UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4703
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEJANDRO LONGORIA, a/k/a Felix Longoria, a/k/a John,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:07-cr-00505-CMC-02)
Submitted: April 28, 2009 Decided: May 15, 2009
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Delgado, BLUESTEIN, NICHOLS, THOMPSON & DELGADO, LLC,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jimmie Ewing, Mark C.
Moore, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alejandro Longoria pled guilty pursuant to a written
plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute and to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine
base, five kilograms or more of powder cocaine, and 100
kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2006) (Count One), and one count of conspiracy to commit money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2006) (Count
Thirty-Four). Longoria was sentenced to a total term of 292
months in prison, and he timely appeals.
Counsel for Longoria filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether
the district court properly conducted Longoria’s guilty plea
hearing and fashioned a reasonable sentence. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
In the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
in the district court, we review for plain error the adequacy of
the guilty plea proceeding under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our
examination of the record shows that the district court fully
complied with the requirements of Rule 11. Longoria’s plea was
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered, and supported
by a factual basis. We therefore find no error.
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Moreover, a review of the record reveals that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Longoria. When determining a sentence, the district court must
calculate the appropriate advisory guidelines range and consider
it in conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006). Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596
(2007). Appellate review of a district court’s imposition of a
sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the [g]uidelines range,” is for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 591. Sentences within the applicable guidelines range
may be presumed by the appellate court to be reasonable. United
States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Longoria, appropriately treating the
sentencing guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and
considering the applicable guidelines range, and weighing the
relevant § 3553(a) factors. The court found that concurrent
sentences of 292 months on Count One and 240 months on Count
Thirty-Four were appropriate in light of the seriousness of the
offenses, Longoria’s leadership role in the drug organization,
the need to promote respect for the law and to protect the
public, and because a substantial amount of drugs were involved.
Furthermore, Longoria’s sentence for Count One, which is the low
end of the applicable guidelines range and below the statutory
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maximum of life in prison, is presumed reasonable on appeal.
Further, while Longoria’s sentence on Count Thirty-Four is the
statutory maximum, we note that it is below the guidelines
range. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Longoria.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Longoria, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Longoria requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Longoria.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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