UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4694
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FRANK WOOD THOMAS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:05-cr-00104-FDW-CH-19)
Submitted: March 12, 2009 Decided: May 18, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas A. Will, Jr., THE LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS A. WILL, JR.,
Gastonia, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a lengthy trial, Frank Wood Thomas was
convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Thomas was sentenced by
the district court to the statutory mandatory minimum of 240
months’ imprisonment, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006).
Finding no error, we affirm.
Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are
no meritorious issues for appeal but questions whether the
district court erred in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion
for judgment of acquittal. Thomas filed a pro se supplemental
brief, joining in counsel’s argument. The Government elected
not to file a responding brief.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2006). “In conducting such
review, we must uphold a jury verdict if there is substantial
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
to support it.” Id. Both direct and circumstantial evidence
are considered, and the government is permitted “all reasonable
inferences that could be drawn in its favor.” United States v.
Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). The defendant “must
2
carry an imposing burden to successfully challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d
281, 288 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
238 (2008).
To prove conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute a controlled substance, the
government must establish that: (1) two or more persons agreed
to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute the
substance; “‘(2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and
(3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of
this conspiracy.’” United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d 220,
225-26 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,
857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 137
(2008). The defendant may be convicted of conspiracy without
knowing all the conspiracy’s details, so long as the defendant
enters the conspiracy understanding its unlawful nature and
willfully joins in the plan on at least one occasion. Burgos,
94 F.3d at 858.
With these standards in mind, our thorough review of
the trial transcript convinces us that Thomas was involved in
“‘a loosely-knit association of members linked . . . by their
mutual interest in sustaining the overall enterprise of catering
to the ultimate demands of a particular drug consumption
market’” — Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Burgos, 94 F.3d
3
at 858 (quoting United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th
Cir. 1993)). “[W]hile many conspiracies are executed with
precision, the fact that a conspiracy is loosely-knit,
haphazard, or ill-conceived does not render it any less a
conspiracy — or any less unlawful.” Id. We therefore conclude
that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. To the extent Thomas argues the Government’s case
rested in large part on the unreliable testimony of the
cooperating witnesses, it is not the province of this court to
second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder.
See United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 283 (4th Cir. 2007).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We deny Thomas’s motion for remand. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are
4
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5