UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4469
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID MURPHY, JR.,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (0:05-cr-01224-MBS-1)
Submitted: April 29, 2009 Decided: May 20, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Redmond, REDMOND LAW FIRM, Charleston, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Jimmie Ewing, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, Christopher Todd Hagins, SOUTH
CAROLINA LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Murphy, Jr., appeals his conviction and
240-month sentence after pleading guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or
more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
846 (2006). Murphy’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he states
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but raises several
claims suggested by Murphy. Murphy filed a pro se supplemental
brief challenging his sentence and the district court’s refusal
to appoint him new counsel. The Government declined to file a
responsive brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for review.
The record confirms that the district court conducted a thorough
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, assuring that Murphy’s plea was
knowing and voluntary in all respects. Moreover, Murphy’s
claims pertaining to his Guidelines range calculation and the
crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity are immaterial
because Murphy was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence for his crime. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)
(providing for a statutory mandatory minimum twenty-year
sentence if the defendant possesses a prior conviction for a
felony drug offense that has become final). Because it was
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undisputed that Murphy possessed a prior felony drug conviction,
and since there existed no basis on which the district court
could depart from the mandatory minimum, we find that his
240-month sentence is per se reasonable. See United States v.
Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
743 (2008).
We also reject Murphy’s contention that the district
court erred when it refused to appoint him new counsel. While
the Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the counsel of
his choosing, “the right to counsel of choice does not extend to
defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 151 (2006).
Because Murphy’s objections pertaining to his attorney failed to
establish a conflict that resulted in a “total lack of
communication,” United States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th
Cir. 2004), we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his requests. Moreover, to the extent
that Murphy’s assertions could be construed as an attempt to
assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims, his claims are
not cognizable on direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523
F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir.) (holding that an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim is not cognizable on direct appeal “unless it
conclusively appears from the record that defense counsel did
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not provide effective representation”) (internal citation
omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
This court requires that counsel inform Murphy, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Murphy requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Murphy. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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