Townsend v. Shook

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-2188

PAULA MAY TOWNSEND,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MARK WILLIAM SHOOK, individually and in his official
capacity as Sheriff of Watauga County; WATAUGA COUNTY;
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

JOHN DOE SURETY,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Dennis L. Howell,
Magistrate Judge. (5:06-cv-00070-DLH)

Submitted: March 19, 2009 Decided: April 24, 2009

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Angela Newell Gray, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
James R. Morgan, Jr., Mary N. Craven, WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE
& RICE, PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In this sexual harassment/wrongful discharge case alleging

various federal and North Carolina state law claims, Paula

Townsend (Plaintiff) appeals from the magistrate judge’s grant

of summary judgment in favor of: (1) Mark Shook, individually

and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Watauga County, North

Carolina; (2) Watauga County; and (3) Western Surety Company.

We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1

I.

In 1986, Plaintiff was hired as an administrative clerk for

the Watauga County Sheriff’s Office by her close family friend,

then Sheriff James Lyons (Sheriff Lyons). 2 Under Sheriff Lyons,

Plaintiff served as a criminal investigator and later as a

detective sergeant in the Watauga County Sheriff’s Office.

1
The parties consented to disposition of this case by a
United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
2
Because Plaintiff’s claims on appeal are analyzed under
the summary judgment standard, we present the facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, as the non-moving party. See Hill
v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th
Cir. 2004).

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 In 1998, Sheriff Lyons appointed Plaintiff to the position

of Chief Deputy Sheriff. In December 2002, through an election,

Mark Shook (Sheriff Shook) became Sheriff of Watauga County.

Sheriff Shook immediately reappointed Plaintiff to the position

of Chief Deputy Sheriff, although he was under no legal

obligation to do so. Plaintiff served in that position until

Sheriff Shook terminated her two and a half years later on July

12, 2005.

As Chief Deputy Sheriff under Sheriff Shook, Plaintiff was

second in command at the Watauga County Sheriff’s Office,

wielded the authority to issue commands and directives in the

name of Sheriff Shook, and served as the acting Sheriff in

Sheriff Shook’s absence. Moreover, as Chief Deputy Sheriff,

Plaintiff was the policy administrator for the Watauga County

Sheriff’s Office, heavily involved in drafting policy and making

sure that such policies were carried out. In her position,

Plaintiff was also responsible for handling all internal

investigations; drafting and administering the office budget;

and chairing the office hiring committee. Sheriff Shook, who

had the sole power to appoint Plaintiff to the position of Chief

Deputy Sheriff, also had the sole power to demote or terminate

her.

In support of her allegations of sexual harassment,

Plaintiff presented evidence that, on numerous occasions

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throughout her tenure as Chief Deputy Sheriff, Sheriff Shook

attempted to engage her romantically through physical and verbal

advances. On each occasion, Plaintiff rebuffed his advances.

For example, on New Years’ Eve 2002, while sitting alone in

a patrol car during a stakeout of a methamphetamine lab, Sheriff

Shook pulled Plaintiff towards him and started fondling one of

her breasts and kissing her. Plaintiff pulled away and told

Sheriff Shook that he “d[id]n’t need to be doing that.” (S.J.A.

37). Sheriff Shook responded that he had been crazy about

Plaintiff since high school and that he had “always had a thing

for [her].” Id.

Sheriff Shook engaged in similar behavior towards Plaintiff

while the two attended an out-of-town training conference in

April 2003. Plaintiff again rebuffed Sheriff Shook’s sexual

advances. Also in April 2003, Sheriff Shook gave Plaintiff a

note expressing his romantic feelings for her at a time when he

believed his life was in danger as a result of death threats.

Another incident of aggressive sexual advances by Sheriff Shook

towards Plaintiff happened in 2003 in Sheriff Shook’s office.

On other occasions, Sheriff Shook touched Plaintiff’s hair and

shoulders and attempted to hold her hand.

Sheriff Shook also occasionally told dirty jokes in

Plaintiff’s presence and, in January or February of 2004, told

Plaintiff of a sexual fantasy that he had involving her.

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Sheriff Shook also occasionally made derogatory comments about

Plaintiff or women in general in her presence.

In contending that Plaintiff was terminated for a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, Sheriff Shook presented

evidence that over the course of Plaintiff’s service as Chief

Deputy Sheriff during his administration, Plaintiff was

increasingly absent from work and generally behaved in a manner

that caused her to lose the respect and trust of many members of

the Watauga County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff acknowledges

that she was warned of this situation by Sheriff Shook on

several occasions and that she was advised by him to take

measures to earn the trust and respect of the deputies.

According to Sheriff Shook, Plaintiff’s professional

failings culminated in a magazine article that featured her in

early July 2005, which angered many members of the Watauga

County Sheriff’s Office. According to Sheriff Shook, this was

the final straw which resulted in his asking Plaintiff to resign

her position as Chief Deputy Sheriff, and when she declined to

do so, he terminated her on July 12, 2005. In rebuttal,

Plaintiff contends that the reasons given by Sheriff Shook were

not legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, but were a mere

pretext for unlawful discrimination.

On June 13, 2006, Plaintiff filed the present action

against Sheriff Shook in both his official capacity as Sheriff

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of Watauga County and in his individual capacity, also naming as

defendants Watauga County and John Doe Surety. The complaint

alleged two federal claims and four state law claims. With

respect to her federal claims, Plaintiff alleged sexual

harassment and wrongful discharge because of her gender in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., along with a concurrent § 1983 claim, 42

U.S.C. § 1983, against all defendants. Plaintiff alleged the

following three claims against all defendants under North

Carolina law: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of North

Carolina public policy, as stated in North Carolina General

Statute § 143-422.2, because she rebuffed Sheriff Shook’s sexual

advances; (2) common law negligent infliction of emotional

distress; and (3) common law intentional infliction of emotional

distress. In her fourth state law claim, Plaintiff alleged

common law negligent supervision and retention of Sheriff Shook

by Watauga County.

Sheriff Shook counterclaimed against Plaintiff for

defamation. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on

December 12, 2006, substituting Western Surety Company, the

surety on Sheriff Shook’s official bond obtained pursuant to

North Carolina General Statute § 162-8, for John Doe Surety as a

defendant.

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 After the close of discovery, Sheriff Shook, Watauga

County, and Western Surety Company (collectively Defendants)

moved for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff moved for

summary judgment with respect to Sheriff Shook’s counterclaim

for defamation. The magistrate judge first determined that

Plaintiff fell within Title VII’s exclusion of protection for

“any person chosen . . . to be on [the] personal staff” of “any

person elected to public office in any State or political

subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof . . .

.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). On this basis, the magistrate judge

granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to

Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1983 claims and dismissed, for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, such claims without prejudice to

Plaintiff filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) based upon the same allegations under the

Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (GERA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16a et seq. The magistrate judge also granted summary

judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s

North Carolina common law claims alleging negligent infliction

of emotional distress and wrongful discharge in violation of

North Carolina public policy, as stated in North Carolina

General Statute § 143-422.2, because she would not accede to the

sexual advances of Sheriff Shook, and dismissed such claims with

prejudice. Moreover, the magistrate judge granted summary

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judgment in favor of Watauga County with respect to Plaintiff’s

claim alleging negligent supervision and retention and dismissed

such claim with prejudice. Finally, the magistrate judge

dismissed Plaintiff’s claim alleging intentional infliction of

emotional distress and Sheriff Shook’s counterclaim for

defamation without prejudice to their respective abilities to

refile such claims in state court in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3).

Plaintiff timely noted the present appeal challenging the

adverse dispositions of her Title VII claim, § 1983 claim, North

Carolina public policy claim, and negligent infliction of

emotional distress claim. We address each claim in turn.

II.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing

all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving

party. Hill, 354 F.3d at 283. Summary judgment is appropriate

“if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on

file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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 III.

Plaintiff first contends the magistrate judge erred in

determining that she fell under Title VII’s exclusion of

protection for the personal staff of an elected official, and

therefore, reversibly erred by granting summary judgment in

favor of Defendants with respect to her Title VII claim and her

§ 1983 claim and by dismissing such claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. While we agree with Plaintiff that the

magistrate judge erroneously held that the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1983

claims, we hold that such error was harmless and affirm the

judgment on these claims.

Title VII defines the term “employee,” in relevant part,

as:

an individual employed by an employer, except that the
term “employee” shall not include any person elected
to public office in any State or political subdivision
of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s
personal staff . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (emphasis added). “The reach of Title

VII’s personal staff exclusion is a question of federal, not

state, law.” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1322 (4th Cir.

1996). In determining whether Plaintiff falls within Title

VII’s personal staff exclusion, “[a] fact-specific examination

of [Plaintiff’s] role is what is required,” and “[i]n general,

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the examination should focus on whether the employee worked in

an intimate and sensitive position of trust, close to the

elected official.” Id. at 1323. See also id. (setting forth

non-rigid list of factors for consideration in fact-specific

examination of plaintiff’s role).

Here, a fact-specific examination of Plaintiff’s role as

Chief Deputy Sheriff, focusing on whether she worked in an

intimate and sensitive position of trust, close to Sheriff

Shook, results in our conclusion that Plaintiff falls under

Title VII’s exclusion of protection for the personal staff of an

elected official. As Chief Deputy Sheriff under Sheriff Shook,

Plaintiff was second in command at the Watauga County Sheriff’s

Office, wielded the authority to issue commands and directives

in the name of Sheriff Shook, and served as the Acting Sheriff

in Sheriff Shook’s absence. Moreover, as Chief Deputy Sheriff,

Plaintiff was the policy administrator for the Watauga County

Sheriff’s Office, requiring her to be heavily involved in

drafting policy and in making sure that such policies were

carried out. Plaintiff also was responsible for handling all

internal investigations; drafting and administering the office

budget; and chairing the office hiring committee. Sheriff

Shook, who had the sole power to appoint Plaintiff to the

position of Chief Deputy Sheriff, also had the sole power to

demote or discharge her. Under the totality of the

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circumstances just outlined, Plaintiff’s position as Chief

Deputy Sheriff was quintessentially an “intimate and sensitive

position of trust, close to [Sheriff Shook].” Id. As such,

Plaintiff is excluded from coverage under Title VII and her

Title VII claim fails as a matter of law.

We note that the crux of Plaintiff’s argument below and on

appeal is that after several months in her position as Chief

Deputy Sheriff, she was Chief Deputy Sheriff on paper only and

that Sheriff Shook relied on her more as a friend with whom he

would confide personal feelings, rather than professionally,

based on their respective positions. We agree with the

magistrate judge’s reasoning in rejecting this argument: “such

an argument, if accepted, would eliminate the exclusion to any

member of any elected official’s personal staff inasmuch as a

loss of trust and intimacy would be the forerunner of most

terminations.” (J.A. 220).

Turning to the subject matter jurisdiction issue, we hold

that application of Title VII’s personal staff exclusion does

not present a lack of subject matter jurisdiction issue. See

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (holding that

Title VII’s provision limiting its application to businesses

with fifteen or more employees was not jurisdictional, on the

basis that “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation

on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the

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restriction as nonjurisdictional in character”). Rather, at the

summary judgment stage, it presents the issue of whether a Title

VII plaintiff can prevail as a matter of law. Cromer, 88 F.3d

at 1324. Here, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim also fails as a matter

of law, because Plaintiff based such claim solely upon her

ability to prevail upon her Title VII claim. Accordingly, we

affirm the magistrate judge’s entry of summary judgment in favor

of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1983

claims, and his dismissal of such claims without prejudice to

Plaintiff filing a claim under the GERA with the EEOC, based

upon the same allegations.

IV.

Plaintiff next contends the magistrate judge committed

reversible error by granting summary judgment in favor of

Defendants with respect to her North Carolina state law claim

alleging that she was wrongfully discharged in violation of

North Carolina public policy, as stated in North Carolina

General Statute § 143-422.2, because she would not accede to the

sexual advances of Sheriff Shook. We agree with Plaintiff’s

contention with respect to Sheriff Shook, sued in both his

individual and official capacities, and with respect to Western

Surety Company. However, we affirm the grant of summary

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judgment in favor of Watauga County, albeit on a different

ground than that upon which the magistrate judge relied.

According to North Carolina General Statute § 143-422.2,

known as North Carolina’s Equal Employment Practices Act

(NCEEPA):

It is the public policy of this State to protect and
safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to
seek, obtain and hold employment without
discrimination or abridgement on account of race,
religion, color, national origin, age, sex or handicap
by employers which regularly employ 15 or more
employees.

Id. 3

In Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir.

2000), we held that there is no private right of action under

NCEEPA for sexual harassment. Id. at 247. Subsequently, in

McLean v. Patten Communities, Inc., 332 F.3d 714 (4th Cir.

2003), we held that a plaintiff does have a private cause of

action under North Carolina common law for violation of public

policy, specifically NCEEPA, when an employee is discharged

because she has refused to accede to the sexual advances of her

supervisor. Id. 722. The distinguishing feature between the

claim disallowed in Smith and the claim allowed in McLean is

that the claim allowed in McLean alleged a wrongful discharge

because of the plaintiff’s refusal of sexual favors to her

3
Defendants do not dispute that Watauga County Sheriff’s
Office has over fifteen employees.

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supervisor, while the claim disallowed in Smith did not allege

wrongful discharge, just sexual harassment.

Here, the magistrate judge relied upon Smith in granting

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to

Plaintiff’s North Carolina public policy claim, with no mention

of McLean. Based upon McLean, we: (1) vacate the judgment

below to the extent the magistrate judge granted summary

judgment in favor of Sheriff Shook, sued in both his individual

and official capacities, and Western Surety with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim alleging wrongful discharge in violation of

North Carolina public policy, as stated in North Carolina

General Statute § 143-422.2, because she rebuffed Sheriff

Shook’s sexual advances and to the extent the magistrate judge

dismissed such claim with prejudice; and (2) remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4

We affirm the judgment below in favor of Watauga County

with respect to Plaintiff’s North Carolina public policy claim

on the basis that, under North Carolina law, Sheriff Shook, and

4
We express no opinion on Sheriff Shook’s claim to
governmental immunity in his official capacity, which argument
the magistrate judge did not reach below. We also express no
opinion on Western Surety Company’s argument that, although
Plaintiff named it as a defendant in her Amended Complaint, she
nevertheless failed to assert a cause of action against it
pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 58-76-5. The
record on appeal does not disclose whether Western Surety
Company raised this argument below.

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not Watauga County, had exclusive responsibility for discharging

Plaintiff. Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 552-53 (4th Cir.

2000) (“Although the county board of commissioners may fix the

number of salaried employees within the sheriff’s office, the

sheriff ‘has the exclusive right’ under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-

103 (1998) ‘to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in

his office.’ North Carolina courts interpret this statute to

preclude county liability for personnel decisions made by

sheriffs.”).

V.

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge

committed reversible error by entering summary judgment in favor

of Defendants with respect to her claim alleging negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff’s argument is

without merit.

A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

under North Carolina common law has three elements: (1) the

defendant engaged in negligent conduct; (2) that such negligent

conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress was

foreseeable to the defendant; and (3) the negligent conduct, in

fact, caused severe emotional distress. Holleman v. Aiken, 668

S.E.2d 579, 591 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). The magistrate judge

granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to

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Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim on

the following basis:

In this case, the only evidence plaintiff has to
support this claim is the same evidence giving rise to
her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Plaintiff simply has alleged no negligent
acts on the part of any defendant and has provided no
evidence of any act of negligence.

(J.A. 227). After reviewing the record on appeal, we completely

agree with the magistrate judge’s analysis of this claim.

Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim and the

dismissal of such claim with prejudice.

VI.

In summary, we: (1) affirm entry of summary judgment in

favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim,

but note that the magistrate judge committed harmless error when

he held the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over such

claim; (2) affirm entry of summary judgment in favor of

Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, but note

that the magistrate judge committed harmless error when he held

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over such claim;

(3) affirm entry of summary judgment in favor of Watauga County

with respect to Plaintiff’s North Carolina public policy claim;

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(4) vacate the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff

Shook and Western Surety Company with respect to Plaintiff’s

North Carolina public policy claim and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion; and (5) affirm entry

of summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to

Plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

We note that the magistrate judge remains free on remand to

dismiss, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s North Carolina public

policy claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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