iii)
there are too many incarcerated people in the United States and
a 300-month sentence “would be a waste for [Owens] and society
at large.”
We affirm the district court’s variant sentence
imposed on remand. After Booker, we review a sentence for
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reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion standard of review.
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); see United
States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]
sentence that deviates from the Guidelines is reviewed under the
same deferential abuse-of-discretion standard as a sentence
imposed within the applicable guidelines range.”). The court
must give due deference to the district court’s decision that
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors justify the sentence.
United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 2008). Even
if this court would have imposed a different sentence, this fact
alone will not justify vacatur of the district court’s sentence.
Id.
At Owens’ resentencing, the district court heard
counsel’s argument regarding the weight that should be afforded
the § 3553(a) factors, afforded Owens an opportunity to
allocute, and thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors before
imposing Owens’ sentence. We conclude that the district court
adequately explained its rationale for imposing the variant
sentence, that the sentence was selected pursuant to a reasoned
process in accordance with law, and that the reasons relied upon
by the district court are plausible and justify the sentence
imposed. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61; United States v. Pauley,
511 F.3d 468, 473-76 (4th Cir. 2007).
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Because we find Owens’ variant sentence imposed on
remand to be reasonable, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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