UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4895
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE JERMAINE HODGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:08-cr-00059-BR-1)
Submitted: May 21, 2009 Decided: May 26, 2009
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance Jermaine Hodge pled guilty to possessing with
intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The district court
sentenced him as a career offender to 300 months' imprisonment,
in the middle of the advisory guidelines range. On appeal,
counsel has filed an Anders * brief, stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether Hodge’s
sentence is reasonable. Hodge was informed of his right to file
a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government
has moved to dismiss the appeal, in part, based upon Hodge’s
waiver of appellate rights as to his sentence. We grant the
Government’s motion and affirm in part and dismiss in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that
waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Poindexter,
492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Generally, if the district
court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his
right to appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the
waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v. Johnson,
410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wessells,
936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). The question of whether a
defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a question of
*
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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law that we review de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d
162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Hodge knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his
sentence. Moreover, the sole sentencing issue he raises on
appeal falls within the scope of the waiver. We therefore grant
the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss this
portion of the appeal.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
precludes our review of the sentence, the waiver does not
preclude our review of any errors in Hodge’s conviction that may
be revealed by our review pursuant to Anders. Our review of the
transcript of the plea colloquy convinces us that the district
court fully complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting
Hodge’s guilty plea. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d
114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). Thus, we affirm Hodge's
conviction.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues not
covered by the waiver. We therefore affirm Hodge’s conviction
and dismiss the appeal of his sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
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counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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