Rendelman v. Rouse

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT LEWIS RENDELMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NANCY ROUSE, Warden; SCOTT
STEININGER, CDRM Correctional
Dietary Regional Manager;  No. 08-6150
CAROLYN THOMAS, Food Service
Administrator, all defendants
individually and in their official
capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-00580-JFM)

Argued: March 25, 2009

Decided: June 25, 2009

Before MICHAEL, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by published opinion.
Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and
Judge Agee joined.
2 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Timothy McGinn, DUKE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Phillip M. Pickus, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appel-
lees. ON BRIEF: James E. Coleman, Jr., Sean E. Andrussier,
James Healy, Matthew Levy, Susan Pourciau, DUKE UNI-
VERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Mary-
land, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:

Scott Rendelman appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Maryland Division of Corrections
(MDOC) officials on his claims under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While incarcerated in
MDOC, Rendelman brought this action against the Correc-
tional Dietary Regional Manager, the Food Service Adminis-
trator, and the Warden at Maryland Correctional Institution –
Hagerstown (MCI-H). Rendelman sued all defendants in their
official and individual capacities, seeking injunctive relief and
damages under RLUIPA and § 1983 based on defendants’
refusal to make any accommodation for his kosher dietary
restrictions. The district court resolved the action on the mer-
its, holding that Rendelman was not entitled to relief under
RLUIPA or § 1983.

Rendelman limits his appeal to the RLUIPA claims. His
recent transfer into federal custody, however, has rendered
moot his claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA. With
respect to damages, we have held previously that RLUIPA
 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE 3
does not authorize a claim for money damages against an offi-
cial sued in her official capacity. Today we hold that, when
invoked as a spending clause statute, RLUIPA does not autho-
rize a claim for money damages against an official sued in her
individual capacity. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment insofar as it rejects Rendelman’s claim for damages.

I.

Rendelman is an Orthodox Jew whose religious beliefs
require him to abide by kosher dietary laws. On January 18,
2006, Rendelman arrived at MDOC to begin service of his
sentence; he was housed temporarily at the Reception Center
before being transferred on January 30, 2006, to MCI-H.
MDOC offers its inmates a choice of two diets: a pork-free
regular diet and a lacto-ovo vegetarian diet. Although the
diets are designed "to accommodate a broad spectrum of reli-
gious practices," J.A. 30, neither diet complies with the laws
of kashrut (the rules derived from the Torah governing the
eating of food). As a result, in order for Rendelman to follow
the dictates of his religion, he is unable to eat many of the
items served on either menu, including any foods cooked at
the prison.

Immediately upon his incarceration and prior to his transfer
to MCI-H, Rendelman requested that prison authorities make
certain accommodations for his religious dietary limitations.
He was informed by the chaplain that a kosher diet was
unavailable. Following his transfer to MCI-H, Rendelman
again requested a kosher diet or reasonable accommodation
for his religious requirements. On February 14, 2006, Rendel-
man sent a handwritten letter to Scott Steininger, the Correc-
tional Dietary Regional Manager, asking to speak to him
about his religious dietary needs. Rendelman wrote that the
Inmate Handbook he received specifically provided, under the
heading "Religious Diets," that "[t]he master menu . . . is
designed to accommodate substitutions or alternate food
selections, extra portions of acceptable menu items, etc. to
4 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE
conform to religious diets," and Rendelman inquired as to
how this policy worked in practice. J.A. 28. He explained that
due to his kosher dietary restrictions he was unable to eat
most of the available foods and that "medical" had docu-
mented that he had already "lost 23 pounds because there are
so few items on the regular tray [he could] eat." Id. On the
same day Rendelman initiated an administrative grievance
process by submitting an informal inmate complaint form. In
the complaint Rendelman quoted the same passage from the
Inmate Handbook and explained that he had been "repeatedly
denied extra portions of items [he could] eat, such as dry
cereal" and that he "need[ed] certain items served on paper
plates" to comply with his religious dietary restrictions. J.A.
26.

The next day, February 15, 2006, Steininger spoke with
Rendelman and "told him that it was his choice not to eat the
food [and] that we do not substitute other food." J.A. 27. The
staff response to Rendelman’s complaint, dated February 16,
acknowledged the language in the Inmate Handbook but simi-
larly explained that "we do not substitute[;] it is up to the
Inmate whether he wants [the] meal or not." J.A. 26.

Rendelman continued to seek relief through the administra-
tive grievance process. He repeatedly requested that MDOC
adhere to the policy stated in the Inmate Handbook and permit
him to "assemble a common fare tray from the mainline fare."
J.A. 33. He also informed MDOC that "[m]any mainline fare
items are kosher if served on paper plates." Id. He was clear
throughout the process that he was "not demanding a kosher
diet line or that any special food be ordered for him." J.A. 39.
In April 2006 Rendelman requested that his complaint be
"handled expeditiously" due to the fact that his "health is at
risk." J.A. 40. He noted that he weighed 154 pounds at his
DOC intake physical but had already lost 30 pounds. In
response to Rendelman’s concerns about weight loss, Stein-
inger wrote in May 2006 that Rendelman, who weighed 128
pounds, "presently falls within the normal limits for his
 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE 5
height": 125-163 pounds for a person who is 5’8". J.A. 58.
Steininger further responded that:

If he has experienced a great deal of weight loss in
a short period of time, I would recommend he be put
on a High Calorie diet, though inmate Rendelman’s
issue has not been a matter of enough calories on the
Regular diet, but rather a refusal to eat certain foods
on this diet.

Id.

Rendelman eventually exhausted his administrative reme-
dies in February 2007, more than a year after the filing of his
initial complaint. He then filed this action pro se on March 7,
2007, in the District of Maryland. Rendelman’s complaint
named as defendants DOC Correctional Dietary Regional
Manager Steininger, Food Service Administrator Carolyn
Thomas, and MCI-H Warden Nancy Rouse. Rendelman
claimed that defendants’ failure to make any accommodations
for his religious dietary restrictions substantially burdened his
religious practices in violation of RLUIPA and § 1983.
Defendants were sued in both their official and individual
capacities. In his prayer for relief Rendelman sought an order
"to make reasonable accommodation for diet of kosher food"
and "damages $300 per day" for the "ongoing" violation. J.A.
8.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Defen-
dants argued, among other things, that Rendelman had failed
to state a claim under RLUIPA and § 1983.

The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the merits, holding that their actions had not vio-
lated the First Amendment or RLUIPA and that Rendelman
was therefore not entitled to any form of relief. The court
relied on Wilkerson v. Beitzel, 2005 WL 5280675 (D. Md.
6 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE
2005), aff’d, 184 F. App’x (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished), in
concluding that MDOC was not obligated under RLUIPA to
accommodate Rendelman’s request for a kosher diet. See
Rendelman v. Rouse, No. 07-cv-580 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 2007).
Rendelman appeals the court’s ruling on his RLUIPA claim,
and we review that ruling de novo. Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d
348, 353 (4th Cir. 2007).

II.

RLUIPA provides that:

No government shall impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997
of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the government demon-
strates that imposition of the burden on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernment interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of further-
ing that compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006). The term "government" as
used in § 2000cc-1 is defined broadly to include:

(i) a State, county, municipality, or other govern-
mental entity created under the authority of a State;

(ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality,
or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and

(iii) any other person acting under color of State
law[.]

Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A).
 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE 7
The protections of § 2000cc-1(a) apply whenever a "sub-
stantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that
receives Federal financial assistance" or whenever a "substan-
tial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the sev-
eral States, or with Indian tribes." Id. § 2000cc-1(b)(1), (2). It
is undisputed that Rendelman is in a program receiving fed-
eral financial assistance, and he bases the applicability of
RLUIPA on this fact.

Rendelman contends in his complaint and on appeal that
defendants’ refusal to make any accommodation for his reli-
gious dietary restrictions imposed a substantial burden on his
religious exercise in violation of § 2000cc-1(a) of RLUIPA,
and that he is therefore entitled to injunctive and monetary
relief. We consider his requests for an injunction and damages
separately.

A.

Defendants argue initially that Rendelman’s claim for
injunctive relief was mooted by his recent transfer out of
MDOC custody. After Rendelman filed his appeal in this
case, he was convicted on several counts of mailing threaten-
ing communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), and he
was thereafter transferred to a federal prison. He is currently
serving a sentence of 180 months in federal custody and has
appealed his federal conviction and sentence.

Defendants are correct that, as a general rule, a prisoner’s
transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incar-
ceration there. See Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87
(4th Cir. 2007); see also Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820,
823 (4th Cir. 1991) (transfer rendered moot a prisoner’s
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, but not claims for
damages); Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048 n.1 (4th Cir.
1986) (same).
8 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE
Rendelman nevertheless contends that his injunctive relief
claim is not moot in this case because it is capable of repeti-
tion yet evading review. Rendelman points out that he has an
appeal pending in this court challenging his conviction and
sentence, and he asserts that he could be returned to MDOC
custody if his appeal is successful. To support his argument
that his transfer to federal custody may not moot his claim for
injunctive relief, Rendelman relies on a single case, Withers
v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980).

The holding in Withers is not applicable, however, to Ren-
delman’s situation. In Withers an inmate brought a § 1983
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on sex-
ual assaults occurring during his temporary confinement on
"idle tier," an initial 60- to 90-day confinement for prisoners
pending assignment to a prison job and regular housing. The
court reasoned that Withers’ claims arising from his residence
on idle tier were capable of repetition, explaining that:

Withers had been twice transferred to [the Maryland
House of Corrections (MHC)], and each time
became the victim of a sexual assault. He is still in
Maryland’s prison system, and, since he had been
previously considered appropriate for minimum cus-
tody housing, he again may be transferred to MHC.
Such a retransfer cannot be said to be purely specu-
lative, and, from Withers’ point of view, there is a
reasonable expectation that he again may be sub-
jected to the same action.

Id. at 161. The court further concluded that Withers’ claims
tended to evade review because the limited duration of a pris-
oner’s residence on idle tier "does not provide sufficient time
to litigate the adequacy of measures to provide such prisoners
as Withers with reasonable protection." Id. Rendelman’s case
is different. If he were to be returned to MCI-H, he would
have sufficient opportunity to re-initiate an action seeking
injunctive relief. Thus, even if Rendelman’s injunction claim
 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE 9
is capable of repetition, it is unlikely that it would persist in
evading judicial review.

Defendants have also brought to our attention a recent deci-
sion by the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Cor-
rectional Services (of which MDOC is a division) to change
its inmate food policies to allow for a religious diet consistent
with kosher dietary restrictions. Assuming the change is
implemented as planned, the provision of a kosher diet would
make it unnecessary for Rendelman to relitigate his claim for
injunctive relief even if he were eventually returned to
MDOC custody.

For these reasons, we conclude that Rendelman’s claim for
injunctive relief is moot.

B.

Although Rendelman’s transfer out of MDOC custody
mooted his claim for injunctive relief, his complaint also
included a claim for damages. We have previously held that
even if a plaintiff’s injunctive relief claim has been mooted,
the action is not moot if the plaintiff may be "entitled to at
least nominal damages." Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City
of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 429 n.4 (4th Cir. 2007); see
also Williams, 952 F.2d at 823; Taylor, 781 F.2d at 1048 n.1.
Rendelman’s action is therefore not moot if we conclude that
he may be entitled to at least nominal damages.

Rendelman seeks damages against defendants in both their
official and individual capacities. In Madison v. Virginia, 474
F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006), we held that RLUIPA does not
authorize claims for money damages against an official who
is sued in her official capacity. Viewing RLUIPA’s judicial
relief language through the lens of Virginia’s assertion of
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, we held that
"Congress unambiguously conditioned federal funds on a
State’s consent to suit." Id. at 122. However, we further held
10 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE
that Congress failed to "clearly and unequivocally" indicate
that the waiver of sovereign immunity extended to money
damages. Id. at 122-23. The question of whether an RLUIPA
plaintiff may pursue a claim for money damages against a
government official in her individual capacity was left unre-
solved in Madison, and also in Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174,
196 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006), issued the same day as Madison.

1.

Defendants contend that, as an exercise of Congress’
spending clause authority, RLUIPA cannot authorize damage
actions against private individuals who are not themselves
recipients of federal funding. For this proposition defendants
cite Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, in
which the Supreme Court explained that:

[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power
is much in the nature of a contract: in return for fed-
eral funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’
power to legislate under the spending power thus
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the "contract." . . . Accordingly,
if Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambigu-
ously.

451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Because we agree with defendants that
Pennhurst’s clear notice requirement resolves whether defen-
dants in this case may be held liable for damages in their indi-
vidual capacities, we need not consider defendants’ broader
assertion that a spending clause statute could in no instance
condition a state’s acceptance of federal funds on the creation
of an individual capacity damages action.1
1
The Supreme Court outlined the limitations on Congress’ spending
clause power in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). First, "the
 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE 11
Section 2000cc-2 of RLUIPA, entitled "Judicial relief,"
provides that "[a] person may assert a violation of this chapter
as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
2(a) (2006). As noted above, the term "government" is
defined to include "any . . . person acting under color of State
law." Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii).

Assuming without deciding that Congress could condition
a state’s acceptance of federal funds on the state subjecting its
officials to liability for damages in their individual capacities,
we must nevertheless determine whether § 2000cc-2(a) "fur-
nishes clear notice" of a congressional intent to do so in
RLUIPA. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006). Legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress’ spending power has previously been held to autho-
rize damages actions against state entities receiving federal
funds. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503
U.S. 60 (1992) (authorizing damages actions against school
districts for intentional violations of Title IX, a spending
clause statute); id. at 70 (noting that "a clear majority [of the
justices in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of
New York City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983),] expressed the view that
damages were available under Title VI [a spending clause
statute] in an action seeking remedies for an intentional viola-
tion"); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (holding
that "the remedies for violations of . . . § 504 of the Rehabili-

exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of ‘the general wel-
fare.’" Id. at 207. Second, where Congress seeks to condition the states’
receipt of federal funds, it "must do so unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences
of their participation." Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). Third,
"conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’" Dole, 483
U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)). And finally, "other constitutional provisions
may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds."
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
12 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE
tation Act [a spending clause statute] are coextensive with the
remedies available in a private cause of action brought under
Title VI"). Our research suggests, however, that it would be
a novel use of the spending clause to condition the receipt of
federal funds on the creation of an individual capacity dam-
ages action; we can find no instance in which the spending
clause has been used in this manner.

When Congress desires to impose a condition under the
spending clause, "it is Congress’ burden to ‘affirmatively
impos[e]’ [the] ‘condition in clear and unmistakable statutory
terms.’" Madison, 474 F.3d at 125 (quoting Va. Dep’t of
Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 563 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(second alteration added)). We conclude therefore that in sim-
ply defining "government" in § 2000cc-2 to include a "person
acting under color of State law," Congress did not signal with
sufficient clarity an intent to subject such a person to an indi-
vidual capacity damages claim under RLUIPA. See Penn-
hurst, 451 U.S. at 17; Madison, 474 F.3d at 125 ("States
cannot, of course, knowingly accept conditions of which they
are unaware or cannot reasonably ascertain."). Hence, Rendel-
man cannot rely on RLUIPA’s spending clause basis to pur-
sue his claim for individual capacity damages.

2.

RLUIPA also purports to have an independent commerce
clause basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b) (RLUIPA applies
whenever "the substantial burden affects, or removal of that
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign
nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes"). In
this case, however, Rendelman has claimed RLUIPA jurisdic-
tion exclusively under § 2000cc-1(b)(1), explaining in his
complaint that "[M]DOC receives federal funds." J.A. 8. He
did not advance any claim that the substantial burden on his
religious exercise caused by the denial of accommodations for
his kosher dietary requirements would "affect . . . commerce
with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian
 RENDELMAN v. ROUSE 13
tribes." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(2). Consequently, the inde-
pendent commerce clause basis for RLUIPA is not properly
before the court on this appeal, and we need not resolve
whether the statute, analyzed under the commerce clause,
would authorize individual capacity damages actions.

III.

In sum, Rendelman’s appeal of his claim for injunctive
relief is dismissed as moot due to his transfer into federal cus-
tody. The district court’s summary judgment in favor of
defendants is affirmed insofar as it rejects Rendelman’s claim
for damages.2

DISMISSED IN PART
AND AFFIRMED IN PART

2
Because RLUIPA does not authorize claims for official or individual
capacity damages, we have no need to evaluate the district court’s deter-
mination that RLUIPA did not require defendants to accommodate Ren-
delman’s kosher dietary restrictions.