UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4641
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN T. MILLNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, Chief
District Judge. (2:07-cr-00014-jpj-pms-1)
Submitted: April 20, 2009 Decided: May 8, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Joel C. Hoppe,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charlottesville, Virginia,
for Appellant. Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States
Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John T. Millner pleaded guilty to assault with intent
to commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1) (2006),
assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm
without just cause or excuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(3) (2006), assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) (2006), and possession of
prohibited objects intended to be used as weapons, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2), (d)(1)(B) (2006). Millner was
sentenced to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment. His attorney
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), raising four issues but stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Millner was advised of his right
to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do so. We
affirm.
In the Anders brief, counsel questions whether
Millner’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Our review of
the transcript of the hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
discloses substantial compliance with that Rule. Although not
raised by counsel, we note that the district court failed to
inform Millner of the specific term of supervised release to
which he was subject, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(H). We find that this omission did not affect
Millner’s substantial rights. See United States v. Martinez,
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277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing standard of
review). Finally, the district court ensured that Millner’s
plea was knowing and voluntary and supported by a sufficient
factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116,
119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Next, counsel questions whether the district court
erred in denying Millner’s motion to suppress a statement made
to a prison official. However, Millner’s voluntary plea of
guilty waived his right to challenge antecedent,
nonjurisdictional errors. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61,
62-63 (1975); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
In addition, counsel questions whether the failure of
the institution in which Millner was housed to provide him with
redacted copies of discovery materials prejudiced Millner. We
conclude Millner was not prejudiced. At the Rule 11 hearing,
Millner averred that he had been provided a sufficient
opportunity to review his case with counsel. Millner’s sworn
statements at the Rule 11 hearing are presumed to be true. See
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
Finally, counsel questions whether the sentence in
this case was procedurally and substantively reasonable. In
reviewing a sentence imposed by the district court, an appellate
court “first examines the sentence for significant procedural
errors,” including “‘failing to calculate (or improperly
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calculating) the [g]uidelines range, treating the [g]uidelines
as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence . . . .’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586,
597 (2007)). If there are no procedural errors, the appellate
court then considers the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. “Substantive reasonableness
review entails taking into account the ‘totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
[g]uidelines range.’” Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473 (quoting Gall,
128 S. Ct. at 597). “If the sentence is within the [g]uidelines
range, . . . an appellate court[] may . . . presume that the
sentence is reasonable.” Id.
We have reviewed the record and find that the district
court committed no procedural errors in calculating Millner’s
sentence. In addition, because Millner’s sentence was within
the advisory guidelines range, this court presumes it to be
reasonable. Therefore, we find no error in the imposition of
Millner’s sentence.
We have examined the entire record in this case in
accordance with the requirements of Anders and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the
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judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Millner, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Millner requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Millner. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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