UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRYL T. LUSTER, a/k/a Darryl Tyrone Luster,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00085-RLW-1)
Submitted: March 26, 2009 Decided: May 4, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Valencia Roberts-Brower, Assistant Federal Public
Defenders, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente,
Acting United States Attorney, John D. Adams, Assistant United
States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darryl T. Luster pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), but reserved his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found
in a search of a rental car Luster was driving. Luster argues
on appeal that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
rental car because his wife was the authorized user and gave him
permission to drive it. Luster also contends that the district
court erred in finding the police officer properly conducted the
search pursuant to the impoundment and inventory exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
We review legal conclusions underlying the denial of a
motion to suppress de novo, and review factual findings for
clear error. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 429 (4th
Cir. 2006). The evidence is construed in the light most
favorable to the government, as the prevailing party below.
United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).
A search can violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights only when the individual has “a legitimate expectation of
privacy” in the place searched. United States v. Wellons, 32
F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). An expectation of privacy is legitimate
2
if the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the
area searched, and that subjective expectation of privacy is
objectively reasonable based on “concepts of real or personal
property law” or “understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
An unauthorized driver of a rented car has “no
legitimate privacy interest in the car” and, therefore, a search
of the car “cannot have violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”
Wellons, 32 F.3d at 119. This conclusion is not altered where
the authorized lessee allows the unauthorized driver to drive
the rental vehicle, as an unauthorized driver still does not
have permission of the rental company, the owner of the vehicle.
Id. at 119 n.2. This principle is of particular applicability
here as Luster did not possess a valid driver’s license, and
thus could not have reasonably believed that the rental
agreement would have authorized him to operate the vehicle,
regardless of his wife’s consent. Therefore, the district court
correctly concluded that as an unauthorized driver, Luster did
not have a legitimate privacy interest in the car and thus the
search of the car did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
Alternatively, Luster urges this court to reconsider
Wellons. A review of the applicable case law reveals no
persuasive reason to overturn or alter the Wellons holding in
this instance. See United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388
3
(4th Cir. 1999) (stating that a panel of this court is “bound by
prior precedent from other panels in this circuit absent
contrary law from an en banc or Supreme Court decision”).
Because Luster had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the rental vehicle, we do not reach Luster’s second
argument regarding the propriety of the inventory search.
Accordingly, we affirm Luster’s conviction and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4