UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4884
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
BURNETT TRIONE SHACKLEFORD,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:06-cr-00206-TLW-1)
Submitted: May 29, 2009 Decided: June 19, 2009
Before TRAXLER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua Snow Kendrick, JOSHUA SNOW KENDRICK, PC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Burnett Trione Shackleford pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more
of cocaine base and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2000). The district
court sentenced Shackleford to 264 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
Shackleford’s guilty plea and whether its sentence is
reasonable. Shackleford filed a pro se brief raising several
issues. We affirm.
Because Shackleford did not move in the district court
to withdraw his guilty plea, his challenge to the adequacy of
the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States
v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of
the transcript of the plea hearing leads us to conclude that the
district court substantially complied with the mandates of Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Shackleford’s guilty plea and that
the court’s omissions did not affect Shackleford’s substantial
rights. Critically, the transcript reveals that the district
court ensured the plea was supported by an independent factual
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basis and that Shackleford entered the plea knowingly and
voluntarily with an understanding of the consequences. See
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir.
1991). Further, Shackleford does not suggest that he would have
declined to plead guilty had the district court’s Rule 11
colloquy been more exacting. Accordingly, we discern no plain
error.
We review Shackleford’s sentence under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
586, 597 (2007). The first step in this review requires us to
ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Id. We
then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.
Id. When reviewing a sentence on appeal, we presume that a
sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is
reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007);
United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here, the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range and gave the parties an opportunity to
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argue for whatever sentence they deemed appropriate. The
district court also heard allocution from Shackleford,
considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and sentenced
Shackleford within his advisory Guidelines range of 262 to 327
months’ imprisonment. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Shackleford. Finally, after review of Shackleford’s
pro se supplemental brief, we conclude it raises no meritorious
issues for appeal.
We have examined the entire record in this case in
accordance with the requirements of Anders, and we find no
meritorious issues for appeal. * Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Shackleford, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Shackleford requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
on Shackleford. We dispense with oral argument because the
*
This case was held in abeyance for United States v.
Antonio, 311 F. App’x 679 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). This
court’s decision in Antonio supports our analysis of
Shackleford’s case.
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facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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