UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4925
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS DIXON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00032-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2009 Decided: April 17, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Lex A. Coleman,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney,
R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Dixon pled guilty to possession of fifty grams
or more of crack cocaine. The district court determined that
Dixon was accountable for 246 grams of crack cocaine, and that
his advisory guideline range was 151 to 188 months imprisonment.
The district court determined that Dixon’s criminal history
category overstated the seriousness of his past criminal
activity, and departed downward and imposed a 140-month
sentence. Dixon appeals, arguing that the district court erred
by converting the $20,000 in cash which was found secreted in a
loveseat in Dixon’s bedroom to its crack cocaine equivalent. He
also argues that the sentence imposed violated his substantive
due process rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
First, we find no clear error in the district court’s
determination that the currency found hidden in the loveseat was
attributable to Dixon’s drug trafficking activities. United
States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 614 (4th Cir. 1994) (providing
standard). The $20,000 was packaged in a manner similar to that
used by persons in the drug trade, it was hidden inside
furniture, and it was implausible, given their income, that
Dixon and his wife could save up that substantial sum “from
their limited income with the expenses any normal family would
have.” While the district court did convert to crack the amount
that Dixon’s mother testified was given to Dixon from family
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members, as the district court noted, even if this sum was not
included in the amount converted to crack, Dixon’s offense level
would remain the same. From our review of the evidence, we do
not find any clear error by the district court in converting the
currency found in Dixon’s home to its cocaine base equivalent.
See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1, cmt.
n.12 (2007); United States v. Sampson, 140 F.3d 585, 592 (4th
Cir. 1998).
Second, Dixon claims that the sentencing disparity
between powder cocaine and crack offenses violates due process.
We find no such violation, either in the statute, or in the
application of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases).
Accordingly, we affirm Dixon’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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