PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
NATALIE J. STEPHENS, on behalf of
R.E.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-1527
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
DONNA WRIGHT, on behalf of
B.W.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-1529
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
DAVID ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1530
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
2 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
HENRY ALLISON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1531
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
KARL SHARP,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1532
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
VIRGIL EVANS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1533
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 3
MARIA CORDOVA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1565
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
KIMBERLY CARTER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1566
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
DOROTHY MORALES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1577
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
4 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
PAUL WARD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1580
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
CHRISTINE A. LATHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1581
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
MARSHA WOODLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1582
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 5
KIM DOUGLAS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1583
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
SUZANNE RUBEN-POPKIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1584
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
CHERYL BIRDOW,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1586
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
6 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
JOHN GAGEL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1587
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
DEBORAH LAQUAY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1588
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
CRYSTAL LUNDY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1589
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 7
HOPE PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1590
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
LLEWELLYN PRATT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1593
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
ELAINE OBEE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
No. 08-1595
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
8 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
CHRISTINA J. WATTS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 08-1596
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Susan K. Gauvey, Magistrate Judge.
(8:05-cv-02574-SKG; 8:06-cv-01163-SKG; 8:06-cv-01311-
SKG; 8:06-cv-02812-SKG; 8:06-cv-02903-SKG; 8:06-cv-
03051-SKG; 8:06-cv-02475-SKG; 1:06-cv-02509-SKG;
8:05-cv-03120-SKG; 8:06-cv-02476-SKG; 8:06-cv-02477-
SKG; 8:06-cv-02506-SKG; 8:06-cv-02507-SKG; 8:06-cv-
02608-SKG; 8:06-cv-02815-SKG; 8:07-cv-00590-SKG;
8:06-cv-03445-SKG; 8:06-cv-02948-SKG; 8:07-cv-00518-
SKG; 8:07-cv-00298-SKG; 8:06-cv-01360-SKG;
8:07-cv-00299-SKG)
Argued: March 26, 2009
Decided: May 7, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, TRAXLER, Circuit
Judge, and Robert J. CONRAD, Jr., Chief United States
District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge
Williams wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge
Conrad joined.
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 9
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Michael Eugene Robinson, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appel-
lant. Stephen F. Shea, ELKIND & SHEA, Silver Spring,
Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Gregory G. Katsas,
Assistant Attorney General, William Kanter, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Mary-
land, for Appellant.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Chief Judge:
Thirty-four prevailing Social Security benefits claimants
petitioned for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West 2006) ("EAJA"). In
response, the Social Security Commissioner, Michael J. Ast-
rue, ("the Commissioner"), agreed that a fee award was
proper but argued that the fees should be paid to the claimants
themselves and not their attorneys. After consolidating the
thirty-four petitions, a federal magistrate judge concluded that
attorney’s fees awarded to a "prevailing party" under the
EAJA are directly payable to the corresponding attorney and
gave an additional award of fees to the lead plaintiff for liti-
gating the issue. The Commissioner appeals, and—guided by
the plain language of the EAJA—we conclude that attorney’s
fees are payable directly to each claimant and reverse the
magistrate judge’s contrary conclusion.
I.
A.
Two sources provide for attorney’s fees for claimants seek-
ing Social Security benefits. First, the Social Security Act
10 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
itself provides that "[w]henever a court renders a judgment
favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the
court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as
part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation,
not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits
to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment
. . . ." 42 U.S.C.A. § 406(b)(1)(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).
Further, the Commissioner may "certify the amount of such
fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition
to, the amount of such past-due benefits." Id. (emphasis
added).
Second, Social Security benefits claimants can receive a fee
award under the EAJA. Congress enacted the EAJA in 1980
in response to concerns that individuals would be deterred
from seeking relief from unreasonable government action
because of the expenses incurred in pursuing such relief. See
S. Rep. No. 96-253, at 7 (1979). The EAJA provides as fol-
lows:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by stat-
ute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other
than the United States fees and other expenses . . .
incurred by that party in any civil action (other than
cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for
judicial review of agency action, brought by or
against the United States in any court having juris-
diction of that action. . . .
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Before awarding attorney’s fees, the EAJA requires the
"party seeking an award of fees" to "submit to the court an
application," which must include "an itemized statement from
any attorney . . . stating the actual time expended and the rate
at which fees and other expenses were computed." Id.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B). The EAJA defines "party," as relevant here,
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 11
as "an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000
at the time the civil action was filed." Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
In 1985, "Congress harmonized fees payable by the Gov-
ernment under EAJA with fees payable under § 406(b) out of
the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits" by enacting
a Savings Provision. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,
796 (2002). The Savings Provision provides:
Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act . . . shall
not prevent an award of fees and other expenses
under section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code
. . . . Section 206(b)(2) of the Social Security Act . . .
shall not apply with respect to any such award but
only if, where the claimant’s attorney receives fees
for the same work under both section 206(b) of that
Act . . . and section 2412(d) of title 28, United States
Code . . . , the claimant’s attorney refunds to the
claimant the amount of the smaller fee.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 note (Savings Provisons). Accordingly,
while attorney’s fees may be awarded under both the EAJA
and § 406(b), the Savings Provision clarifies that the attorney
must refund to the claimant the smaller fee. "Thus, an EAJA
award offsets an award under Section 406(b), so that the
amount of the total past-due benefits the claimant actually
receives will be increased by the EAJA award up to the point
the claimant receives 100 percent of the past-due benefits."
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (internal quotation marks, cita-
tions, and alterations omitted).
Since the enactment of the EAJA in 1980, the Commis-
sioner has consistently paid attorney’s fees directly to the
attorneys, not the claimants. In fact, the Commissioner cre-
ated a direct deposit system for attorneys and issued I.R.S.
1099 forms directly to the attorneys who received awards,
noting the awards as taxable attorney income.
12 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
Recently, however, the Commissioner altered this practice
and took the position that attorney’s fees under the EAJA
were the property of prevailing claimants and not their attor-
neys. This change was driven, in part, by the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996. Under 31 U.S.C.A. § 3716(c)(6)
(West 2003), the federal government collects debts through
the means of administrative offset, thus:
Any Federal agency that is owed by a person a
past due, legally enforceable nontax debt that is over
180 days delinquent . . . shall notify the Secretary of
the Treasury of all such nontax debts for purposes of
administrative offset under this subsection.
Id.
The Debt Collection Improvement Act required the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, through its Financial Management Ser-
vice bureau, to create a centralized program for withholding
and reducing federal payments pursuant to this administrative
offset provision. The program, called the Treasury Offset Pro-
gram ("TOP"), provides for collection of past-due obligations
including child support, state income taxes, and various non-
tax federal debts. In 2005, the Financial Management Service
began the collection of what the Commissioner terms "‘mis-
cellaneous’ payments, which include payments for attorney’s
fees pursuant to the EAJA." (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) These pay-
ments are "eligible for offset" under 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(1),
which provides:
[A]ll Federal payments are eligible for offset
under this section. Eligible Federal payments
include, but are not limited to, Federal wage, salary,
and retirement payments, vendor and expense reim-
bursement payments, certain benefit payments,
travel advances and reimbursements, grants, fees,
refunds, judgments . . ., tax refunds, and other pay-
ments made by Federal Agencies.
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 13
31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(1) (2008) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to these regulations, however, the TOP may per-
form an administrative offset only "[w]hen a match occurs,
and all other requirements for offset have been met." 31
C.F.R. § 285.5(c)(2). A "match" occurs when "the taxpayer
identifying number and name . . . of the payee on a payment
record are the same as the taxpayer identifying number and
name of the debtor on a delinquent debt record." Id.
§ 285.5(b).
Thus, "fees," including attorney’s fees, are a payment eligi-
ble to be offset if there is a "match." Under the Commission-
er’s former policy, because the attorneys were paid their fees
directly, there would be no "match" if the claimant that the
attorney represented owed a debt to the government. Now,
however, the Commissioner takes the position that fees
belong to the claimant and not the attorney. Using the TOP,
the Commissioner can thus ascertain if the claimant owes a
debt to the federal government and, if he or she does, offset
the attorney’s fee payment to cover that debt.
B.
This case arises from thirty-four attorney’s fee petitions
filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland by individuals who prevailed in their claims for
Social Security benefits. After the Commissioner asserted that
the fees were payable to the claimants and thus subject to
administrative offset, the thirty-four petitions were consoli-
dated and the parties agreed to proceed before a magistrate
judge. Following a hearing, the magistrate judge ruled in a
thorough written decision on March 13, 2008, that the attor-
ney’s fees were payable to the attorney, not the claimants, and
thus not subject to administrative offset. In addition, the mag-
istrate judge awarded the lead plaintiff, Natalie Stephens,
attorney’s fees for litigating the issue. The Commissioner
stipulated to payment in twelve of the cases without waiving
14 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
its legal position1 and filed a timely appeal on May 7, 2008.
We possess jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West
2006) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(3) (West 2006).
II.
The Commissioner’s appeal raises a question of statutory
interpretation, a quintessential question of law, which we
review de novo. United States v. Abuagla, 336 F.3d 277, 278
(4th Cir. 2003). On appeal, the Commissioner argues that
attorney’s fees under the EAJA, which are available to "pre-
vailing part[ies]," are payable directly to the claimants and not
their attorneys. In contrast, Stephens contends that fees under
the EAJA are best understood as payable directly to the attor-
neys themselves. Both sides agree that this issue has engen-
dered a circuit split, with several circuits adopting both
positions. Compare Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th
Cir. 2008) (concluding, in a case involving Social Security
benefits, that fees are payable to the claimant, not attorney);
Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007) cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 486 (2008) (same); FDL Techs. Inc. v.
United States, 967 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (conclud-
ing, in a context other than Social Security benefits, that attor-
ney’s fees under the EAJA were payable to the party not the
attorney), with Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir.
2008) (concluding, in the context of Social Security benefits,
that fee award was payable directly to attorney); King v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 230 F. App’x 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2007)
(unpublished) (same); Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 297,
304 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding, in a context other than Social
Security benefits, that attorney’s fees under a statute similar
to the EAJA were payable directly to attorney)2. In an unpub-
1
In these twelve fee petitions, the claimants had assigned any right to
attorney’s fees to their attorney. We are not called upon in this case to pass
upon the legal effect of such an assignment.
2
The Government has conceded that this case controls as to the EAJA
in the Fifth Circuit.
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 15
lished opinion, which the magistrate judge relied upon, we
took the position that attorney’s fees awarded to the prevail-
ing party under 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417 (West 2001) are the prop-
erty of the attorney, not the client, and cannot be subject to
administrative setoff. Duncan v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 887 F.2d
1078, 1989 WL 117742 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table
decision).
"When interpreting statutes we start with the plain lan-
guage." U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 377 F.3d
345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004). "It is well established that when the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd-
is to enforce it according to its terms." Lamie v. United States
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In interpreting the plain language of a statute, we give
the terms their "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,
absent an indication Congress intended [it] to bear some dif-
ferent import." North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 515 F.3d 344, 351 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
We now conclude, in light of the clear statutory text, that
the better answer is that attorney’s fees under the EAJA are
payable to the claimant, not the attorney, and thus are subject
to administrative offset. In reaching this conclusion we begin,
and end, with the plain language of § 2412(d)(1)(A), which
provides that the fees may be awarded to a "prevailing party."
As the Tenth Circuit explained, "this statutory language
clearly provides that the prevailing party, who incurred the
attorney’s fees, and not that party’s attorney, is eligible for an
award of attorney’s fees." Manning, 510 F.3d at 1249-50. The
EAJA offers a specific definition of "prevailing party" tied to
an individual’s, not an attorney’s, net worth. Id. at 1251. The
EAJA also requires the "party," not the "attorney," to submit
an itemized statement for any "award of fees and other
expenses." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Finally, in defining
16 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
"fees and other expenses," the EAJA lumps attorney’s fees
with a variety of other costs, including "the reasonable
expenses of expert witnesses, [and] the reasonable cost of any
study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project." Id.
§ 2412(d)(2)(A). These provisions clarify that "[t]he EAJA
. . . was not enacted for the benefit of counsel to ensure that
counsel gets paid." Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251; see also
Reeves, 526 F.3d at 736 (noting "the structure of the statute
demonstrates Congress did not intend all service providers to
become additional parties to the action for the purpose of
asserting their claims for compensation").
Several additional considerations bolster this conclusion.
First, Congress has shown that it "knows what language to use
to award attorney’s fees to an attorney and what language to
use when it chooses to award the fees to the prevailing party."
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1252. While the EAJA provides that
fees are to be provided to the "prevailing party," § 406(b) of
the Social Security Act specifically authorizes payment of
attorney’s fees to "such attorney." Congress’s continued use
of different language is particularly telling because Congress
has specifically acted to harmonize the EAJA with the Social
Security Act through the Savings Provision but "has not sub-
stantially amended § 406(b) since enacting the EAJA." Id.
In addition, it is "settled law that the attorney does not have
standing to apply for the EAJA fees; that right belongs to the
prevailing party." Id. See, e.g., Panola Land Buying Ass’n v.
Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509-11 (11th Cir. 1988); Oguachuba
v. INS, 706 F.2d 93, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1983). While the question
of who has the right to apply for an attorney’s fee does not
necessarily answer the question we face, it is nonetheless per-
suasive because the provision of the EAJA covering an appli-
cation for attorney’s fees, like the provision at issue here,
grants the right to apply for fees to a "party" that submits an
application and confirms that they are a "prevailing party." 28
U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 17
Finally, our reading of the EAJA is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b)
(West 2003), which awards attorney’s fees to "prevailing part-
[ies]" in certain civil rights cases.3 Although never directly
confronted with the question presented here, the Court has
repeatedly indicated that fees under § 1988 run to the party,
not the attorney. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87
(1990) ("Section 1988 makes the prevailing party eligible for
a discretionary award of attorney’s fees."). As the Court
explained in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), "while it
is undoubtedly true that Congress expected fee shifting to
attract competent counsel to represent citizens deprived of
their civil rights, it neither bestowed fee awards upon
attorneys nor rendered them nonwaivable or nonnegotiable."
Id. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language of the
EAJA provides that attorney’s fees are payable to the prevail-
ing party—in this case the Social Security claimants—and not
the attorney.
III.
Stephens resists this conclusion by contending that the stat-
utory language is not as plain as we would make it, and that
common sense and public policy require a different result. We
disagree.
First, Stephens points to the Savings Provision, which
requires an attorney who receives fees under both the EAJA
and the Social Security Act to reimburse the claimant the
smaller fee award. This provision, Stephens argues, shows
that Congress viewed fee awards under the EAJA as belong-
3
The Supreme Court has counseled that the various fee-shifting statutes
using the term "prevailing party" should be interpreted consistently. See
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602-03 & n.4 (2001).
18 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
ing to the attorney. The Savings Provision, however, "by its
own terms, only comes into play after the attorney actually
receives double fees." Reeves, 526 F.3d at 737. It does not
presuppose that attorney’s fees under the EAJA are directly
payable to the attorney, but merely rests on the "uncontrover-
sial proposition that Congress anticipated attorneys will often
be the ultimate beneficiaries of the attorney’s fees awarded
under the EAJA." Id.
Next, Stephens contends that the Commissioner’s position
runs afoul of Congress’s purpose in enacting the EAJA
because attorneys will no longer take these cases if they know
any fee awards may be offset against other debts.4 On this
point, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that:
While we acknowledge there is a risk that individ-
uals who owe debts subject to offset by the govern-
ment may ultimately have a more difficult time
paying the bill for litigation, we cannot use Con-
gress’s general statements of findings and purpose to
override the plain meaning of specific provisions of
the Act.
Reeves, 526 F.3d at 737.
Finally, Stephens contends that the Commissioner’s posi-
tion overlooks that attorneys are the real party in interest for
the award of attorney’s fees. Stephens’s argument on this
point is a call to common sense—that is, "the prevailing party
is only nominally the person who receives the award; the real
party in interest vis-a-vis attorneys’ fees awarded under the
statute are the attorneys themselves." Marre, 117 F.3d at 304.
See also King, 230 F. App’x at 481 (noting "an attorney can-
4
At oral argument, counsel for Stephens, who represented all thirty-four
of the claimants in this case, stated that he already had declined represen-
tation for several Social Security claimants who would have been subject
to an administrative offset.
STEPHENS v. ASTRUE 19
not bring an independent action for attorney’s fees," but, that
"fees awarded under the EAJA are payable to the attorney;
they are awarded for the benefit of the party, but the money
is not the party’s to keep.").
We appreciate that, at first blush, "it seems counter intuitive
to hold that an award of attorney’s fees does not go to the
attorney, especially since the EAJA fees are calculated based
on the time spent by the attorney and based on the attorney’s
hourly rate." Manning, 510 F.3d at 1255; see also Reeves, 526
F.3d at 738 (noting that plaintiff "may well be right" that
holding fees are payable to party is bad public policy but that
"policy decisions are properly left to Congress, not the
courts"). Unfortunately for Stephens, however, "[the Supreme
Court] ha[s] stated time and again that courts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial
inquiry is complete.’" Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-254 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449
U.S. 424, 430 (1981)) (citations omitted).
And, Congress may well have had reason for awarding fees
directly to the prevailing party and not the attorney. As noted,
"attorney’s fees" are lumped together with a variety of "fees
and other expenses" under the EAJA. Presumably, if attor-
ney’s fees are directly payable to the attorneys, so are these
other fees. Congress could rightly have desired to avoid such
a result, which would leave a court ordering payments to a
variety of parties and individuals in every case involving the
EAJA. We also note that Stephens’s real problem lies with the
Debt Collection Improvement Act, not the EAJA. Prior to the
implementation of that statute, our answer to the question
posed in this case would have had no real practical impact.
In sum, Stephens asks us to "improve the statute—to
amend it, really." Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291,
308 (4th Cir. 2000), aff’d sub. nom. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal
20 STEPHENS v. ASTRUE
Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002). We cannot do that, however, "with-
out trespassing on a function reserved for the legislative
branch." Id. Thus, while we may be sympathetic to the con-
cerns raised by Stephens, sympathy does not permit us to
ignore the plain language of the statute.
IV.
Attorney’s fees under the EAJA are awarded to the "pre-
vailing party," not the attorney. Accordingly, we must vacate
the magistrate judge’s awards to the attorney and remand the
case. We likewise vacate the additional fee award to Stephens
for litigating this issue below. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103, 111 (1992) (holding that "to qualify as a prevailing party,
a . . . plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits
of his claim").
VACATED AND REMANDED