Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

IOTA XI CHAPTER OF SIGMA CHI 
FRATERNITY, George Mason
University; RYAN DUCKWITZ,
Consul, Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma
Chi Fraternity; JUSTIN PIETRO, Pro
Consul, Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma
Chi Fraternity,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PAMELA PATTERSON, Associate
Dean of Students, individually and
in her official capacity; MICHELE
GOUBADIA, Associate Director for
Student Activities, Greek Life,  No. 08-1417
individually and in her official
capacity; GIRARD MULHERIN, Dean
of Students, individually and in
his official capacity; SANDY
HUBLER, Vice President of
University Life, individually and
in her official capacity; ALAN G.
MERTEN, President, individually
and in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

2 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-00883-LMB-TCB)

Argued: January 27, 2009

Decided: May 13, 2009

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Duncan joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Christopher Aldo Porco, THE LAW OFFICES
OF CHRISTOPHER ALDO PORCO, P.L.L.C., Washington,
D.C., for Appellants. Stephen R. McCullough, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: William C. Tucker,
BUTLER, WILLIAMS & SKILLING, P.C., Richmond, Vir-
ginia, for Appellants. Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General
of Virginia, William E. Thro, Special Counsel, William C.
Mims, Chief Deputy Attorney General, David G. Drummey,
Brian E. Walther, K. Anne Gambrill Gentry, Assistant Attor-
neys General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 3
OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

The Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity (the "Chap-
ter") and two of its officers, Ryan Duckwitz and Justin Pietro,
sued George Mason University (the "University") and several
of its administrators1 in the Eastern District of Virginia, alleg-
ing, inter alia, constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Chapter and certain of its members were sanctioned by
the University following their involvement in a series of disci-
plinary incidents, and the plaintiffs allege that those sanctions
deprived the Chapter and its members of their procedural due
process and free speech rights. The district court awarded
summary judgment to the defendants, see Iota Xi Chapter of
the Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 538 F. Supp. 2d 915
(E.D. Va. 2008), and this appeal followed. As explained
below, we affirm.

I.

A.

1.

The University is a public institution located in Fairfax
County, Virginia, where, until May 8, 2006, the Chapter was
an officially recognized student group.2 Between February
1
The University administrators named as defendants are Pamela Patter-
son, Associate Dean of Students; Michele Goubadia, Associate Director
for Student Activities, Greek Life; Girard Mulherin, Dean of Students;
Sandy Hubler, Vice President of University Life; and Alan G. Merten,
University President. The plaintiffs sued these defendants in their individ-
ual and official capacities.
2
According to the district court, "[o]fficial recognition allows a student
group to publish their affiliation with the University, apply for certain uni-
versity funds, and seek assistance from the University in planning events."
Iota Xi Chapter of the Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 538 F. Supp. 2d
915, 919 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2008).
4 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
2005 and August 2006, the Chapter and its members were
involved in a string of on- and off-campus incidents that cul-
minated in the revocation of the Chapter’s official University
recognition and the individual discipline of several Chapter
members.

Five separate disciplinary incidents led to the Chapter being
sanctioned. The first such incident occurred on February 26,
2005, when the Chapter co-hosted a party at an off-campus
house. A female University student asserted that she was sex-
ually assaulted at the party by a Chapter member. The victim
initiated administrative charges against the Chapter member,
and the University’s Sexual Assault Hearing Panel subse-
quently adjudicated the member as responsible. As a result,
the Chapter member was expelled from the University.

The second such incident occurred in mid-August 2005,
when several Chapter members took part in a party where
underage guests drank excessively. As a result of this second
incident, defendant Girard Mulherin, Dean of Students, placed
the Chapter on interim suspension on August 24, 2005. Mul-
herin lifted the interim suspension on September 6, 2005,
after determining that the Chapter had not authorized the
party, and that the Chapter had fully cooperated with the Uni-
versity’s investigation.

The third incident took place on September 7, 2005, when
the Chapter hosted another party where underage guests con-
sumed alcohol, and where a second female University student
claimed that she had been sexually assaulted by a Chapter
member. The victim filed an administrative complaint in con-
nection with that event, and the offending Chapter member
was adjudicated to be responsible for the sexual assault. He
was placed on disciplinary probation for the remainder of his
undergraduate career.

Finally, two incidents of alleged hazing occurred on
December 7, 2005. The first hazing incident occurred at about
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 5
8:30 a.m., when several Chapter members and pledges gath-
ered on-campus near Fenwick Library and began to sing and
march (the "library incident"). Defendant Michele Goubadia,
Associate Director for Student Activities, Greek Life, wit-
nessed the event from her office and concluded that the Chap-
ter was conducting hazing activity. The second hazing
incident occurred later that day, when Goubadia learned that
a Chapter pledge had informed his instructor that he could not
go home to retrieve an extra-credit assignment (the "class-
room incident"). The instructor inferred that the student could
not go home because of hazing by the Chapter, and she
informed Goubadia about the classroom incident. In response
to these suspected hazing incidents, Goubadia placed the
Chapter on interim suspension, prohibiting it from participat-
ing in all social events, community service, and recruitment
efforts. On December 8, 2005, Goubadia sent a memorandum
to defendant Pamela Patterson, Associate Dean of Students,
characterizing the two December 7 events as hazing. That
same day, Patterson sent an interim suspension notice to the
Chapter, restricting it from conducting any social event where
more than three Chapter members or pledges were present,
pending a University investigation.

The University subsequently determined that a disciplinary
hearing was warranted on the five incidents described above.
On February 7, 2006, the University informed the Chapter
that a disciplinary hearing would be conducted on May 4,
2006. After the Chapter requested a detailed description of the
charges against it, the University, on February 23, 2006, pro-
vided the Chapter with a "Complaint" listing the following
charges:

1. Hazing — 8:30 a.m. on December 7, 2005 in the
area of Fenwick Library on the George Mason
Campus.

2. Providing alcohol to minors — September 7,
2005.
6 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
3. Underage consumption of alcohol — September
7, 2005.

4. Sponsoring a party under conditions that
resulted in sexual assault/s on a female guest.
February 26, 2005 and September 7, 2005[.]

J.A. 774.3 On March 10, 2006, Dean Mulherin offered to set-
tle the charges with the Chapter with a two-year suspension
of the Chapter’s University recognition, which the Chapter
declined. The University provided the Chapter, in advance of
the disciplinary hearing, with a list of the witnesses that the
University intended to call.

2.

On May 4, 2006, the University convened a panel of three
students from the University’s Student Judicial Board (the
"Panel") to address the four charges against the Chapter. Dur-
ing a five-hour hearing (the "Hearing"), the Chapter was per-
mitted to make opening and closing statements, object to
certain testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and present evi-
dence.

At the Hearing, Dean Mulherin represented the University
and presented several witnesses in support of the charges
against the Chapter. Associate Director Goubadia testified
concerning the library incident, which she characterized as
hazing. Juliet Blank-Godlove, the instructor involved in the
classroom incident, also testified. With regard to the class-
room incident, Blank-Godlove stated that she "was concerned
for hazing. It seemed to me that [the Chapter pledge] was part
of a kidnap process, part of a pre-initiation process where he’s
not able to go home." J.A. 620. Additionally, the two female
victims of the sexual assaults at Chapter-sponsored parties
3
Citations herein to "J.A. __" refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the
parties in this appeal.
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 7
testified that they had consumed alcohol at those parties
despite being underage, and that they were sexually assaulted
by Chapter members. When the Chapter’s representative
sought to cross-examine these witnesses about whether they
had actually been sexually assaulted, Mulherin stated that the
prior sexual assault ruling should not be reopened, because to
do so could "revictimize the victim by going through the
details of this event again." Id. at 637. The Panel’s hearing
officer agreed and precluded further inquiry on that subject.
A male friend of one of the sexual assault victims, who was
with the victim on the night she was assaulted, also testified.
He stated that he had seen the victim consuming alcoholic
beverages at the party, and that when he looked for her later
in the evening in the backyard of the house, Chapter members
told him to go back inside the house. He said that he later
learned the victim had been sexually assaulted in a shed in the
backyard.

The Chapter also presented witnesses at the Hearing. Two
of its witnesses testified as to the Chapter’s overall character.
One female witness, who was dating a Chapter member,
described the fraternity as welcoming and trustworthy, and
explained that she had not seen any aggressive behavior
against women by Chapter members. Another witness testi-
fied that the Chapter had raised funds to assist him with medi-
cal bills. The Chapter also presented testimony seeking to
rebut the University’s allegation that it had engaged in hazing.
Several witnesses — who had been Chapter pledges at the
time of the library incident — testified that the incident had
just been a "fun thing," not a hazing ritual. J.A. 694. Further-
more, the student who was involved in the classroom hazing
incident testified that Blank-Godlove had misinterpreted his
statements. He explained that the reason he could not retrieve
his assignment was because he did not have his car that week
and not because of hazing. He further explained that the
assignment had been for extra credit, and that he felt it was
unnecessary to retrieve it.
8 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
At the conclusion of the Hearing, Dean Mulherin recom-
mended that the Chapter be permanently dismissed from cam-
pus. Mulherin later explained that his recommendation was
based on the Chapter’s refusal to acknowledge that it had
engaged in any wrongful conduct. Characterizing the Chap-
ter’s communications leading up to the Hearing as "hostile in
tone," he concluded that "they had not come to a realization
that they were engaged in conduct that was not acceptable."
J.A. 869-D. In Mulherin’s view, the Chapter refused "to rec-
ognize that they had a problem." Id. at 869-C. Similarly,
Associate Dean Patterson stated that "nobody from the frater-
nity . . . showed any concern about the charges, only what the
university was doing." Id. at 924-D to 925-A.

By letter dated May, 8, 2006, the University notified the
Chapter that the Panel had concluded, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the Chapter had engaged in "(1) [h]azing on
December 7, 2005"; (2) "[p]roviding alcohol to underage per-
sons on September 7, 2005"; and (3) "[s]ponsoring social
events under conditions that resulted in sexual assaults on
female guests" on February 26 and September 7, 2005. J.A.
151. The Panel found the proof on the charge of underage
consumption of alcohol to be insufficient, and dismissed that
charge.

As a result of the Panel’s decision, the University imposed
the following sanctions. First, it revoked the Chapter’s Uni-
versity recognition until at least September 1, 2016.4 Second,
the Dean of Students and the Director of Student Activities
were instructed "to monitor membership in George Mason
University recognized fraternal organizations to insure that
4
The revocation of University recognition precludes the Chapter from
applying for University funding and publicizing itself as an officially rec-
ognized organization. Furthermore, the Chapter may not participate in "or-
ganizational affairs which would imply university recognition." J.A. 872-
C. Loss of recognition also precludes the Chapter from booking space on
campus or using campus facilities.
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 9
the current membership of Sigma Chi fraternity does not re-
emerge under a different name." J.A. 151. Finally, the deci-
sion was "to be published as deemed appropriate by the Dean
of Students in order to inform and educate the George Mason
University community regarding our institutional values." Id.
On November 2, 2007, the University publicized the results
of the Hearing in The Mason Gazette, a university newspaper.

The Chapter appealed the Panel’s decision to defendant
Sandy Hubler, Vice President for Student Life, who rejected
the appeal on June 2, 2006. Hubler explained that, in reaching
her decision, she had "carefully considered both the appeal
document and supporting exhibits" submitted by the Chapter,
and concluded that the Chapter had "failed to provide new
evidence, identify a defect in the proceedings, or specify a
standard of fairness that was abridged." J.A. 152. She also
determined that "the sanctions imposed are proportionate to
the offense." Id.

3.

Several weeks after the Hearing, in August 2006, two addi-
tional incidents led to the discipline of several Chapter mem-
bers, including plaintiffs Pietro and Duckwitz. Pertinent to
these proceedings, Pietro and another Chapter member
attended a Greek Organizational Recruitment Fair (the "orien-
tation fair") wearing Sigma Chi t-shirts. A University official
saw the two Chapter members at the orientation fair and noti-
fied Associate Director Goubadia. Goubadia confronted the
members and told them that the event was for recognized
organizations only, and that they could not be included
because the Chapter was not a recognized student group. The
second incident involved an off-campus golf tournament and
"Brotherhood Day" by Chapter members, including Duck-
witz, aspects of which contravened the University’s sanctions
against the Chapter.

These two incidents were ultimately referred to H. David
Shaw, the University’s Director of Judicial Affairs. Pietro,
10 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
Duckwitz, and four other Chapter members were then charged
with "[f]ailure to comply with a university official,"
"[u]nauthorized use of the George Mason University" name or
logo, and "[f]ailure to comply with an official judicial sanc-
tion." J.A. 1157. Shaw conducted a disciplinary hearing on
these charges and found that all six Chapter members were
responsible. As a result of that hearing, Pietro was given a
"formal warning," placed on "probationary status" for one
year, required to write a ten-page research paper on student
ethics, and "restricted from participating in any university
sponsored extracurricular activities for the 2006-07 Academic
Year." Id. at 1165. Duckwitz was similarly given a formal
warning, placed on probationary status, and restricted from
participating in extracurricular activities for the 2006-07 Aca-
demic Year. Id. at 1164.

B.

On August 31, 2007, the Chapter, Pietro, and Duckwitz
filed their complaint against the University and the adminis-
trator defendants in the Eastern District of Virginia. The com-
plaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter
alia, that the University and the administrator defendants had
violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to pro-
cedural due process (the "procedural due process claim"), as
well as their right to freedom of speech under the First
Amendment (the "free speech claims").5

On September 14, 2007, the district court denied the plain-
tiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, by which they had
sought to prevent the University from imposing its sanctions.
Then, on November 9, 2007, the court dismissed the Univer-
sity as a defendant, concluding that the University, as an arm
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, could not be sued under
5
The Complaint also alleged equal protection, conspiracy, and supervi-
sory liability claims under § 1983, as well as a state law breach of contract
claim. None of these claims, however, are at issue in this appeal.
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 11
§ 1983 without its consent. In February 2008, the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. Pertinent to this appeal,
the defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion for
summary judgment exceeded by two pages the page limit pre-
scribed by the court’s local rules. Rejecting the plaintiffs’
request that the memorandum be stricken in its entirety, the
court instead ordered that its final two pages be stricken. On
March 10, 2008, the court entered summary judgment in favor
of the defendants, and denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for
summary judgment. See Iota Xi Chapter of the Sigma Chi
Fraternity v. Patterson, 538 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2008).

On April 9, 2008, the plaintiffs timely filed their notice of
appeal in this matter. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s award of summary
judgment. See Tigrett v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002). In assessing a sum-
mary judgment ruling, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable
factual inferences in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). We are entitled to sustain a
district court’s judgment on "any ground apparent from the
record." CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts of India,
551 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2009). Finally, we review for
abuse of discretion a district court’s imposition of sanctions
for a violation of the court’s local rules. See Dove v. Codesco,
569 F.2d 807, 810 (4th Cir. 1978).

III.

In their appeal, the plaintiffs maintain that the district court
erred in three respects in awarding summary judgment to the
defendants. First, the plaintiffs contend that the court erred by
rejecting their procedural due process claim. Second, the
12 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
plaintiffs assert that the court erroneously rejected their free
speech claims. Finally, the plaintiffs maintain that the court
erred in failing to strike the memorandum submitted in sup-
port of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We
address these contentions in turn.

A.

The plaintiffs first contend that the district court "should
have provided appropriate relief to the Chapter for having
successfully proved that its due process rights were violated."
Br. of Appellants 22. In order for the plaintiffs to succeed on
their procedural due process claim, they are obliged to show
(1) a cognizable "liberty" or "property" interest; (2) the depri-
vation of that interest by "some form of state action"; and (3)
that the procedures employed were constitutionally inade-
quate. Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167,
172 (4th Cir. 1988).

In assessing a procedural due process claim, "[u]nless there
has been a ‘deprivation’ [of a protected liberty or property
interest] by ‘state action,’ the question of what process is
required . . . is irrelevant, for the constitutional right to ‘due
process’ is simply not implicated." Stone, 855 F.2d at 172.
The plaintiffs assert that the defendants, in sanctioning the
Chapter, deprived it and its members of two constitutionally
protected rights. First, the plaintiffs contend that the Univer-
sity deprived the Chapter of its constitutional liberty interest
in its members’ right to free association by instituting sanc-
tions against the Chapter. Second, the plaintiffs maintain that
the University deprived the Chapter of its property interest in
its "good name, honor, reputation, and integrity" when the
University published the results of the Hearing in a University
newspaper.

1.

We first assess the issue of whether the University deprived
the Chapter and its members of a liberty interest in the right
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 13
to free association. The First Amendment protects two types
of association: intimate association and expressive associa-
tion. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18
(1984). As the Supreme Court has explained, intimate associ-
ation consists of the choice to "enter into and maintain [an]
intimate human relationship[ ]." Id. at 617. The Court has
defined expressive association as the "right to associate for
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the
First Amendment — speech, assembly, petition for the redress
of grievances, and the exercise of religion." Id. at 618. In
these proceedings, the plaintiffs rely solely on the contention,
accepted by the district court, that the Chapter members
engaged in expressive association.

In its summary judgment award to the defendants, the dis-
trict court concluded that the Chapter possessed a protected
liberty interest in the expressive associational right of its
members. See Iota Xi Chapter of the Sigma Chi Fraternity v.
Patterson, 538 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923 (E.D. Va. 2008). The
court explained that "[t]he Chapter has adequately described
its institutional mission to inculcate its members with certain
leadership skills and community values and, as a result, it is
protected by the First Amendment’s expressive associational
right." Id. The court then determined that the defendants had
deprived the Chapter members of their right to free associa-
tion, concluding that prohibiting Chapter members from join-
ing any recognized fraternal organization at the University
"constitute[d] a deprivation of the Chapter members’ right to
expressive association." Id. at 924. Ultimately, however, the
court rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim
because the University’s procedures were constitutionally
adequate and its sanctions were reasonable. See id. at 927.

Although we agree with the district court’s ultimate dispo-
sition of this claim, we do not, after reviewing the record,
adopt its reasoning on the deprivation issue. In concluding
that the defendants had deprived the Chapter members of their
free association right, the court found that the members were
14 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
prohibited from joining any other fraternities on the Univer-
sity campus, erroneously relying on a document entitled
"SUGGESTED SANCTIONS" that was apparently attached
to a "Hearing Report Form" from the University Judicial
Board. See Iota Xi, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 924. As the court
observed, among the suggested sanctions is "‘[a] prohibition
preventing current members of Sigma Chi from belonging to
any fraternal organization recognized by the University.’" Id.
(quoting J.A. 778). Notably, those suggested sanctions are not
the sanctions that the University ultimately imposed. Indeed,
by letter dated May 8, 2006, from Associate Dean Patterson
to the Chapter’s representative, "[t]he following sanctions
were recommended to and accepted by the Judicial Adminis-
trator":

University recognition of Sigma Chi Fraternity is to
be immediately revoked and not reinstated prior to
September 1, 2016. At that time, the fraternity may
apply for university recognition.

The Dean of Students and the Director of Student
Activities are asked to monitor membership in
George Mason University recognized fraternal orga-
nizations to insure that the current membership of
Sigma Chi fraternity does not re-emerge under
another name . . . .

These decisions are to be published as deemed
appropriate by the Dean of Students.

J.A. 779.

The sanction relied on by the district court in its ruling —
that Chapter members are prohibited from joining any frater-
nity — is plainly not among the sanctions imposed by the
University. Nor does the record reflect that any Chapter mem-
bers have been prevented from joining other fraternities.
Rather, the University revoked its recognition of the Chapter
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 15
and then simply sought to ensure that it did not evade the
revocation sanction by reconstituting itself under a different
name. The court thus misapprehended the record in relying on
the proposition that Chapter members are "prohibited from
joining any recognized fraternal organization on the George
Mason campus." Iota Xi, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 924. Moreover,
the plaintiffs have not proffered any other compelling theory
on the deprivation question. In this circumstance, we are con-
tent to conclude — without deciding whether the Chapter pos-
sessed a cognizable liberty interest or whether the University
procedures were constitutionally adequate — that the Univer-
sity did not deprive the Chapter members of any free associa-
tion right.

2.

Because of its disposition of the liberty interest issue, the
district court declined to reach and address the question of
whether the Chapter possessed a property interest in its repu-
tation. See Iota Xi, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 923 n.10. Having dis-
agreed with the court’s reasoning, however, we are obliged to
dispose of that issue.

In this case, the plaintiffs maintain that the University’s
publication in The Mason Gazette that the Chapter had "facili-
tated sexual assaults," J.A. 1173, had the effect of labeling the
Chapter as "a sexual predator," marking the Chapter with a
"badge of disgrace." Br. of Appellants 24. In support of this
contention, the plaintiffs rely on language from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau that, "[w]here
a person’s good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential." 400 U.S. 433,
437 (1971).

Five years after that decision, however, the Court empha-
sized that Constantineau should not be read as broadly as the
plaintiffs now suggest. In Paul v. Davis, the Court made clear
16 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
that there is no constitutional right to be free from stigma. See
424 U.S. 693, 706-10 (1976). Referring to its Constantineau
decision, the Court emphasized that it had "never held that
mere defamation of an individual, whether by branding him
disloyal or otherwise, was sufficient to invoke the guarantees
of procedural due process absent an accompanying loss of
government employment." Id. at 706; see also Siegart v. Gil-
ley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (recognizing that "injury to rep-
utation by itself is not a ‘liberty’ interest protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Johnson v. Morris, 903 F.2d 996,
999 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Publication of stigmatizing charges
alone, without damage to ‘tangible interests such as employ-
ment,’ does not invoke the due process clause." (quoting
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701)).

Put simply, in this case the plaintiffs have identified no
injury to the Chapter — economic or otherwise — resulting
from the University’s published statements in The Mason
Gazette. As such, the plaintiffs have failed to identify a cogni-
zable, constitutionally protected property interest in the Chap-
ter’s reputation. We are thus obliged to affirm on this issue.

B.

The plaintiffs next contend that the district court erred in
awarding summary judgment to the defendants on the free
speech claims. The plaintiffs identify three separate alleged
infringements of the First Amendment. First, the plaintiffs
assert that the defendants punished Chapter members for sing-
ing and dancing in front of the library (the "library claim").
Second, the plaintiffs maintain that the defendants retaliated
against the Chapter for rejecting the University’s pre-Hearing
settlement offer (the "retaliation claim"). And, third, the plain-
tiffs contend that two Chapter members were punished for
displaying Chapter letters on their clothing at the orientation
fair (the "orientation claim"). The court awarded summary
judgment to the defendants on each of these claims, determin-
ing that the Chapter lacked standing to pursue the library
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 17
claim, and that the retaliation claim and the orientation claim
both lacked merit.

First, with regard to the library claim, the district court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the students’ singing and danc-
ing in front of the library was protected speech, but it con-
cluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the claim.
See Iota Xi, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 928. For a plaintiff to possess
standing to pursue a lawsuit, there must be "injury, causation,
and redressability." S.C. Wildlife Fed’n v. Limehouse, 549
F.3d 324, 329 (4th Cir. 2008). "Redressability" requires a
plaintiff to allege that "the asserted injury was the conse-
quence of the defendants’ actions, or that the prospective
relief will remove the harm." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
505 (1975) (emphasis added). It must be "likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).

In these proceedings, as the district court explained, even
if the plaintiffs succeeded on the library claim, they would not
be entitled to relief because "the University’s sanctions are
fully supported by an adequate and independent justification
— the determination that the Chapter irresponsibly hosted two
off-campus parties." Iota Xi, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 928. Thus,
even if the members’ free speech rights were infringed when
they were punished for signing and marching in front of the
library, other adequate grounds existed for the University’s
sanctions, such as the two incidents of sexual assault. As the
court explained,

there was extensive, reliable evidence that underage
George Mason students, including the two female
victims, were served alcohol at two separate
Chapter-sponsored parties and that some students
experienced severe intoxication. Furthermore, . . .
the [Panel] took notice of the earlier disciplinary
findings that two sexual assaults occurred in the
18 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
vicinity of these parties. This record established an
evidentiary basis upon which the [Panel] could rea-
sonably conclude that the events and the atmosphere
of the Chapter-sponsored parties were contributing
factors to the sexual assaults.

Id. at 927. The court emphasized that "it was entirely reason-
able for the University to classify these events as antithetical
to its educational mission and the safety of its students." Id.
Thus, absent the hazing charge, the University’s sanctions on
the Chapter are yet reasonable, and the library claim is not
redressable because a ruling on that claim would not alter that
conclusion. Because the library claim is not redressable, the
plaintiffs lack standing to pursue it, and we must affirm the
court’s ruling.

Second, the district court concluded that the retaliation
claim lacked merit because "the University is entitled to
impose any sanction permitted by its own rules and regula-
tions." Iota Xi, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 928. The University, the
court explained, was entitled to offer a lesser punishment to
the Chapter, and then impose a harsher penalty after its more
lenient offer was rejected and the Hearing concluded. The
court correctly observed that such an offer is analogous to a
prosecutor’s offer to a criminal defendant. "In the criminal
context," the court explained, "a prosecutor is free to indict a
defendant on more serious charges if the defendant insists on
his right to a jury trial." Id. at 928 n.20. Here, the University
offered the Chapter a more lenient punishment if it would set-
tle, and the Chapter refused that offer. The plaintiffs have
failed to identify how their rights have been contravened, and
summary judgment was therefore also appropriate on the
retaliation claim.

Third, regarding the orientation claim, the district court
ruled that there was no genuine issue of material fact because
the proper party was not named as a defendant. See Iota Xi,
538 F. Supp. 2d at 929. H. David Shaw, the University’s
 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON 19
Director of Judicial Affairs, was the University official who
conducted the hearing concerning these incidents, and who
also administratively adjudicated the ensuing charges. Thus,
Shaw was the official who inflicted the alleged constitutional
injury on the plaintiffs. In order to obtain relief on that claim,
the plaintiffs should have named Shaw as a defendant, and
their failure to do so entitles the existing defendants to judg-
ment as a matter of law on the orientation claim. Cf. Moore
v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he right
defendants in a § 1983 suit are the persons whose wrongful
acts harmed the plaintiff.").

C.

Finally, we briefly examine the plaintiffs’ contention that
the district court erred in refusing to strike the memorandum
that the defendants submitted in support of their summary
judgment motion. The defendants’ memorandum consisted of
thirty-two pages, exceeding the thirty-page limit specified in
the court’s local rules. In response, the court struck the last
two pages of the memorandum.6

Pursuant to Local Rule 7(F)(3) of the Eastern District of
Virginia, "[a]ll briefs, including footnotes . . . shall not exceed
thirty (30) . . . pages double-spaced." The plaintiffs’ rely on
the rule’s use of the word "shall," asserting that it means that
the district court lacked the discretion to impose any sanction
other than striking the defendants’ entire memorandum. Thus,
they contend, striking the entire submission was the only per-
missible and appropriate remedy.
6
In striking the last two pages of the defendants’ memorandum, the dis-
trict court apparently also struck the page containing the signature of
counsel. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ summary judgment
submission therefore lacked a signature, and, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, the entire memorandum should have been stricken. Put sim-
ply, we deem this contention to be meritless. The memorandum was prop-
erly signed by counsel when it was submitted to the district court, and thus
complied with Rule 11.
20 IOTA XI v. PATTERSON
In these proceedings, the district court acted well within its
discretion in fashioning a sanction for the defendants’ failure
to comply with Rule 7(F)(3). "It has long been recognized,"
we have explained, "that federal courts possess certain
implied inherent powers that ‘are necessary to the exercise of
all others.’" United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 236
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). Although Rule 7(F)(3) utilizes man-
datory language, it does not specify any particular sanction for
a party’s noncompliance, and the court was entitled to rely on
its inherent authority to fashion an appropriate sanction.7 The
court exercised that discretion by striking the last two pages
of the defendants’ memorandum, and the plaintiffs have failed
to show how the court abused its discretion in that respect.
See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 361 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir.
2004) ("Within wide limits, it is for courts, not litigants, to
decide what rules are desirable and how rigorously to enforce
them." (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, this
final contention must also be rejected.

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.

AFFIRMED

7
To support their contention, the plaintiffs rely on the district court deci-
sion in United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 472 F.
Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Va. 2007), which struck a party’s entire brief for fail-
ure to comply with the page limit restrictions specified in the local rules.
In Custer Battles, the court struck the plaintiffs’ response briefs because,
rather than submit a single thirty-page brief, they had submitted two briefs
that totaled forty-five pages. See Custer Battles, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 792-
93. Although the court struck both briefs, its decision was an exercise of
its discretion, rather than an application of a strict mandate spelled out in
the local rules.