UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4077
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES LAMAR BULLARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00390-RJC-2)
Submitted: April 23, 2009 Decided: April 29, 2009
Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Gretchen C.F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Lamar Bullard appeals from his conviction and
180-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
cocaine base and possession of a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking offense. On appeal, he contends that
counsel provided ineffective assistance by delaying his guilty
plea and his provision of assistance to the government. He
asserts that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, he would have
cooperated earlier, received a downward departure for
substantial assistance, and been sentenced below the mandatory
minimum sentences for the two offenses.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not
generally cognizable on direct appeal unless ineffective
assistance “conclusively appears” on the record. See United
States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). To
establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show that his counsel erred and that, but for
counsel’s error, the outcome of his proceeding would have been
different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984). To satisfy the second prong of Strickland, Bullard must
demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
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Because it is not apparent from the record that
counsel provided ineffective assistance as alleged by Bullard,
this claim is not cognizable on direct appeal, but instead must
be raised, if at all, in a post-conviction proceeding pursuant
to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). See United
States v. James, 337 F.3d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 2003). We
therefore affirm Bullard’s conviction and sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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