UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1063
BILLY G. ASEMANI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-8005
BILLY G. ASEMANI,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge.
(1:05-cv-02821-AMD)
Submitted: March 20, 2009 Decided: April 24, 2009
Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
No. 08-1063 dismissed; No. 08-8005 affirmed by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Billy G. Asemani, Appellant Pro Se. Ariana Wright Arnold,
Assistant United States Attorney, Melanie Lisa Glickson, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
These consolidated appeals arise from an action filed
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671-
2680 (2006), by Billy G. Asemani, a former federal detainee
presently incarcerated in a Maryland state prison. Asemani’s
action sought damages for injuries allegedly sustained while he
was being detained by the Department of Homeland Security.
After the Government filed a motion for summary
judgment, the district court issued a notice pursuant to
Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising
Asemani that he had seventeen days from the date of the notice
to file any written opposition. Prior to expiration of the
seventeen-day period, the district court issued a memorandum
opinion and order granting the Government’s motion for summary
judgment. In Appeal No. 08-1063, Asemani challenged the court’s
failure to afford him the full time allotted to respond to the
Government’s summary judgment motion. He also raised this issue
in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion in the district court. When
that court entered an order reflecting its inclination to grant
the Rule 60(b) motion, we remanded for the limited purpose of
permitting the district court to consider Asemani’s responsive
pleading. Asemani v. United States, 283 F. App’x 160 (4th Cir.
2008) (No. 08-1063).
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On remand, the district court entered an order
granting Asemani thirty days to file a response. Asemani
received a thirty-day extension of this time period, at the
conclusion of which he moved to place his case in abeyance
pending action in an unrelated case. Alternatively, he moved
for another extension of time to file a response. The district
court denied the motion for abeyance and for an extension of
time and ordered the case closed. Asemani timely appealed.
This appeal from the district court’s final order was assigned
No. 08-8005, and was consolidated with Asemani’s earlier appeal,
No. 08-1063, now back from remand.
In Appeal No. 08-1063, Asemani’s sole argument on
appeal is that the district court erred in entering its original
judgment three days before his response deadline. Our remand of
the appeal and the district court’s order allowing Asemani time
to file a responsive pleading render this appeal moot. The fact
that Asemani failed on remand to file a responsive pleading does
not alter this result.
In Appeal No. 08-8005, Asemani raises a single issue:
whether the lower court abused its discretion by dismissing his
case at the same time it denied his motion for an extension of
time. He requests that we again remand the case to the district
court, directing the court to allow him to file a response.
Alternatively, he requests leave to appeal the order dismissing
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his complaint. However, because Asemani asserts no specific
challenges to the order granting summary judgment, he has
abandoned any challenge to the substance of the order.
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir.
1999).
To the extent that Asemani challenges the district
court’s action ordering the case closed, our remand was for the
limited purpose of allowing the district court to consider
Asemani’s response to the Government’s motion for summary
judgment. As Asemani failed to file a response, nothing
remained for the court to consider, and its action closing the
case was proper.
To the extent that Asemani challenges the propriety of
the district court’s denial of a further extension of time, we
review such denials for abuse of discretion. See Carefirst of
Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390,
396 (4th Cir. 2003). Because Asemani failed to allege any
reason warranting yet another extension of time, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Appeal No. 08-1063,
and affirm the judgment of the district court in Appeal No. 08-
8005. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
No. 08-1063 DISMISSED
No. 08-8005 AFFIRMED
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