UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5166
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KELLI ALLISON HOLLIDAY, a/k/a Kelli Stephens,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(8:04-cr-00596-HFF-1)
Submitted: April 7, 2009 Decided: April 29, 2009
Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kelli Allison Holliday appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking her supervised release and imposing a sentence
of eight months in prison. On appeal, Holliday’s attorney has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), asserting, in his opinion, there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but raising the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion by revoking Holliday’s supervised
release and sentencing her to serve eight months in prison.
Holliday was notified of her right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, but she has not done so. We affirm.
We review a judgment revoking supervised release and
imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). To revoke
supervised release, a district court need only find a violation
by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(2006). We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a district court
must consider the Chapter Seven policy statements, and the
statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation
sentences, the district court ultimately has broad discretion to
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revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 438-39.
Holliday was convicted of bank fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006), a Class B felony, and the district
court sentenced her to five months in prison followed by three
years of supervised release. As a condition of her supervised
release, Holliday was prohibited from purchasing, possessing,
using, distributing, or administering any controlled substance
except as prescribed by a physician. While Holliday was on
supervised release, the probation officer petitioned the
district court to issue a supervised release violation warrant
based on Holliday’s alleged abuse of prescription drugs.
According to the probation officer, Holliday was visibly under
the influence of drugs during a home visit; she tested positive
for morphine and amphetamine; and prescriptions she had obtained
had been taken in excessive quantities.
Holliday was arrested and released on bond, on the
conditions that she participate in an inpatient substance abuse
program and refrain from any use or unlawful possession of a
narcotic drug or other controlled substance unless prescribed by
a licensed medical practitioner. Upon successful completion of
the program, the probation officer indicated she would request
that the supervised release violation petition be withdrawn.
Holliday was terminated from the treatment program for illegal
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drug use, and her bond was revoked, after she tested positive
for opiates and admitted that a friend had slipped her a Lortab.
The probation officer recommended that the district court revoke
Holliday’s supervised release and impose a sentence of eleven
months in prison, which was the high end of her sentencing range
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4 (2007). At her
final revocation hearing, Holliday admitted that she violated
her supervised release conditions, and she requested that the
district court sentence her to time served in jail since her
bond had been revoked, which was about one month.
The district court found a violation and determined
that the court was statutorily authorized to revoke Holliday’s
supervised release and impose a sentence of up to three years in
prison followed by up to five years of supervised release less
any revocation term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (e)(3), (h)
(2006). The court determined Holliday’s sentencing range under
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 was five to eleven months in prison. After
hearing Holliday’s arguments in mitigation, the court noted it
had reviewed the supervised release violation report, the
previous presentence report, and the factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006). The court then revoked the previously imposed
term of supervised release and imposed a sentence of eight
months in prison, the middle of Holliday’s advisory sentencing
range, with no further period of supervised release.
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On appeal, appellate counsel notes that Holliday
admitted violating her supervised release, and her eight-month
sentence is less than the high end of the recommended sentencing
range and does not exceed the statutory maximum for revocation
of supervised release. Counsel concludes that given the nature
of Holliday’s conduct while on supervised release as reflected
in the record, it does not appear that the district court abused
its discretion in revoking her supervised release and sentencing
her as it did. We have reviewed the record and likewise
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Holliday’s supervised release, and her sentence to
eight months in prison is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
of her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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